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Attack Tree Analysis for iced-rs/iced

Objective: Attacker's Goal: To compromise application that use given project by exploiting weaknesses or vulnerabilities within the project itself.

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Iced Application **[CRITICAL NODE]**
├───[1.0] Exploit Iced Framework Vulnerabilities **[CRITICAL NODE]**
│   ├───[1.1] Input Handling Vulnerabilities **[HIGH RISK PATH]** **[CRITICAL NODE]**
│   │   ├───[1.1.1] Malicious Message Injection **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   │   │   └───[1.1.1.1] Craft and Send Malicious Iced Messages **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   │   │       ├───[1.1.1.1.b] Inject Unexpected Data Types/Values **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   │   │       └───[1.1.1.1.c] Trigger Unintended Application State Changes **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   │   ├───[1.1.2] Widget Input Manipulation **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   │   │   └───[1.1.2.1] Overflow/Underflow Widget Input Fields **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   │   │       └───[1.1.2.1.b] Inject Special Characters/Control Codes **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   │   ├───[1.1.3] Event Handling Exploits **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   │   │   └───[1.1.3.1] Trigger Unexpected Event Sequences **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   │   │       └───[1.1.3.1.a] Flood Application with Specific Events **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   │   │   └───[1.1.3.2] Exploit Event Handler Logic Flaws **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   │   │       └───[1.1.3.2.a] Identify Vulnerable Event Handlers **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   │   │       └───[1.1.3.2.b] Craft Events to Trigger Logic Errors **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   ├───[1.2] Rendering Engine Vulnerabilities
│   │   ├───[1.2.1] Resource Exhaustion via Rendering **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   │   │   └───[1.2.1.1] Trigger Complex Rendering Operations **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   │   │       ├───[1.2.1.1.a] Craft UI Elements with High Rendering Cost **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   │   │       └───[1.2.1.1.b] Repeatedly Trigger Resource-Intensive Redraws **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   ├───[1.5] Dependency Vulnerabilities (in Iced's dependencies) **[HIGH RISK PATH]** **[CRITICAL NODE]**
│   │   ├───[1.5.1] Exploit Known Vulnerabilities in Iced Dependencies **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   │   │   ├───[1.5.1.1] Identify Iced Dependencies **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   │   │   ├───[1.5.1.2] Scan Dependencies for Known Vulnerabilities (e.g., using `cargo audit`) **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   │   │   └───[1.5.1.3] Exploit Discovered Vulnerabilities **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
├───[2.0] Exploit Application Logic Vulnerabilities (within the Iced application itself, facilitated by Iced) **[HIGH RISK PATH]** **[CRITICAL NODE]**
│   ├───[2.1] Logic Errors in Message Handlers **[HIGH RISK PATH]** **[CRITICAL NODE]**
│   │   ├───[2.1.1] Bypass Application Logic via Crafted Messages **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   │   │   ├───[2.1.1.1] Analyze Application Message Handling Logic **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   │   │   ├───[2.1.1.2] Craft Messages to Circumvent Security Checks **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   │   │   └───[2.1.1.3] Trigger Unauthorized Actions **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   │   ├───[2.1.2] Denial of Service via Message Flooding **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   │   │   ├───[2.1.2.1] Flood Application with Resource-Intensive Messages **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   │   │   └───[2.1.2.2] Overload Message Queue and Application Logic **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   │   ├───[2.2] Insecure Data Handling in Iced Application **[HIGH RISK PATH]** **[CRITICAL NODE]**
│   │   │   └───[2.2.2] Data Injection via UI Input **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   │   │   │   ├───[2.2.2.1] Inject Malicious Data through Iced Widgets **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   │   │   │   ├───[2.2.2.1.a] Identify Input Fields that Process Data **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   │   │   │   ├───[2.2.2.1.b] Inject Code or Malicious Payloads **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   │   │   │   └───[2.2.2.1.c] Exploit Backend Processing of Injected Data **[HIGH RISK PATH]**

Attack Tree Path: 1. Compromise Iced Application [CRITICAL NODE]:

  • This is the ultimate goal of the attacker. Success here means the attacker has achieved unauthorized access, control, or disruption of the application.

Attack Tree Path: 2. [1.0] Exploit Iced Framework Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]:

  • Exploiting vulnerabilities within the Iced framework itself is a critical path because it can potentially affect all applications built using that version of Iced.
  • Success here can lead to widespread impact and potentially more severe vulnerabilities than application-specific flaws.

Attack Tree Path: 3. [1.1] Input Handling Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

