Attack Surface: 1. Request Smuggling/Splitting (HTTP/1.1)
Description: Exploitation of ambiguities in how hyper
interprets HTTP/1.1 headers like Transfer-Encoding
and Content-Length
. Attackers craft requests processed differently by hyper
and downstream systems.
- How Hyper Contributes:
hyper
's parsing and handling of these headers are the direct source of this vulnerability. - Example: An attacker sends a request with conflicting
Transfer-Encoding
andContent-Length
headers, leading tohyper
misinterpreting the request boundary. - Impact: Bypass security controls, access unauthorized data, execute arbitrary requests, poison caches.
- Risk Severity: Critical
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Update
hyper
: Use the latest version. - Fuzz Testing: Extensively fuzz test
hyper
's handling ofTransfer-Encoding
,Content-Length
, and chunked encoding. - Proxy Configuration (Indirect): While not directly
hyper
, ensure consistent proxy handling. Prefer HTTP/2. - WAF (with caution): Can help, but do not rely solely on it.
- Update
Attack Surface: 2. HTTP/2 Frame Handling Vulnerabilities
Description: Flaws in hyper
's processing of HTTP/2 frames (HEADERS, DATA, SETTINGS, etc.) leading to DoS, information leaks, or potentially RCE.
- How Hyper Contributes:
hyper
's core functionality is the direct implementation of HTTP/2 frame handling. - Example: An attacker sends a malformed
HEADERS
frame causinghyper
to crash or enter an infinite loop. - Impact: Denial-of-service (most likely), information disclosure, potential remote code execution (less likely).
- Risk Severity: High
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Update
hyper
: Prioritize updates addressing HTTP/2 vulnerabilities. - Extensive Fuzzing: Fuzz test the HTTP/2 frame handling extensively.
- Resource Monitoring: Monitor CPU and memory usage.
- Rate Limiting: Implement connection-level rate limiting.
- Update
Attack Surface: 3. HPACK Bomb (HTTP/2 Header Compression)
Description: Attackers send requests with highly compressed headers that expand to consume excessive memory, causing a denial-of-service.
- How Hyper Contributes:
hyper
's HPACK decompression implementation is directly responsible. - Example: A crafted request with a HPACK header expands to consume gigabytes of memory.
- Impact: Denial-of-service due to memory exhaustion.
- Risk Severity: High
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Configure Header Limits: Use
hyper
's API to set appropriate limits on header list size (max_header_list_size()
). - Memory Monitoring: Monitor server memory usage.
- Configure Header Limits: Use