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Attack Tree Analysis for emilk/egui

Objective: Execute Arbitrary Code OR Exfiltrate Sensitive Data via egui

Attack Tree Visualization

Attacker Goal: Execute Arbitrary Code OR Exfiltrate Sensitive Data via egui

├── 1. Execute Arbitrary Code
│   ├── 1.1 Exploit Deserialization Vulnerabilities (if custom data loading is used with egui) [HIGH RISK]
│   │   ├── 1.1.1  Craft malicious serialized data that, when deserialized by egui's context or components, triggers unintended code execution. [CRITICAL]
│   │   │   └── 1.1.1.1 Identify unsafe deserialization patterns in how the application integrates with egui's data persistence features (if any).
│   └── 1.4 Exploit Weaknesses in Custom `egui` Integrations [HIGH RISK]
│       ├── 1.4.1  If the application uses custom `egui` widgets or rendering, analyze these for vulnerabilities. [CRITICAL]
│       │   └── 1.4.1.1  Review custom widget code for common programming errors (e.g., buffer overflows, integer overflows, logic errors).
│       └── 1.4.2  If the application uses `egui`'s raw input handling, analyze this for vulnerabilities. [CRITICAL]
│           └── 1.4.2.1  Ensure proper sanitization and validation of raw input data before passing it to `egui`.
│
└── 2. Exfiltrate Sensitive Data
    └── 2.3 Exploit Weaknesses in Data Handling within Custom Widgets [HIGH RISK]
        ├── 2.3.1 If custom widgets handle sensitive data, analyze them for vulnerabilities that could lead to data leakage. [CRITICAL]
        │   └── 2.3.1.1 Review custom widget code for proper data handling practices, ensuring that sensitive data is not exposed unnecessarily.
        └── 2.3.2 If custom widgets store or transmit data, ensure secure practices are followed. [CRITICAL]
            └── 2.3.2.1 Implement encryption and secure communication protocols where necessary.

Attack Tree Path: 1. Execute Arbitrary Code

  • 1.1 Exploit Deserialization Vulnerabilities (High Risk):

    • Description: This attack vector targets applications that use egui in conjunction with custom data loading and deserialization. If the application deserializes data from untrusted sources without proper validation, an attacker can craft malicious serialized data that, when processed, triggers unintended code execution within the application's context.
    • 1.1.1 Craft malicious serialized data (Critical):
      • Attack Steps:
        1. The attacker identifies the serialization format used by the application (e.g., JSON, bincode, YAML).
        2. The attacker analyzes the application's code (or uses reverse engineering) to understand how the deserialized data is used.
        3. The attacker crafts a malicious payload that, when deserialized, creates objects or calls functions in a way that leads to unintended code execution. This might involve exploiting known vulnerabilities in the serialization library or leveraging application-specific logic flaws.
        4. The attacker delivers the malicious payload to the application (e.g., through a file upload, network request, or user input).
      • Mitigation:
        • Avoid Untrusted Deserialization: Do not deserialize data from untrusted sources if at all possible.
        • Use Safe Deserialization Libraries: If deserialization is necessary, use a well-vetted and secure deserialization library. Consider alternatives to serde if its default behavior is deemed too risky for the specific use case.
        • Validate Deserialized Data: Thoroughly validate all data after deserialization and before using it. This includes checking data types, ranges, and relationships between values.
        • Principle of Least Privilege: Run the application with the minimum necessary privileges to limit the impact of a successful exploit.

Attack Tree Path: 1.4 Exploit Weaknesses in Custom egui Integrations (High Risk):

