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threat-modeling.md

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Threat Model Analysis for fuellabs/fuel-core

Threat: Local Data Tampering (Fuel-Core Storage)

  • Description: An attacker gains unauthorized access to the system where fuel-core is running and directly modifies files in fuel-core's data storage directory. This could include altering the blockchain database, transaction history, configuration files, or even private keys if stored locally.
    • Impact: Data corruption, loss of funds if private keys are compromised, manipulation of application's view of the blockchain state, denial of service if critical data is corrupted.
    • Affected Fuel-Core Component: Data Storage Module, File System Access, Key Management (if applicable).
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Operating System Security Hardening: Secure the operating system running fuel-core with strong passwords, access control lists, and regular security updates.
      • File System Permissions: Implement strict file system permissions to restrict access to fuel-core's data directories to only the necessary users and processes.
      • Encryption at Rest: Encrypt fuel-core's data storage at rest to protect sensitive data even if physical access is gained.
      • Regular Backups: Implement regular backups of fuel-core's data to allow for recovery in case of data corruption or compromise.
      • Security Monitoring: Monitor file system access and integrity for suspicious activity.

Threat: Exposure of Private Keys

  • Description: If fuel-core or the application using it manages private keys (e.g., for signing transactions), vulnerabilities in key generation, storage, or handling could lead to exposure. This could be due to insecure storage mechanisms, code vulnerabilities, or human error.
    • Impact: Complete compromise of funds and assets associated with the exposed private keys, unauthorized transaction signing, identity theft within the Fuel network context.
    • Affected Fuel-Core Component: Key Generation Module, Key Storage Module, Transaction Signing Module, Wallet Management (if applicable).
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Secure Key Storage: Use hardware wallets, secure enclaves, or encrypted key stores to protect private keys. Avoid storing keys in plaintext or easily accessible locations.
      • Principle of Least Privilege: Grant access to private keys only to the necessary components and processes.
      • Regular Security Audits: Audit key management practices and code for vulnerabilities related to key handling.
      • User Education: Educate developers and users about secure key management practices.
      • Consider Key Derivation: If appropriate, use key derivation techniques to minimize the risk of exposing master private keys.

Threat: Vulnerabilities in Fuel-Core Code

  • Description: Security vulnerabilities exist within the fuel-core codebase itself (e.g., buffer overflows, injection vulnerabilities, logic errors). An attacker could exploit these vulnerabilities to gain unauthorized access, execute arbitrary code, or cause denial of service.
    • Impact: Complete compromise of the system running fuel-core, data breaches, service disruption, control over the application, potential for wider impact on the Fuel network if vulnerabilities are systemic.
    • Affected Fuel-Core Component: Any module within fuel-core codebase.
    • Risk Severity: Critical to High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Regular Security Audits: Conduct regular security audits of the fuel-core codebase by qualified security professionals.
      • Penetration Testing: Perform penetration testing to identify and exploit potential vulnerabilities in a controlled environment.
      • Secure Development Practices: Follow secure development practices throughout the fuel-core development lifecycle (e.g., code reviews, static analysis, vulnerability scanning).
      • Dependency Management: Carefully manage dependencies and keep them updated to patch known vulnerabilities.
      • Regular Fuel-Core Updates: Stay up-to-date with the latest fuel-core releases and security patches provided by the Fuel Labs team.

Threat: Malicious Node Impersonation

  • Description: An attacker sets up a rogue Fuel node and manipulates the network communication to make fuel-core believe it is a legitimate peer. The attacker might then feed fuel-core false blockchain data, invalid transactions, or disrupt its network participation. This could be achieved by exploiting vulnerabilities in node discovery or P2P communication protocols.
    • Impact: Data corruption within fuel-core's view of the blockchain, application malfunction due to incorrect data, potential for double-spending if fuel-core accepts invalid transactions, or denial of service if fuel-core is forced to process malicious data.
    • Affected Fuel-Core Component: P2P Networking Module, Node Discovery, Block Synchronization.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Ensure fuel-core is configured to connect to a trusted set of nodes (if possible, though P2P networks are designed to be permissionless).
      • Monitor fuel-core's network connections and peer list for anomalies.
      • Implement application-level validation of data received from fuel-core against trusted sources if feasible.
      • Keep fuel-core updated to benefit from the latest security patches in the P2P networking stack.

