Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
90 lines (79 loc) · 12.9 KB

mitigations.md

File metadata and controls

90 lines (79 loc) · 12.9 KB

Mitigation Strategies Analysis for habitat-sh/habitat

Mitigation Strategy: Supervisor Principle of Least Privilege

  • Description:
    1. Analyze Service Requirements: For each service managed by the Habitat Supervisor, meticulously analyze the minimum system privileges required for its proper operation. This includes file system access paths, network ports, and necessary system capabilities.
    2. Configure Supervisor User: Configure the Habitat Supervisor to run as a dedicated, non-root user. This is typically achieved through the Supervisor's process management configuration (e.g., systemd unit file). Ensure this user has only the essential permissions identified in the previous step.
    3. Restrict Supervisor Capabilities: If running as root is unavoidable for initial setup (e.g., binding to privileged ports), leverage Linux capabilities to drop all unnecessary root privileges immediately after startup. Configure the Supervisor to retain only the absolute minimum capabilities required for its ongoing operation.
    4. Limit File System Access: Utilize file system permissions to strictly limit the Supervisor's access to only the directories and files it absolutely needs. This includes Habitat package directories, service data directories, and Supervisor configuration files. Deny access to any other parts of the file system.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Supervisor Privilege Escalation (Severity: High): Limits the potential damage if a vulnerability in the Supervisor is exploited. An attacker with limited Supervisor privileges is less likely to gain full system control.
    • Lateral Movement from Supervisor (Severity: Medium): Restricting Supervisor privileges reduces the attacker's ability to move laterally to other parts of the system or network if the Supervisor is compromised.
    • Data Breach via Supervisor (Severity: Medium): Limits the scope of data accessible to a compromised Supervisor, reducing the potential for data breaches.
  • Impact:
    • Supervisor Privilege Escalation: Significantly Reduces
    • Lateral Movement from Supervisor: Moderately Reduces
    • Data Breach via Supervisor: Moderately Reduces
  • Currently Implemented: Partially Implemented - Supervisors are configured to run as the non-root hab user, but fine-grained capability dropping and file system access restrictions are not fully enforced.
  • Missing Implementation: Implement capability dropping in Supervisor process management configuration. Review and tighten file system permissions for the hab user and Supervisor processes.

Mitigation Strategy: Encrypt Supervisor Gossip Communication

  • Description:
    1. Generate Gossip Encryption Key: Create a strong, randomly generated encryption key specifically for Habitat Supervisor gossip. This key should be unique to your Habitat ring.
    2. Configure HAB_ gossip_ENCRYPT_KEY: Set the HAB_GOSSIP_ENCRYPT_KEY environment variable or configure the gossip_encrypt_key setting in the Supervisor configuration file for every Supervisor in your Habitat ring. Use the generated encryption key as the value.
    3. Restart Supervisors: Restart all Supervisors in the Habitat ring for the encryption configuration to take effect.
    4. Secure Key Management: Ensure the gossip encryption key is securely managed and distributed. Avoid storing it in plain text in easily accessible locations. Consider using Habitat's secrets management features or a secure external secret store for key distribution and rotation.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Gossip Protocol Sniffing (Severity: Medium): Prevents eavesdropping on Supervisor gossip traffic, protecting sensitive information about service topology, configuration, and health status from being intercepted on the network.
    • Man-in-the-Middle Attacks on Gossip (Severity: Medium): Makes it significantly harder for attackers to inject malicious gossip messages or manipulate the gossip protocol to disrupt service discovery or configuration management.
  • Impact:
    • Gossip Protocol Sniffing: Significantly Reduces
    • Man-in-the-Middle Attacks on Gossip: Moderately Reduces
  • Currently Implemented: No - Supervisor gossip encryption is not currently enabled in the Habitat deployment.
  • Missing Implementation: Gossip encryption needs to be enabled by configuring HAB_GOSSIP_ENCRYPT_KEY or gossip_encrypt_key for all Supervisors across all environments. A secure key generation and distribution process needs to be established.

Mitigation Strategy: Mandatory Habitat Package Signing and Origin Verification

  • Description:
    1. Establish and Secure Habitat Origin: Define a dedicated Habitat origin for your organization's packages. Secure the private key associated with this origin meticulously. Restrict access to the private key to only authorized build systems and personnel.
    2. Configure HAB_ORIGIN_KEYS on Supervisors: On every Habitat Supervisor, configure the HAB_ORIGIN_KEYS environment variable or the origin_keys setting in the Supervisor configuration file. Set this to the public key of your trusted Habitat origin. This instructs the Supervisor to only load packages signed by this origin.
    3. Sign All Packages in Build Pipeline: Integrate package signing into your automated Habitat package build pipeline. Ensure that every package built for deployment is signed using the private key of your trusted origin before being uploaded to the Habitat Depot.
    4. Enforce Origin Verification in All Environments: Ensure that origin verification is enabled and enforced on Supervisors in all environments (development, staging, production). This prevents accidental deployment of unsigned or untrusted packages even in non-production environments.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Habitat Supply Chain Attacks (Severity: High): Prevents the deployment of tampered, backdoored, or malicious Habitat packages from untrusted sources, significantly mitigating supply chain risks within the Habitat ecosystem.
    • Habitat Package Spoofing (Severity: Medium): Prevents attackers from creating and deploying packages that falsely claim to be from your organization's trusted origin.
  • Impact:
    • Habitat Supply Chain Attacks: Significantly Reduces
    • Habitat Package Spoofing: Significantly Reduces
  • Currently Implemented: Partially Implemented - Package signing is enabled for production builds, but HAB_ORIGIN_KEYS enforcement on Supervisors is not consistently applied across all environments.
  • Missing Implementation: Enforce HAB_ORIGIN_KEYS on all Supervisors in all environments. Strengthen the process for secure private key management and access control for the Habitat origin.