  • Description: This attack vector focuses on vulnerabilities introduced by the application's own code that extends or integrates with egui. Custom widgets, rendering logic, and raw input handling are all potential areas of concern.
    • 1.4.1 Analyze custom widgets/rendering (Critical):
      • Attack Steps:
        1. The attacker identifies any custom egui widgets or rendering logic used by the application.
        2. The attacker analyzes the source code (if available) or uses reverse engineering techniques to understand the implementation.
        3. The attacker looks for common programming errors, such as:
          • Buffer Overflows: Writing data beyond the allocated size of a buffer.
          • Integer Overflows: Performing arithmetic operations that result in values exceeding the maximum (or minimum) representable value for a given integer type.
          • Logic Errors: Flaws in the code's logic that can lead to unexpected behavior or vulnerabilities.
          • Use-after-free: Accessing memory that has already been freed.
          • Unsafe unsafe code: Misuse of Rust's unsafe keyword.
        4. The attacker crafts input or interactions that trigger the identified vulnerability, potentially leading to code execution.
      • Mitigation:
        • Thorough Code Review: Conduct rigorous code reviews of all custom egui code, paying close attention to potential security vulnerabilities.
        • Use Safe Coding Practices: Follow secure coding guidelines for Rust, including proper memory management, input validation, and error handling.
        • Fuzzing: Use fuzzing techniques to test custom widgets and rendering logic with a wide range of inputs to identify potential crashes or unexpected behavior.
        • Static Analysis: Employ static analysis tools to automatically detect potential vulnerabilities in the code.
    • 1.4.2 Analyze raw input handling (Critical):
      • Attack Steps:
        1. The attacker identifies if the application uses egui's raw input handling capabilities.
        2. The attacker analyzes how the raw input data is processed and used within the application.
        3. The attacker crafts malicious input data that bypasses any existing validation or sanitization checks.
        4. The attacker delivers the malicious input to the application.
        5. The malicious input is processed by egui or the application's custom code, potentially triggering a vulnerability (e.g., a buffer overflow or an injection attack).
      • Mitigation:
        • Strict Input Validation: Implement rigorous input validation before passing any raw input data to egui or any other part of the application. Validate data types, lengths, ranges, and allowed characters.
        • Sanitization: Sanitize input data to remove or escape any potentially harmful characters or sequences.
        • Input Whitelisting: Define a whitelist of allowed input values or patterns and reject anything that doesn't match.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exfiltrate Sensitive Data

  • 2.3 Exploit Weaknesses in Data Handling within Custom Widgets (High Risk):

    • Description: This attack vector targets custom egui widgets that handle sensitive data. If these widgets are not implemented securely, they could leak data to an attacker.
    • 2.3.1 Analyze custom widgets for data leakage (Critical):
      • Attack Steps:
        1. The attacker identifies custom egui widgets that handle sensitive data (e.g., passwords, personal information, financial data).
        2. The attacker analyzes the source code (if available) or uses reverse engineering to understand how the data is handled.
        3. The attacker looks for vulnerabilities that could lead to data leakage, such as:
          • Improper Data Storage: Storing sensitive data in insecure locations (e.g., unencrypted files, insecure memory).
          • Inadvertent Logging: Logging sensitive data to files or consoles.
          • Unprotected Data Transmission: Sending sensitive data over unencrypted network connections.
          • Side-Channel Attacks: Leaking information through observable behavior (e.g., timing differences, power consumption).
        4. The attacker exploits the identified vulnerability to access or intercept the sensitive data.
      • Mitigation:
        • Secure Data Handling Practices: Follow secure coding guidelines for handling sensitive data, including proper storage, transmission, and disposal.
        • Data Minimization: Only store and process the minimum amount of sensitive data necessary.
        • Avoid Logging Sensitive Data: Do not log sensitive data to files, consoles, or other insecure locations.
        • Code Review: Conduct thorough code reviews of custom widgets to ensure that they handle sensitive data securely.
    • 2.3.2 Ensure secure data storage/transmission (Critical):
      • Attack Steps:
        1. The attacker identifies how custom widgets store or transmit data.
        2. The attacker checks if sensitive data is stored or transmitted securely.
        3. If data is not stored or transmitted securely, the attacker can intercept or access it.
      • Mitigation:
        • Encryption: Encrypt sensitive data both at rest (when stored) and in transit (when transmitted over a network). Use strong, well-vetted encryption algorithms.
        • Secure Communication Protocols: Use secure communication protocols (e.g., HTTPS, TLS) to protect data transmitted over a network.
        • Secure Storage: Store sensitive data in secure locations, such as encrypted databases or secure key management systems.
        • Regular Security Audits: Conduct regular security audits to identify and address potential vulnerabilities in data storage and transmission.