  • Input handling is a consistently high-risk area in software security. Applications built with Iced, like any other software, are vulnerable to input-based attacks.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • [1.1.1] Malicious Message Injection [HIGH RISK PATH]:
      • Iced applications communicate using messages. If message handling is not robust, attackers can inject malicious messages to:
        • [1.1.1.b] Inject Unexpected Data Types/Values [HIGH RISK PATH]: Cause errors or unexpected behavior by sending messages with incorrect data types or values that the application is not designed to handle.
        • [1.1.1.c] Trigger Unintended Application State Changes [HIGH RISK PATH]: Manipulate the application's state by sending messages that alter variables or trigger logic in unintended ways.
    • [1.1.2] Widget Input Manipulation [HIGH RISK PATH]:
      • Iced widgets receive user input. Vulnerabilities can arise if widget input is not properly validated.
        • [1.1.2.b] Inject Special Characters/Control Codes [HIGH RISK PATH]: Inject special characters or control codes into widget inputs to bypass input validation, manipulate UI behavior, or potentially exploit backend processing.
    • [1.1.3] Event Handling Exploits [HIGH RISK PATH]:
      • Iced uses events to manage UI interactions. Exploiting event handling logic flaws can lead to unexpected application states or denial of service.
        • [1.1.3.1] Trigger Unexpected Event Sequences [HIGH RISK PATH]:
          • [1.1.3.1.a] Flood Application with Specific Events [HIGH RISK PATH]: Send a large number of specific events to overwhelm the application's event handling mechanism, leading to denial of service.
        • [1.1.3.2] Exploit Event Handler Logic Flaws [HIGH RISK PATH]:
          • [1.1.3.2.a] Identify Vulnerable Event Handlers [HIGH RISK PATH]: Analyze application code to find event handlers with logic flaws or insufficient security checks.
          • [1.1.3.2.b] Craft Events to Trigger Logic Errors [HIGH RISK PATH]: Create specific events designed to trigger identified logic errors in vulnerable event handlers, potentially bypassing security checks or causing unintended actions.

Attack Tree Path: 4. [1.2] Rendering Engine Vulnerabilities

  • [1.2.1] Resource Exhaustion via Rendering [HIGH RISK PATH]: * Attackers can exploit the rendering engine to cause denial of service by consuming excessive resources. * [1.2.1.1] Trigger Complex Rendering Operations [HIGH RISK PATH]: * [1.2.1.1.a] Craft UI Elements with High Rendering Cost [HIGH RISK PATH]: Design UI elements that are computationally expensive to render, such as complex shapes, excessive layers, or inefficient drawing operations. * [1.2.1.1.b] Repeatedly Trigger Resource-Intensive Redraws [HIGH RISK PATH]: Force the application to repeatedly redraw resource-intensive UI elements, overwhelming the rendering engine and causing performance degradation or crashes.

Attack Tree Path: 5. [1.5] Dependency Vulnerabilities (in Iced's dependencies) [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

  • Dependency vulnerabilities are a significant and frequently exploited attack vector in modern software development. Iced, like most projects, relies on external dependencies.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • [1.5.1] Exploit Known Vulnerabilities in Iced Dependencies [HIGH RISK PATH]:
      • Iced's dependencies may contain known vulnerabilities. Attackers can exploit these vulnerabilities if the application uses a vulnerable version of Iced or its dependencies.
        • [1.5.1.1] Identify Iced Dependencies [HIGH RISK PATH]: Determine the dependencies used by Iced (e.g., by examining Cargo.toml or build files).
        • [1.5.1.2] Scan Dependencies for Known Vulnerabilities (e.g., using cargo audit) [HIGH RISK PATH]: Use tools like cargo audit or other vulnerability scanners to identify known vulnerabilities in Iced's dependencies.
        • [1.5.1.3] Exploit Discovered Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH]: Research and exploit any discovered vulnerabilities in Iced's dependencies, potentially gaining code execution or other forms of compromise.

Attack Tree Path: 6. [2.0] Exploit Application Logic Vulnerabilities (within the Iced application itself, facilitated by Iced) [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

  • Vulnerabilities in the application's own logic, especially when interacting with the UI framework (Iced), are a high-risk path.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • [2.1] Logic Errors in Message Handlers [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Application-specific message handlers are crucial for application logic. Errors in these handlers can be exploited.
        • [2.1.1] Bypass Application Logic via Crafted Messages [HIGH RISK PATH]:
          • [2.1.1.1] Analyze Application Message Handling Logic [HIGH RISK PATH]: Reverse engineer or analyze the application's code to understand how it handles messages and identify potential logic flaws.
          • [2.1.1.2] Craft Messages to Circumvent Security Checks [HIGH RISK PATH]: Create messages specifically designed to bypass security checks or authorization logic within message handlers.
          • [2.1.1.3] Trigger Unauthorized Actions [HIGH RISK PATH]: Send crafted messages to trigger unauthorized actions or access restricted functionalities by exploiting logic flaws in message handlers.
    • [2.1.2] Denial of Service via Message Flooding [HIGH RISK PATH]:
      • Attackers can flood the application with messages to cause denial of service.
        • [2.1.2.1] Flood Application with Resource-Intensive Messages [HIGH RISK PATH]: Send a large volume of messages that are resource-intensive to process, overwhelming the application's message processing capabilities.
        • [2.1.2.2] Overload Message Queue and Application Logic [HIGH RISK PATH]: Flood the message queue with messages, causing it to grow excessively and overload the application's logic, leading to performance degradation or crashes.
    • [2.2] Insecure Data Handling in Iced Application [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Insecure handling of data, especially user input, within the Iced application is a major risk.
        • [2.2.2] Data Injection via UI Input [HIGH RISK PATH]:
          • [2.2.2.1] Inject Malicious Data through Iced Widgets [HIGH RISK PATH]: Use Iced widgets to inject malicious data into the application.
            • [2.2.2.1.a] Identify Input Fields that Process Data [HIGH RISK PATH]: Identify UI input fields that are used to process data on the backend or within the application logic.
            • [2.2.2.1.b] Inject Code or Malicious Payloads [HIGH RISK PATH]: Inject code (e.g., script injection) or malicious payloads (e.g., SQL injection strings, command injection sequences) into input fields.
            • [2.2.2.1.c] Exploit Backend Processing of Injected Data [HIGH RISK PATH]: Exploit vulnerabilities in the backend processing of the injected data, such as command injection, SQL injection, or other injection-based attacks.