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Attack Tree Analysis for hyperium/hyper

Objective: Compromise application using Hyper by exploiting Hyper-specific vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Visualization

Root Goal: [CRITICAL NODE] Compromise Application via Hyper Vulnerabilities ├───[AND] [CRITICAL NODE] Exploit HTTP Protocol Handling Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├───[OR] HTTP Request Smuggling/Desync [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├───[AND] Divergence in Request Parsing between Hyper and Backend [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├───[OR] Header Injection via Crafted Requests [HIGH-RISK PATH] ├───[AND] [CRITICAL NODE] Exploit TLS/SSL Implementation Vulnerabilities (if using HTTPS) [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├───[OR] TLS Downgrade Attacks [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├───[AND] [CRITICAL NODE] Weak TLS Configuration in Hyper [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├───[OR] Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) Attacks due to Misconfiguration [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├───[AND] Allowing Insecure TLS Configurations [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├───[AND] Lack of Proper Certificate Management [HIGH-RISK PATH] ├───[AND] Exploit Asynchronous Nature and Resource Management Issues │ ├───[OR] Denial of Service via Resource Exhaustion │ │ ├───[AND] Unbounded Connection/Request Handling [HIGH-RISK PATH] ├───[AND] [CRITICAL NODE] Exploit Dependencies Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├───[OR] Vulnerabilities in Hyper's Direct Dependencies [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├───[AND] [CRITICAL NODE] Outdated or Vulnerable Dependencies [HIGH-RISK PATH] ├───[AND] Exploit Misconfiguration or Misuse of Hyper API [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├───[OR] Insecure Defaults or Lack of Hardening [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├───[AND] [CRITICAL NODE] Relying on Default Hyper Configurations without Review [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├───[OR] Improper Error Handling in Application Code [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├───[AND] Leaking Sensitive Information in Error Responses [HIGH-RISK PATH]

Attack Tree Path: 1. [CRITICAL NODE] Compromise Application via Hyper Vulnerabilities:

  • Attack Vectors: This is the overarching goal. Attackers will attempt to exploit any weakness in Hyper or its integration to compromise the application. This includes all attack vectors listed below.

Attack Tree Path: 2. [CRITICAL NODE] Exploit HTTP Protocol Handling Vulnerabilities:

  • Attack Vectors:
    • HTTP Request Smuggling/Desync:
      • Divergence in Request Parsing between Hyper and Backend: Attackers craft requests that are interpreted differently by Hyper and the backend server. This can lead to:
        • Bypassing security controls (e.g., authentication, authorization).
        • Request hijacking, where one user's request is routed to another user's session.
        • Cache poisoning, where malicious responses are cached and served to legitimate users.
    • Header Injection via Crafted Requests: Attackers manipulate HTTP headers in requests to inject malicious content or commands. This can lead to:
      • Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) if injected headers are reflected in responses.
      • Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) if injected headers control backend requests.
      • Bypassing security checks based on header values.

Attack Tree Path: 3. [CRITICAL NODE] Exploit TLS/SSL Implementation Vulnerabilities (if using HTTPS):

  • Attack Vectors:
    • TLS Downgrade Attacks: Attackers attempt to force the application to use weaker, less secure TLS versions or cipher suites. This can be achieved through:
      • Weak TLS Configuration in Hyper: If Hyper is configured to allow outdated TLS protocols (e.g., TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1) or weak cipher suites, attackers can exploit these weaknesses.
      • Exploiting vulnerabilities in the TLS negotiation process.
    • Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) Attacks due to Misconfiguration: Attackers intercept communication between the client and server. This can be facilitated by:
      • Allowing Insecure TLS Configurations: Weak TLS configurations make MitM attacks easier to execute.
      • Lack of Proper Certificate Management:
        • Using expired or self-signed certificates can lead to client-side warnings that users might ignore, or can be bypassed by attackers.
        • Compromised private keys allow attackers to impersonate the server.

Attack Tree Path: 4. Denial of Service via Resource Exhaustion (under Exploit Asynchronous Nature and Resource Management Issues):

  • Attack Vectors:
    • Unbounded Connection/Request Handling: If Hyper is not configured with appropriate limits on connections and requests, attackers can overwhelm the server by:
      • Opening a large number of connections simultaneously.
      • Sending a flood of requests.
      • Exploiting HTTP/2 or HTTP/3 stream limits if not properly configured.
      • This can lead to service unavailability and resource exhaustion (CPU, memory, network bandwidth).

Attack Tree Path: 5. [CRITICAL NODE] Exploit Dependencies Vulnerabilities:

  • Attack Vectors:
    • Vulnerabilities in Hyper's Direct Dependencies: Hyper relies on other Rust crates (dependencies). If these dependencies have known vulnerabilities, attackers can exploit them through the application using Hyper.
      • Outdated or Vulnerable Dependencies: Using outdated versions of dependencies that have known security flaws.
      • Exploiting zero-day vulnerabilities in dependencies.

Attack Tree Path: 6. Exploit Misconfiguration or Misuse of Hyper API:

  • Attack Vectors:
    • Insecure Defaults or Lack of Hardening:
      • Relying on Default Hyper Configurations without Review: Using Hyper with its default settings without understanding and customizing them for security can leave the application vulnerable. Default settings might be too permissive or expose unnecessary features.
    • Improper Error Handling in Application Code:
      • Leaking Sensitive Information in Error Responses: Application code that uses Hyper might inadvertently expose sensitive information (e.g., internal paths, database credentials, user data) in error responses when handling Hyper-related errors.