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Attack Tree Analysis for firecracker-microvm/firecracker

Objective: To gain unauthorized access to the host system or other microVMs from within a guest microVM, or to disrupt the application's service by exploiting vulnerabilities in Firecracker or its configuration.

Attack Tree Visualization

Attack Goal: Compromise Application via Firecracker Exploitation [CRITICAL]
├───[OR]─ [HIGH-RISK] Gain Unauthorized Access to Host System [CRITICAL]
│   ├───[OR]─ [HIGH-RISK] Exploit Firecracker API Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL]
│   │   ├───[AND]─ [HIGH-RISK] Identify API Endpoint Vulnerability (e.g., Buffer Overflow, Injection)
│   │   │   └─── [HIGH-RISK] Trigger Vulnerability via Malicious API Request from Guest VM
│   ├───[OR]─ [HIGH-RISK] Exploit Firecracker Process Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL]
│   ├───[OR]─ [HIGH-RISK] Exploit Guest Kernel/OS Vulnerabilities to Escape [CRITICAL]
│   │   ├───[AND]─ [HIGH-RISK] Identify Vulnerability in Guest Kernel (Linux, etc.)
│   │   │   └─── [HIGH-RISK] Exploit Kernel Vulnerability from within Guest VM to gain host privileges (VM Escape)
│   ├───[OR]─ [HIGH-RISK] Exploit VirtIO Device Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL]
│   │   ├───[AND]─ [HIGH-RISK] Identify Vulnerability in VirtIO Device Implementation in Firecracker
│   │   │   └─── [HIGH-RISK] Trigger vulnerability via malicious interaction with VirtIO device from Guest VM (e.g., network, block device)
│   └───[OR]─ [HIGH-RISK] Resource Exhaustion leading to Host Instability
│       ├───[AND]─ [HIGH-RISK] Exploit Resource Limits Misconfiguration
│       │   └─── [HIGH-RISK] Exceed resource limits (CPU, memory, I/O) from Guest VM to destabilize the host.
├───[OR]─ [HIGH-RISK] Network-Based Attacks between MicroVMs (if networked)
│   ├───[AND]─ [HIGH-RISK] Exploit Network Segmentation Weakness
│   │   └─── [HIGH-RISK] Bypass network segmentation to communicate with and attack other microVMs on the same host.
└───[OR]─ [HIGH-RISK] Host Resource Exhaustion via MicroVMs (as mentioned above, also leads to DoS)
    └─── [Refer to "Resource Exhaustion leading to Host Instability" branch above]

Attack Tree Path: [CRITICAL] Gain Unauthorized Access to Host System:

This is the overarching high-risk goal. Success here means the attacker has broken out of the microVM and gained control over the underlying host machine. This is the most severe compromise.

Attack Tree Path: [HIGH-RISK] Exploit Firecracker API Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL]:

  • Attack Vector: Exploiting vulnerabilities in the Firecracker API. This includes:
    • [HIGH-RISK] Identify API Endpoint Vulnerability (e.g., Buffer Overflow, Injection) and [HIGH-RISK] Trigger Vulnerability via Malicious API Request from Guest VM: This involves finding and exploiting common web API vulnerabilities like buffer overflows or injection flaws within the Firecracker API endpoints. A successful exploit allows the attacker to execute arbitrary code on the host, escaping the microVM.
  • Critical Node: The Firecracker API is a critical control plane. Compromising it directly leads to potential host takeover.

Attack Tree Path: [HIGH-RISK] Exploit Firecracker Process Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL]:

  • Attack Vector: Exploiting vulnerabilities within the core Firecracker process itself. This could include:
    • Memory safety issues (despite Rust's protections, unsafe code or logic errors can exist).
    • Logic errors in Firecracker's core virtualization or resource management logic.
  • Critical Node: The Firecracker process is the foundation of isolation. Vulnerabilities here can directly undermine the security of the entire system.

Attack Tree Path: [HIGH-RISK] Exploit Guest Kernel/OS Vulnerabilities to Escape [CRITICAL]:

  • Attack Vector: Exploiting vulnerabilities in the guest operating system kernel to achieve VM escape. This is a classic VM escape technique.
    • [HIGH-RISK] Identify Vulnerability in Guest Kernel (Linux, etc.) and [HIGH-RISK] Exploit Kernel Vulnerability from within Guest VM to gain host privileges (VM Escape): This involves leveraging known or zero-day vulnerabilities in the guest kernel to gain elevated privileges on the host system.
  • Critical Node: The guest kernel, while isolated, is still a potential attack surface if not properly hardened and patched.

Attack Tree Path: [HIGH-RISK] Exploit VirtIO Device Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL]:

  • Attack Vector: Exploiting vulnerabilities in the implementation of VirtIO devices within Firecracker. VirtIO devices are the communication channels between the guest and the host.
    • [HIGH-RISK] Identify Vulnerability in VirtIO Device Implementation in Firecracker and [HIGH-RISK] Trigger vulnerability via malicious interaction with VirtIO device from Guest VM (e.g., network, block device): This involves finding and exploiting flaws in how Firecracker implements VirtIO devices (like network or block devices). Successful exploitation can lead to host compromise through these interfaces.
  • Critical Node: VirtIO devices are a crucial interface for guest-host interaction and a potential point of weakness if not securely implemented.

Attack Tree Path: [HIGH-RISK] Resource Exhaustion leading to Host Instability:

  • Attack Vector: Causing resource exhaustion on the host system from within a guest microVM.
    • [HIGH-RISK] Exploit Resource Limits Misconfiguration and [HIGH-RISK] Exceed resource limits (CPU, memory, I/O) from Guest VM to destabilize the host.: This relies on misconfigured resource limits for the microVM. If limits are too generous, a malicious guest can consume excessive resources (CPU, memory, I/O), destabilizing the host and potentially causing denial of service for other microVMs or the host itself.

Attack Tree Path: [HIGH-RISK] Network-Based Attacks between MicroVMs (if networked):

  • Attack Vector: Exploiting weaknesses in network segmentation to attack other microVMs on the same host.
    • [HIGH-RISK] Exploit Network Segmentation Weakness and [HIGH-RISK] Bypass network segmentation to communicate with and attack other microVMs on the same host.: If microVMs are networked and network segmentation is weak or misconfigured, an attacker in one microVM can bypass these controls and communicate with and potentially compromise other microVMs on the same host.

Attack Tree Path: [HIGH-RISK] Host Resource Exhaustion via MicroVMs (as mentioned above, also leads to DoS):

  • Attack Vector: This is a reiteration of the "Resource Exhaustion leading to Host Instability" path, emphasizing that host resource exhaustion can also lead to a Denial of Service (DoS) condition for the application and potentially other services on the host.