Mitigation Strategy: Seccomp Filtering (System Call Filtering)
- Mitigation Strategy: Restrict the system calls the Firecracker VMM process can make.
- Description:
- Identify Allowed System Calls: Analyze the Firecracker source code and documentation (and potentially use
strace
) to determine the minimum set of system calls required for Firecracker's operation. - Create Seccomp Profile: Create a JSON file that defines the seccomp-bpf filter. This file will specify a whitelist of allowed system calls and a default action (e.g.,
SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM)
) for all other system calls. - Apply Seccomp Filter: Use the
--seccomp-filter
option when launching Firecracker, providing the path to the JSON file. - Test Extensively: Thoroughly test the application with the seccomp filter. Monitor for errors, adjusting the filter as needed.
- Regular Review: Periodically review the seccomp profile for updates and improvements.
- Identify Allowed System Calls: Analyze the Firecracker source code and documentation (and potentially use
- Threats Mitigated:
- VMM Exploits (Severity: High): Limits exploitation of vulnerabilities in the Firecracker VMM.
- MicroVM Escape (Severity: Critical): Reduces the risk of VM escape by restricting VMM access to the host kernel.
- Impact:
- VMM Exploits: Significantly reduces the risk (High impact).
- MicroVM Escape: Significantly reduces the risk (High impact).
- Currently Implemented:
- Example: Not implemented.
- Missing Implementation:
- Example: Create and apply a seccomp profile to all Firecracker instances.
- Description:
Mitigation Strategy: Reduced Device Exposure
- Mitigation Strategy: Minimize the number of devices exposed to the guest VM via Firecracker's configuration.
- Description:
- Identify Essential Devices: Determine the absolute minimum devices needed (usually virtio-net and virtio-block).
- Configure Firecracker: When launching Firecracker, use command-line options or API calls to specify only the essential devices. Do not add unnecessary devices.
- Test: Thoroughly test the guest application.
- Threats Mitigated:
- Device Driver Exploits (Severity: High): Reduces exploitable device drivers within the guest.
- MicroVM Escape (Severity: Critical): Limits the attack surface for escaping via device driver vulnerabilities.
- Impact:
- Device Driver Exploits: Significantly reduces the risk (High impact).
- MicroVM Escape: Significantly reduces the risk (High impact).
- Currently Implemented:
- Example: Partially implemented. Only virtio-net and virtio-block are exposed, but further investigation is needed.
- Missing Implementation:
- Example: Review Firecracker configuration and startup scripts.
- Description:
Mitigation Strategy: Regular Firecracker Updates
- Mitigation Strategy: Keep Firecracker itself up-to-date.
- Description:
- Subscribe to Notifications: Subscribe to the Firecracker security mailing list and vulnerability databases.
- Monitor for Updates: Regularly check for new Firecracker releases.
- Automated Updates (Ideal): Integrate Firecracker updates into your CI/CD pipeline.
- Manual Updates (If Necessary): Establish a process for manually updating Firecracker instances.
- Threats Mitigated:
- Known Vulnerabilities (Severity: Variable, often High or Critical): Protects against known Firecracker vulnerabilities.
- Impact:
- Known Vulnerabilities: Eliminates the risk from known, patched vulnerabilities (High impact).
- Currently Implemented:
- Example: Partially implemented. Manual checks are performed, but no automation.
- Missing Implementation:
- Example: Implement automated updates.
- Description:
Mitigation Strategy: Resource Limits (via Firecracker's cgroup integration)
- Mitigation Strategy: Limit resources available to each Firecracker instance using Firecracker's cgroup features.
- Description:
- Define Resource Limits: Determine appropriate limits for CPU, memory, disk I/O, and network bandwidth.
- Configure cgroups (via Firecracker): Use Firecracker's built-in cgroup support (command-line options).
- Test and Monitor: Test with limits and monitor resource usage.
- Threats Mitigated:
- Denial of Service (DoS) (Severity: High): Prevents resource exhaustion impacting other VMs or the host.
- Resource Exhaustion (Severity: Medium): Protects against resource exhaustion within a VM.
- Impact:
- Denial of Service (DoS): Significantly reduces the risk (High impact).
- Resource Exhaustion: Significantly reduces the risk (High impact).
- Currently Implemented:
- Example: Basic memory limits via
--memory-size
. No limits on CPU, disk I/O, or network.
- Example: Basic memory limits via
- Missing Implementation:
- Example: Implement comprehensive limits using cgroups for CPU, disk I/O, and network.
- Description:
Mitigation Strategy: Disable Unnecessary Firecracker Features
- Mitigation Strategy: Turn off unused Firecracker features directly through its configuration.
- Description:
- Review Documentation: Review Firecracker documentation and command-line options.
- Identify Unused Features: Determine which features are not required (e.g., metrics, logging to a socket).
- Disable Features: Use command-line options or configuration to disable them.
- Test: Thoroughly test after disabling features.
- Threats Mitigated:
- Vulnerabilities in Unused Features (Severity: Variable): Reduces the attack surface.
- Impact:
- Vulnerabilities in Unused Features: Reduces the risk (Medium to High impact).
- Currently Implemented:
- Example: Metrics collection is disabled. Other features not reviewed.
- Missing Implementation:
- Example: Comprehensive review of all Firecracker features.
- Description:
Mitigation Strategy: Jailer Usage (If Applicable - Direct Firecracker Tool)
- Mitigation Strategy: Properly configure and use the
jailer
.- Description:
- Understand Jailer: Familiarize yourself with
jailer
. - Configure Chroot: Define a minimal chroot environment.
- Configure Cgroups: Set resource limits (CPU, memory, etc.).
- Configure Namespaces: Use namespaces for isolation.
- Test Thoroughly: Test with
jailer
enabled. - Regular Review: Periodically review the configuration.
- Understand Jailer: Familiarize yourself with
- Threats Mitigated:
- VMM Exploits (Severity: High): Additional confinement for the VMM.
- MicroVM Escape (Severity: Critical): Restricts VMM access to the host.
- Impact:
- VMM Exploits: Reduces the risk (Medium to High impact).
- MicroVM Escape: Reduces the risk (Medium impact).
- Currently Implemented:
- Example: The
jailer
is not currently used.
- Example: The
- Missing Implementation:
- Example: Evaluate and potentially implement
jailer
.
- Example: Evaluate and potentially implement
- Description: