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Attack Surface Analysis for iced-rs/iced

  • Description: Widgets receiving and propagating unvalidated/unsanitized user input through Iced's message-passing system.
  • How Iced Contributes: Iced's core message-passing architecture is the direct mechanism for this vulnerability. The framework's design facilitates the flow of data, and if a widget mishandles input, Iced's system propagates the problem.
  • Example: A custom text input widget emits raw HTML. Another Iced widget renders this HTML directly, leading to an XSS vulnerability within the Iced application itself. This is distinct from a general web XSS.
  • Impact: Code execution (XSS), data corruption, application compromise.
  • Risk Severity: High to Critical (depending on how the propagated data is used).
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developer: Implement strict input validation and sanitization within each Iced widget before emitting any messages. Use a centralized validation layer for complex Iced message flows. Employ type-safe Iced messages. This is a direct responsibility when using Iced.
  • Description: Bugs or security flaws within custom-built Iced widgets.
  • How Iced Contributes: Iced directly enables the creation of custom widgets. These are new code components within the Iced framework, expanding the attack surface because of Iced's extensibility.
  • Example: A custom Iced widget designed to display images doesn't validate image data, leading to a buffer overflow within the Iced application's rendering process.
  • Impact: Code execution, denial of service, application crash, data corruption.
  • Risk Severity: High to Critical (depending on the Iced widget's functionality).
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developer: Thoroughly review and test all custom Iced widgets. Apply secure coding practices specifically to the Iced widget's code. Fuzz test custom Iced widgets. This is a direct responsibility when extending Iced.
  • Description: Overwhelming the Iced application with a large volume of messages.
  • How Iced Contributes: Iced's event-driven architecture, the core of how Iced functions, is inherently susceptible to this if message handling isn't rate-limited within the Iced application.
  • Example: Rapidly triggering an Iced button's on_press event, flooding the Iced application with messages.
  • Impact: Application unavailability, denial of service.
  • Risk Severity: High (because it directly impacts Iced's core functionality).
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developer: Implement rate limiting on Iced event handlers and message processing within the Iced application. Use bounded queues for Iced messages. This is a direct responsibility when using Iced's event system.
  • Description: Exploiting vulnerabilities in external libraries used by Iced for image and font rendering.
  • How Iced Contributes: Iced directly relies on external crates (like image and font-kit) for these tasks, and the Iced application chooses to use and render the output. This is a direct consequence of using Iced's rendering capabilities.
  • Example: A crafted image file exploits a vulnerability in the image crate, leading to code execution when the Iced application attempts to display it using Iced's rendering features.
  • Impact: Code execution, application compromise.
  • Risk Severity: High to Critical (depending on the vulnerability in the underlying library, but Iced is the direct vector).
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developer: Keep all dependencies (especially image/font libraries used by Iced) up-to-date. Validate image and font data before passing it to Iced's rendering functions. Consider sandboxing the rendering process (if possible within the Iced context). This is a direct responsibility when using Iced's rendering.