Attack Surface: Untrusted Widget Input Propagation
- Description: Widgets receiving and propagating unvalidated/unsanitized user input through Iced's message-passing system.
- How Iced Contributes: Iced's core message-passing architecture is the direct mechanism for this vulnerability. The framework's design facilitates the flow of data, and if a widget mishandles input, Iced's system propagates the problem.
- Example: A custom text input widget emits raw HTML. Another Iced widget renders this HTML directly, leading to an XSS vulnerability within the Iced application itself. This is distinct from a general web XSS.
- Impact: Code execution (XSS), data corruption, application compromise.
- Risk Severity: High to Critical (depending on how the propagated data is used).
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Developer: Implement strict input validation and sanitization within each Iced widget before emitting any messages. Use a centralized validation layer for complex Iced message flows. Employ type-safe Iced messages. This is a direct responsibility when using Iced.
Attack Surface: Custom Widget Vulnerabilities
- Description: Bugs or security flaws within custom-built Iced widgets.
- How Iced Contributes: Iced directly enables the creation of custom widgets. These are new code components within the Iced framework, expanding the attack surface because of Iced's extensibility.
- Example: A custom Iced widget designed to display images doesn't validate image data, leading to a buffer overflow within the Iced application's rendering process.
- Impact: Code execution, denial of service, application crash, data corruption.
- Risk Severity: High to Critical (depending on the Iced widget's functionality).
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Developer: Thoroughly review and test all custom Iced widgets. Apply secure coding practices specifically to the Iced widget's code. Fuzz test custom Iced widgets. This is a direct responsibility when extending Iced.
Attack Surface: Denial-of-Service (DoS) via Message Flooding
- Description: Overwhelming the Iced application with a large volume of messages.
- How Iced Contributes: Iced's event-driven architecture, the core of how Iced functions, is inherently susceptible to this if message handling isn't rate-limited within the Iced application.
- Example: Rapidly triggering an Iced button's
on_press
event, flooding the Iced application with messages. - Impact: Application unavailability, denial of service.
- Risk Severity: High (because it directly impacts Iced's core functionality).
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Developer: Implement rate limiting on Iced event handlers and message processing within the Iced application. Use bounded queues for Iced messages. This is a direct responsibility when using Iced's event system.
Attack Surface: Rendering Vulnerabilities (Image/Font Handling)
- Description: Exploiting vulnerabilities in external libraries used by Iced for image and font rendering.
- How Iced Contributes: Iced directly relies on external crates (like
image
andfont-kit
) for these tasks, and the Iced application chooses to use and render the output. This is a direct consequence of using Iced's rendering capabilities. - Example: A crafted image file exploits a vulnerability in the
image
crate, leading to code execution when the Iced application attempts to display it using Iced's rendering features. - Impact: Code execution, application compromise.
- Risk Severity: High to Critical (depending on the vulnerability in the underlying library, but Iced is the direct vector).
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Developer: Keep all dependencies (especially image/font libraries used by Iced) up-to-date. Validate image and font data before passing it to Iced's rendering functions. Consider sandboxing the rendering process (if possible within the Iced context). This is a direct responsibility when using Iced's rendering.