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Attack Tree Analysis for gfx-rs/gfx

Objective: Compromise application using gfx-rs by exploiting vulnerabilities within gfx-rs or its interaction with the underlying graphics stack.

Attack Tree Visualization

  • Compromise gfx-rs Application [CRITICAL NODE]
    • Exploit Vulnerabilities in gfx-rs Library Itself [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
      • Memory Safety Vulnerabilities in unsafe Code [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
        • Craft input to exploit [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
        • Achieve Code Execution/DoS [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
      • Dependency Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH]
        • Determine exploitability via gfx-rs [HIGH-RISK PATH]
        • Exploit dependency vulnerability [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
    • Exploit Vulnerabilities in Underlying Graphics Stack (Drivers/APIs) [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
      • API Misuse by gfx-rs Triggering Driver Bugs [HIGH-RISK PATH]
        • Craft gfx-rs usage to trigger bugs [HIGH-RISK PATH]
        • Cause Driver Crash/System Instability [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
      • Exploit Known Driver Vulnerabilities via gfx-rs [HIGH-RISK PATH]
        • Identify gfx-rs calls to trigger [HIGH-RISK PATH]
        • Craft application logic to execute calls [HIGH-RISK PATH]
        • Exploit known driver vulnerability [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
    • Supply Malicious Input Data to gfx-rs Application [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
      • Malicious Shaders [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
        • Craft malicious shaders [HIGH-RISK PATH]
        • Inject malicious shaders [HIGH-RISK PATH]
        • Cause DoS/System Instability/GPU Code Execution [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
  • Description: Attackers target weaknesses directly within the gfx-rs library code itself.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • Memory Safety Vulnerabilities in unsafe Code [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Description: Bugs in unsafe Rust code within gfx-rs can lead to memory corruption.
      • Attack Steps:
        • Craft input to exploit [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]: Develop specific input or conditions to trigger memory safety vulnerabilities in unsafe blocks.
        • Achieve Code Execution/DoS [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]: Successfully exploit the memory corruption to gain code execution on the target system or cause a denial of service.
      • Impact: High (Code Execution, DoS, Data Corruption)
      • Mitigation: Rigorous code review of unsafe blocks, fuzzing, static analysis tools, community security audits of gfx-rs.
    • Dependency Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
      • Description: Vulnerabilities in dependencies of gfx-rs can be indirectly exploited.
      • Attack Steps:
        • Determine exploitability via gfx-rs [HIGH-RISK PATH]: Analyze if a known dependency vulnerability is exploitable through gfx-rs's usage of that dependency.
        • Exploit dependency vulnerability [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]: Leverage the dependency vulnerability via gfx-rs to compromise the application.
      • Impact: Variable, depends on the dependency vulnerability.
      • Mitigation: Regularly update dependencies, use dependency vulnerability scanning tools, monitor security advisories for Rust crates.
  • Description: Attackers target vulnerabilities in graphics drivers or APIs that gfx-rs interacts with.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • API Misuse by gfx-rs Triggering Driver Bugs [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
      • Description: Incorrect API call sequences from gfx-rs can trigger bugs in graphics drivers.
      • Attack Steps:
        • Craft gfx-rs usage to trigger bugs [HIGH-RISK PATH]: Design specific sequences of gfx-rs operations intended to trigger known or potential driver bugs.
        • Cause Driver Crash/System Instability [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]: Trigger the driver bug leading to a driver crash, system instability, or potentially further exploitation.
      • Impact: Medium to High (DoS, System Instability, potentially Code Execution via driver exploit)
      • Mitigation: Thorough testing across different drivers and hardware, reporting driver bugs to vendors, using well-established and tested graphics API usage patterns.
    • Exploit Known Driver Vulnerabilities via gfx-rs [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
      • Description: Leverage gfx-rs to trigger publicly known vulnerabilities in graphics drivers.
      • Attack Steps:
        • Identify gfx-rs calls to trigger [HIGH-RISK PATH]: Determine which gfx-rs API calls can be used to reach the vulnerable code paths in drivers.
        • Craft application logic to execute calls [HIGH-RISK PATH]: Develop application logic that uses gfx-rs to execute the identified API calls under attacker control.
        • Exploit known driver vulnerability [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]: Successfully trigger and exploit the known driver vulnerability through gfx-rs.
      • Impact: High (DoS, System Instability, potentially Code Execution via driver exploit)
      • Mitigation: Stay updated on driver security advisories, encourage users to update drivers, implement workarounds for known driver bugs if feasible.
  • Description: Attackers provide crafted input data to the application that, when processed by gfx-rs, triggers vulnerabilities.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • Malicious Shaders [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Description: Malicious shaders are provided to the application to exploit shader compiler or GPU execution vulnerabilities.
      • Attack Steps:
        • Craft malicious shaders [HIGH-RISK PATH]: Develop shaders designed to exploit shader compiler bugs, GPU execution vulnerabilities (e.g., infinite loops, memory access violations in shaders).
        • Inject malicious shaders [HIGH-RISK PATH]: Introduce these malicious shaders into the application through shader loading mechanisms.
        • Cause DoS/System Instability/GPU Code Execution [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]: Trigger shader compilation errors leading to DoS, or shader execution vulnerabilities leading to GPU crashes, system instability, or potentially GPU-based code execution.
      • Impact: Medium to High (DoS, System Instability, potentially GPU-based Code Execution)
      • Mitigation: Shader validation and sanitization, sandboxing shader compilation and execution (very complex), restricting shader sources to trusted origins, using pre-compiled shaders where possible.