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threat-modeling.md

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Threat Model Analysis for gfx-rs/gfx

Threat: Shader Buffer Overflow/Underflow

  • Description: An attacker crafts malicious shader code (GLSL, HLSL) that, when executed by the GPU through gfx, attempts to read or write memory outside of allocated buffer boundaries. This can be achieved by manipulating shader inputs or exploiting vulnerabilities in shader logic.
  • Impact: Application crash, unexpected behavior, memory corruption, potential for arbitrary code execution (though less likely in typical application context, more likely driver instability).
  • Affected gfx component: Shader execution pipeline, GPU driver interaction via gfx, Buffer resources managed by gfx.
  • Risk severity: High
  • Mitigation strategies:
    • Thoroughly review and test shader code, especially boundary checks.
    • Utilize shader validation tools during development.
    • Implement robust error handling for shader loading and compilation within the gfx application.
    • Employ memory safety practices in shader design.

Threat: Use-After-Free/Double-Free in gfx/Dependencies

  • Description: A vulnerability within the gfx library itself or its underlying dependencies (including system graphics libraries used by gfx) allows an attacker to trigger a use-after-free or double-free condition. This could be exploited by crafting specific gfx API calls or input data that exposes the underlying vulnerability.
  • Impact: Application crash, memory corruption, potential for arbitrary code execution (though less likely in typical application context, more likely driver instability).
  • Affected gfx component: gfx core library, underlying graphics API bindings used by gfx, system graphics drivers interacted with by gfx.
  • Risk severity: High
  • Mitigation strategies:
    • Keep gfx and its dependencies updated to the latest versions to benefit from bug fixes and security patches.
    • Report potential memory safety issues found in gfx to the maintainers.
    • Carefully audit any unsafe code blocks used in the application's gfx integration and within gfx itself if contributing.

Threat: GPU Driver Exploit via gfx Commands

  • Description: An attacker crafts a sequence of gfx API calls or input data through gfx that exploits a vulnerability in the underlying GPU driver. This could involve sending unexpected or malformed commands via gfx that trigger driver bugs.
  • Impact: Application crash, system instability, potential privilege escalation (less likely in typical application context, more likely driver instability or system hang).
  • Affected gfx component: gfx API calls, gfx command submission pipeline, GPU driver interaction initiated by gfx.
  • Risk severity: High
  • Mitigation strategies:
    • Encourage users to keep GPU drivers updated to the latest versions.
    • Implement input validation and sanitization for data passed to gfx commands, especially if the data originates from untrusted sources.
    • In sandboxed environments, consider limiting the available graphics API features or driver access if possible to reduce the attack surface exposed through gfx.

Threat: Malicious Shader Injection

  • Description: If the application loads shaders from untrusted sources (user-provided, external files without validation) and uses gfx to process them, an attacker can inject malicious shaders designed to crash the driver, leak information, or perform other malicious actions when executed by the GPU via gfx.
  • Impact: Application crash, information disclosure (potentially through rendering output controlled by gfx), potential for other malicious actions depending on shader capabilities and driver vulnerabilities exposed through gfx.
  • Affected gfx component: Shader loading and compilation pipeline within the gfx application, Shader module used by gfx, GPU driver interaction via gfx.
  • Risk severity: High
  • Mitigation strategies:
    • Avoid loading shaders from untrusted sources if possible.
    • If user-provided shaders are necessary, implement strict validation and sanitization processes before loading and using them with gfx.
    • Consider using shader compilers and validators provided by graphics API vendors to detect potentially malicious or problematic shader code before using it with gfx.
    • Implement a secure shader compilation pipeline that minimizes the risk of introducing vulnerabilities during the compilation process within the gfx application.