Threat: RPC Endpoint Spoofing

  • Description: If the fuel-core RPC endpoint is exposed, an attacker could intercept or redirect traffic to a fake RPC endpoint. The attacker could then manipulate responses to the application, tricking it into performing unintended actions or providing false information. This could be done through DNS poisoning, ARP spoofing (on a local network), or by compromising network infrastructure.
    • Impact: Application logic errors due to manipulated data from the RPC, unauthorized transaction submission to attacker-controlled addresses, information disclosure if the attacker logs or intercepts requests and responses.
    • Affected Fuel-Core Component: RPC Server Module, API Handlers.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Strong Authentication and Authorization: Implement robust authentication (e.g., API keys, JWT) and authorization mechanisms for the RPC endpoint.
      • HTTPS: Always use HTTPS to encrypt communication between the application and the fuel-core RPC endpoint, preventing eavesdropping and man-in-the-middle attacks.
      • Network Segmentation: Isolate the fuel-core instance and its RPC endpoint within a secure network segment.
      • Firewall Rules: Restrict access to the RPC endpoint to only authorized IP addresses or networks.
      • Regular Security Audits: Audit the RPC endpoint configuration and access controls regularly.

Threat: Data Tampering in Transit (P2P/RPC)

  • Description: An attacker intercepts network traffic between fuel-core and other nodes (P2P) or between the application and fuel-core (RPC) and modifies the data packets. For P2P, this could involve altering block data or transaction broadcasts. For RPC, this could involve modifying requests or responses.
    • Impact: For P2P: Blockchain corruption in fuel-core's local state, acceptance of invalid transactions, denial of service. For RPC: Application malfunction due to incorrect data, unintended transaction execution, data integrity issues.
    • Affected Fuel-Core Component: P2P Networking Module, RPC Server Module, Data Serialization/Deserialization.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Encryption: Ensure all communication channels (P2P and RPC) are encrypted. Fuel's P2P layer should ideally have built-in encryption. Use HTTPS for RPC.
      • Integrity Checks: Implement or rely on built-in integrity checks (e.g., checksums, digital signatures) for data transmitted over the network.
      • Secure Network Infrastructure: Deploy fuel-core in a secure network environment and protect against network-level attacks.

Threat: SwayVM Escape (if applicable and relevant)

  • Description: Vulnerabilities in the SwayVM (Fuel's smart contract virtual machine) could potentially allow a malicious smart contract to escape its sandbox or gain unintended access to resources or influence the fuel-core client's behavior in unexpected ways.
    • Impact: Unpredictable behavior, potential security breaches within the Fuel network context, potentially impacting the application's interaction with smart contracts, data corruption, or denial of service.
    • Affected Fuel-Core Component: SwayVM Integration Module, Smart Contract Execution Environment.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • SwayVM Security Audits: Ensure the SwayVM undergoes rigorous security audits and penetration testing.
      • Sandboxing and Isolation: Rely on the SwayVM's sandboxing and isolation mechanisms to prevent smart contracts from escaping their execution environment.
      • Resource Limits and Governance: Implement and enforce resource limits and governance mechanisms within the Fuel network to mitigate the impact of potential VM escapes.
      • Regular Fuel-Core Updates: Keep fuel-core updated to benefit from any SwayVM security patches and improvements.
      • Input Validation and Output Sanitization: Carefully validate inputs to and sanitize outputs from smart contract interactions to minimize the impact of potential VM escape vulnerabilities.