attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for facebook/relay

Objective: CRITICAL NODE: Compromise Relay Application (Critical Goal)

Attack Tree Visualization

Root Goal: CRITICAL NODE: Compromise Relay Application

AND
├── **High-Risk Path:** Exploit GraphQL Layer Vulnerabilities **CRITICAL NODE:** (Primary Attack Surface)
│   ├── **High-Risk Path:** GraphQL Introspection Abuse **CRITICAL NODE:** (Information Gathering Entry Point)
│   │   └── Goal: Discover schema details to aid further attacks
│   │       └── Method: Access `/graphql` endpoint with introspection query
│   │       └── Method: Analyze schema for sensitive data, mutations, and weak points
│   ├── **High-Risk Path:** Complex/Malicious GraphQL Queries **CRITICAL NODE:** (Direct Impact on Availability and Data)
│   │   └── Goal: Overload server or extract excessive data
│   │       └── Method: Craft deeply nested queries
│   │       └── Method: Send queries with computationally expensive resolvers
│   │       └── Method: Exploit missing query complexity limits **CRITICAL NODE:** (Easy DoS Vulnerability)
│   │       └── Method: Use aliasing and fragments to request large datasets
│   ├── **High-Risk Path:** GraphQL Field Authorization Bypass **CRITICAL NODE:** (Direct Access to Sensitive Data)
│   │   └── Goal: Access data fields without proper authorization
│   │       └── Method: Exploit misconfigured/missing field-level authorization **CRITICAL NODE:** (Common Authorization Weakness)
│   │       └── Method: Manipulate query structure to bypass authorization checks
│
AND
├── **High-Risk Path:** Insecure GraphQL Endpoint Configuration **CRITICAL NODE:** (Configuration Weakness - Easy to Exploit)
│   └── Goal: Access sensitive information or functionalities due to misconfigured GraphQL endpoint
│       └── Method: Exposed GraphQL endpoint without proper authentication/authorization **CRITICAL NODE:** (Critical Misconfiguration)
│       └── Method: Enabled introspection in production environment

Attack Tree Path: Exploit GraphQL Layer Vulnerabilities CRITICAL NODE: (Primary Attack Surface)

├── High-Risk Path: GraphQL Introspection Abuse CRITICAL NODE: (Information Gathering Entry Point) │ │ └── Goal: Discover schema details to aid further attacks │ │ │ └── Method: Access /graphql endpoint with introspection query │ │ │ └── Method: Analyze schema for sensitive data, mutations, and weak points │ ├── High-Risk Path: Complex/Malicious GraphQL Queries CRITICAL NODE: (Direct Impact on Availability and Data) │ │ └── Goal: Overload server or extract excessive data │ │ │ └── Method: Craft deeply nested queries │ │ │ └── Method: Send queries with computationally expensive resolvers │ │ │ └── Method: Exploit missing query complexity limits CRITICAL NODE: (Easy DoS Vulnerability) │ │ │ └── Method: Use aliasing and fragments to request large datasets │ ├── High-Risk Path: GraphQL Field Authorization Bypass CRITICAL NODE: (Direct Access to Sensitive Data) │ │ └── Goal: Access data fields without proper authorization │ │ │ └── Method: Exploit misconfigured/missing field-level authorization CRITICAL NODE: (Common Authorization Weakness) │ │ │ └── Method: Manipulate query structure to bypass authorization checks

Attack Tree Path: Insecure GraphQL Endpoint Configuration CRITICAL NODE: (Configuration Weakness - Easy to Exploit)

└── Goal: Access sensitive information or functionalities due to misconfigured GraphQL endpoint │ └── Method: Exposed GraphQL endpoint without proper authentication/authorization CRITICAL NODE: (Critical Misconfiguration) │ └── Method: Enabled introspection in production environment