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Attack Tree Analysis for gleam-lang/gleam

Objective: Gain unauthorized access and control over the Gleam application and its data by exploiting vulnerabilities specific to Gleam or its ecosystem.

Attack Tree Visualization

[CRITICAL NODE] Compromise Gleam Application ├───(OR)─ Exploit Gleam Language/Compiler Weaknesses │ └───(AND)─ [CRITICAL NODE] Discover Compiler Bug in Gleam Code Generation ├───(OR)─ [CRITICAL NODE] Exploit Gleam Interoperability Issues │ ├───(AND)─ [CRITICAL NODE] Erlang Interoperability Vulnerabilities │ │ └───(AND)─ [HIGH RISK PATH] Data Type Mismatches/Conversion Errors at Gleam-Erlang Boundary │ └───(AND)─ [CRITICAL NODE] JavaScript Interoperability Vulnerabilities (If Applicable) │ └───(AND)─ [HIGH RISK PATH] Injection Vulnerabilities via JS Interop (e.g., Cross-Site Scripting) └───(OR)─ [CRITICAL NODE] Exploit Gleam Ecosystem/Dependency Vulnerabilities └───(AND)─ [CRITICAL NODE] Dependency Vulnerabilities in Hex Packages └───(AND)─ [HIGH RISK PATH] Vulnerable Dependency Introduced via gleam.toml

Attack Tree Path: [CRITICAL NODE] Discover Compiler Bug in Gleam Code Generation

Attack Vector Name: Compiler Code Generation Bug Exploitation

  • Description of the Attack:
    • Attacker identifies a bug in the Gleam compiler's code generation phase. This bug could lead to the generation of incorrect or unsafe Erlang code (or JavaScript code if applicable via other tools).
    • The attacker crafts Gleam code specifically designed to trigger this compiler bug.
    • When the Gleam code is compiled, the bug is triggered, resulting in vulnerable compiled code.
    • The attacker then exploits the vulnerability in the compiled application.
  • Potential Impact:
    • Arbitrary code execution on the server or client (depending on where the compiled code runs).
    • Memory corruption, leading to crashes or unpredictable behavior.
    • Circumvention of security mechanisms.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Thoroughly test Gleam applications, especially edge cases and complex logic.
    • Report any suspected compiler bugs to the Gleam team.
    • Regularly update the Gleam compiler to the latest version with bug fixes.
    • Implement robust error handling in Gleam code to catch unexpected behavior.
    • Employ fuzzing techniques on Gleam code and generated Erlang code to identify potential compiler vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Path: [HIGH RISK PATH] Data Type Mismatches/Conversion Errors at Gleam-Erlang Boundary

Attack Vector Name: Erlang Interop Data Type Mismatch Exploitation

  • Description of the Attack:
    • Gleam application interacts with Erlang code using FFI (Foreign Function Interface).
    • Attacker exploits inconsistencies or errors in data type conversion between Gleam's type system and Erlang's dynamic typing.
    • This can lead to unexpected data being passed to Erlang functions, causing logic errors, crashes, or security vulnerabilities in the Erlang side.
    • For example, an integer expected by Erlang code might be misinterpreted as a string due to incorrect conversion, leading to unexpected behavior.
  • Potential Impact:
    • Logic errors in the application.
    • Data corruption or manipulation.
    • Unexpected program behavior, potentially leading to denial of service or security breaches.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Carefully manage data conversion between Gleam and Erlang.
    • Explicitly define and validate data types at the interop boundary.
    • Use Gleam's FFI features with caution.
    • Thoroughly test data exchange between Gleam and Erlang code.
    • Employ robust error handling for conversion failures.

Attack Tree Path: [HIGH RISK PATH] Injection Vulnerabilities via JS Interop (e.g., Cross-Site Scripting)

Attack Vector Name: JavaScript Interop Injection (Cross-Site Scripting - XSS)

  • Description of the Attack:
    • Gleam application generates frontend code or interacts with JavaScript in a browser environment (if Gleam is used in such a context via transpilation or bridging).
    • Attacker injects malicious JavaScript code into the application's output, which is then executed in a user's browser.
    • This is typically achieved by exploiting vulnerabilities in how Gleam code handles user input or data that is rendered in the frontend.
    • For example, if Gleam code directly embeds user-provided strings into HTML without proper encoding, an attacker can inject <script> tags.
  • Potential Impact:
    • Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities.
    • Account takeover by stealing session cookies or credentials.
    • Data theft from the user's browser.
    • Malware distribution.
    • Defacement of the web page.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • If Gleam is used for frontend development, be extremely vigilant about Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities.
    • Ensure proper output encoding and sanitization for all user-controlled data rendered in the frontend.
    • Use a robust templating engine with automatic output encoding.
    • Follow secure frontend development practices.
    • Conduct XSS vulnerability testing (static and dynamic analysis).

Attack Tree Path: [HIGH RISK PATH] Vulnerable Dependency Introduced via gleam.toml

Attack Vector Name: Dependency Vulnerability Exploitation

  • Description of the Attack:
    • Gleam application relies on external packages managed through gleam.toml (using Hex package manager).
    • Attacker exploits a known vulnerability in one of the Gleam dependencies (or their transitive dependencies).
    • This vulnerability could be in the dependency's code itself, allowing for remote code execution, data breaches, or other malicious activities.
    • The attacker leverages the vulnerable dependency to compromise the Gleam application.
  • Potential Impact:
    • Full application compromise.
    • Data breaches and data exfiltration.
    • Denial of service.
    • Privilege escalation.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Regularly audit and update Gleam dependencies listed in gleam.toml.
    • Use dependency scanning tools to identify known vulnerabilities in dependencies.
    • Implement a dependency management policy.
    • Pin dependency versions in gleam.toml to ensure consistent builds and reduce the risk of unexpected updates.
    • Monitor security advisories for Gleam dependencies and the broader Erlang/OTP ecosystem.
    • Be aware of transitive dependencies and their potential vulnerabilities.