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threat-modeling.md

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Threat Model Analysis for hyperium/hyper

Threat: HTTP Request Smuggling

  • Description: An attacker exploits vulnerabilities in Hyper's HTTP parsing to inject a second, malicious request within a legitimate one. This is achieved by manipulating headers like Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding in a way that Hyper misinterprets request boundaries. The attacker can then bypass security controls or poison caches.
  • Impact: Bypassing security controls, cache poisoning, request routing manipulation, data exfiltration.
  • Hyper Component Affected: hyper::server::conn::Http1, hyper::http::parse.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Use strict HTTP parsing configurations in Hyper.
    • Implement application-level validation of request boundaries.
    • Prefer HTTP/2 or HTTP/3 which are less susceptible to classic smuggling.
    • Ensure consistent HTTP parsing behavior across your infrastructure.

Threat: Denial of Service (DoS) via Malformed Requests

  • Description: An attacker sends a flood of specially crafted, malformed HTTP requests designed to exploit weaknesses in Hyper's request parsing logic. These requests consume excessive server resources (CPU, memory) during parsing, leading to service disruption for legitimate users.
  • Impact: Service unavailability, resource exhaustion, application slowdown or crash.
  • Hyper Component Affected: hyper::server::conn::Http1, hyper::server::conn::Http2, hyper::server::conn::Http3, hyper::http::parse.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Configure request size limits in Hyper.
    • Implement connection limits in Hyper.
    • Use rate limiting to restrict request frequency.
    • Implement input validation to reject malformed requests early.
    • Perform regular fuzzing and stress testing of Hyper's parsing.

Threat: TLS/SSL Vulnerabilities due to Misconfiguration or Outdated Libraries

  • Description: Hyper relies on TLS libraries like rustls or openssl. Misconfiguration within Hyper's TLS setup or using outdated TLS libraries can introduce vulnerabilities. Attackers can exploit these to perform man-in-the-middle attacks, decrypt communication, or downgrade security.
  • Impact: Confidentiality breach, integrity breach, authentication bypass.
  • Hyper Component Affected: hyper::server::conn::Http1, hyper::server::conn::Http2, hyper::server::conn::Http3 (TLS integration), underlying TLS library.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Use strong TLS configurations in Hyper (TLS 1.3, strong cipher suites).
    • Regularly update TLS libraries (rustls or openssl).
    • Implement HSTS headers.
    • Ensure proper certificate management.

Threat: HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 Protocol Vulnerabilities (e.g., Rapid Reset)

  • Description: HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 protocols have inherent complexities that can lead to vulnerabilities in their implementations within Hyper. For example, the HTTP/2 Rapid Reset attack can cause DoS. New protocol-level vulnerabilities may emerge.
  • Impact: Denial of Service, resource exhaustion, application instability.
  • Hyper Component Affected: hyper::server::conn::Http2, hyper::server::conn::Http3.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Keep Hyper updated to benefit from security patches.
    • Configure resource limits for HTTP/2/3 (stream limits, connection limits).
    • Monitor security advisories related to HTTP/2/3 and Hyper.
    • Consider disabling HTTP/2/3 if not strictly necessary.

Threat: Connection Exhaustion DoS

  • Description: An attacker attempts to overwhelm the Hyper server by opening a massive number of connections. This can be achieved through slowloris attacks or connection floods, exhausting server resources and preventing legitimate connections.
  • Impact: Denial of Service, server overload, inability to serve legitimate requests.
  • Hyper Component Affected: hyper::server::accept::Accept, hyper::server::conn.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Configure connection limits in Hyper.
    • Set connection timeouts to close idle connections.
    • Implement connection-level rate limiting.
    • Configure OS-level limits on connections.
    • Use load balancing to distribute traffic.

Threat: Memory Exhaustion

  • Description: Bugs within Hyper or improper handling of large requests/responses can lead to excessive memory consumption. An attacker can exploit this by sending large requests or triggering memory leaks, causing the server to run out of memory and crash.
  • Impact: Denial of Service, application crash, server instability.
  • Hyper Component Affected: hyper::server::conn, hyper::body, memory management within Hyper.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Enforce request and response size limits in Hyper.
    • Implement memory monitoring and alerting.
    • Conduct regular code audits for memory leaks.
    • Use OS-level resource limits to restrict memory usage.