Mitigation Strategy: Automated Habitat Package Vulnerability Scanning in Build Pipeline

  • Description:
    1. Integrate Habitat Package Scanning Tool: Choose and integrate a vulnerability scanning tool that can analyze Habitat packages and their dependencies (e.g., Trivy, Grype, Clair with Habitat support). Integrate this tool into your Habitat package build pipeline (e.g., CI/CD system).
    2. Scan Packages During Build Process: Configure the build pipeline to automatically scan each newly built Habitat package for known vulnerabilities before it is published to the Habitat Depot.
    3. Define Vulnerability Policy: Establish a clear vulnerability policy that defines acceptable risk levels. This policy should specify thresholds for vulnerability severity (e.g., critical, high, medium) and potentially the number of allowed vulnerabilities.
    4. Fail Build on Policy Violation: Configure the build pipeline to automatically fail the build process if the vulnerability scan detects vulnerabilities that violate the defined vulnerability policy. This prevents vulnerable packages from being deployed.
    5. Generate and Review Vulnerability Reports: Generate detailed vulnerability scan reports as part of the build process. Ensure these reports are reviewed by security and development teams to understand identified vulnerabilities and plan remediation.
    6. Automate Remediation Workflow: Establish a workflow for addressing identified vulnerabilities. This may involve updating dependencies, patching code, or implementing compensating controls.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Known Vulnerabilities in Habitat Package Dependencies (Severity: High): Significantly reduces the risk of deploying Habitat services with known vulnerabilities in their dependencies, which could be exploited by attackers.
    • Vulnerable Base Packages (Severity: Medium): Helps identify vulnerabilities in base packages used to build Habitat packages, prompting updates or alternative base package selection.
  • Impact:
    • Known Vulnerabilities in Habitat Package Dependencies: Significantly Reduces
    • Vulnerable Base Packages: Moderately Reduces
  • Currently Implemented: No - Automated vulnerability scanning of Habitat packages is not currently integrated into the build pipeline.
  • Missing Implementation: Select and integrate a suitable Habitat package vulnerability scanning tool into the CI/CD pipeline. Define a vulnerability policy and configure the build pipeline to enforce it. Establish a vulnerability remediation workflow.

Mitigation Strategy: Habitat Integration with External Secret Store (e.g., Vault)

  • Description:
    1. Deploy and Secure External Secret Store: Deploy and harden an external secret store like HashiCorp Vault. Ensure it is properly secured, access-controlled, and highly available.
    2. Configure Habitat Supervisor for Secret Store Access: Configure Habitat Supervisors to authenticate and communicate with the external secret store. This typically involves providing Supervisor configuration with credentials and API endpoint details for the secret store.
    3. Migrate Secrets to External Secret Store: Identify all sensitive configuration data (passwords, API keys, certificates) currently stored within Habitat packages or Supervisor configurations. Migrate these secrets to the external secret store. Organize secrets within the secret store in a logical and manageable way.
    4. Utilize Habitat Secret Binding: Modify Habitat service plans to use Habitat's secret binding mechanism ({{secret "path/to/secret"}}) to retrieve secrets from the external secret store at runtime. Replace hardcoded secrets in service configurations with these secret bindings.
    5. Implement Least Privilege Access Control in Secret Store: Configure fine-grained access control policies within the external secret store. Grant each Habitat service and Supervisor only the minimum necessary permissions to access the specific secrets they require.
    6. Enable Secret Rotation and Auditing (If Supported): Leverage the secret rotation and audit logging features of the external secret store if available. Implement automated secret rotation for sensitive credentials and enable audit logging of secret access for monitoring and security analysis.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Hardcoded Secrets in Habitat Packages (Severity: High): Eliminates the risk of developers accidentally or intentionally hardcoding secrets directly into Habitat packages, which can be easily exposed.
    • Secret Exposure in Habitat Configuration Files (Severity: High): Prevents secrets from being stored in plain text in Supervisor or service configuration files, reducing the risk of exposure through configuration management systems or file system access.
    • Unauthorized Secret Access (Severity: Medium): Centralized secret management and fine-grained access control in the external secret store significantly reduce the risk of unauthorized access to sensitive credentials.
  • Impact:
    • Hardcoded Secrets in Habitat Packages: Significantly Reduces
    • Secret Exposure in Habitat Configuration Files: Significantly Reduces
    • Unauthorized Secret Access: Moderately Reduces
  • Currently Implemented: Partially Implemented - Evaluation of Vault integration is underway. Proof-of-concept implementations exist, but full production integration is missing. Development environments may still rely on configuration files for some secrets.
  • Missing Implementation: Full production integration with an external secret store (like Vault) is required. Migrate all secrets from Habitat packages and configuration files to the external secret store. Implement fine-grained access control policies and explore secret rotation and auditing capabilities.