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Attack Tree Analysis for influxdata/influxdb

Objective: Compromise Application via InfluxDB Exploitation

Attack Tree Visualization

└── Compromise Application via InfluxDB Exploitation (CRITICAL NODE - Root Goal) (OR) ├── Exploit InfluxDB Vulnerabilities (HIGH-RISK PATH) (OR) │ └── Exploit Known CVEs (CRITICAL NODE) (OR) │ └── Identify and Exploit Publicly Disclosed Vulnerabilities (e.g., via CVE databases, security advisories) ├── Exploit Insecure Configuration (HIGH-RISK PATH) (OR) │ ├── Default Credentials (CRITICAL NODE) (OR) │ │ └── Use Default Admin Credentials (if not changed) │ ├── Weak Authentication/Authorization (HIGH-RISK PATH) (OR) │ │ ├── No Authentication Enabled (CRITICAL NODE) (OR) │ │ │ └── Access InfluxDB API without any authentication │ ├── Exposed Management Ports (CRITICAL NODE) (OR) │ │ └── Access InfluxDB management ports (e.g., 8086, 8088) from untrusted networks │ └── Insecure Network Configuration (HIGH-RISK PATH) (OR) │ └── InfluxDB Directly Exposed to Public Internet (CRITICAL NODE) (OR) │ └── Access InfluxDB API directly from the public internet without proper security controls └── Exploit InfluxQL Injection (HIGH-RISK PATH) (OR) └── Parameterized Queries Not Used (CRITICAL NODE) (OR) └── Application constructs InfluxQL queries by directly concatenating user input

Attack Tree Path: 1. Exploit InfluxDB Vulnerabilities (HIGH-RISK PATH)

  • Exploit Known CVEs (CRITICAL NODE)
    • Attack Vector: Identify and Exploit Publicly Disclosed Vulnerabilities (e.g., via CVE databases, security advisories)
      • Description: Attackers search for known vulnerabilities in the specific version of InfluxDB being used by the application. Publicly available CVE databases and security advisories are primary sources for this information. If a vulnerable version is found and a public exploit exists or can be easily developed, attackers can leverage it to compromise the InfluxDB instance and potentially the application.
      • Likelihood: Medium (Depends heavily on the application's patching cadence and how quickly vulnerabilities are addressed).
      • Impact: High (Successful exploitation can lead to Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the InfluxDB server, allowing full system compromise, data breaches, and denial of service).
      • Effort: Low-Medium (If public exploits are available, the effort is low. Developing a new exploit for a known vulnerability might require medium effort).
      • Skill Level: Low-Medium (Using existing exploits can be done by individuals with low to medium technical skills. Developing exploits requires more expertise).
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) and Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) can be configured to detect known exploit patterns. However, attackers might try to evade detection).
      • Actionable Insight: Regularly monitor InfluxDB security advisories and CVE databases. Implement a robust patch management process to promptly upgrade InfluxDB to the latest stable and patched versions.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit Insecure Configuration (HIGH-RISK PATH)

  • Default Credentials (CRITICAL NODE)

    • Attack Vector: Use Default Admin Credentials (if not changed)
      • Description: Many systems, including databases, come with default administrative credentials. If these are not changed during initial setup, attackers can easily guess or find these default credentials online and use them to gain administrative access to InfluxDB.
      • Likelihood: Medium (Common misconfiguration, especially in development, testing, or quickly deployed environments).
      • Impact: High (Full administrative access to InfluxDB. Attackers can read, modify, and delete all data, create new users, change configurations, and potentially perform actions that lead to denial of service or further system compromise).
      • Effort: Low (Extremely easy. Attackers simply try the default username and password combinations).
      • Skill Level: Low (Beginner level skill required).
      • Detection Difficulty: Low (Login attempts using default credentials are easily logged and can be detected through basic security monitoring).
      • Actionable Insight: Immediately change default administrator credentials upon InfluxDB installation. Enforce strong password policies for all user accounts.

  • Weak Authentication/Authorization (HIGH-RISK PATH)

    • No Authentication Enabled (CRITICAL NODE)
      • Attack Vector: Access InfluxDB API without any authentication
        • Description: If authentication is not enabled in InfluxDB's configuration, anyone who can reach the InfluxDB API endpoint can access and control the database without any credentials.
        • Likelihood: Low-Medium (Less common in production environments, but possible in development, testing, or misconfigured systems).
        • Impact: High (Complete and unrestricted access to InfluxDB. Attackers can read, write, and delete all data, potentially leading to data breaches, data manipulation, and denial of service).
        • Effort: Low (Very easy. Attackers simply access the InfluxDB API endpoint).
        • Skill Level: Low (Beginner level skill required).
        • Detection Difficulty: Low (Access to the API without authentication is a clear anomaly and can be easily detected through network monitoring and access logs).
        • Actionable Insight: Always enable authentication for InfluxDB, especially if it is accessible from any network other than localhost. Configure strong authentication mechanisms.

  • Exposed Management Ports (CRITICAL NODE)

    • Attack Vector: Access InfluxDB management ports (e.g., 8086, 8088) from untrusted networks
      • Description: InfluxDB exposes management ports (like 8086 for HTTP API and 8088 for the admin UI in older versions). If these ports are accessible from untrusted networks (e.g., the public internet), attackers can directly interact with the InfluxDB API and potentially exploit other vulnerabilities or misconfigurations.
      • Likelihood: Medium (Common misconfiguration in cloud environments or when perimeter firewalls are not properly configured).
      • Impact: High (Direct access to the InfluxDB API opens the door to all other potential attacks, including authentication bypass, data breaches, and denial of service).
      • Effort: Low (Network scanning tools can easily identify open ports. Accessing open ports is straightforward).
      • Skill Level: Low (Beginner level skill required).
      • Detection Difficulty: Low (Firewall logs and network monitoring can easily detect unauthorized access attempts to these ports).
      • Actionable Insight: Restrict access to InfluxDB management ports to trusted networks only (e.g., internal network, VPN, specific IP ranges). Use firewalls and network segmentation to enforce these restrictions.

  • Insecure Network Configuration (HIGH-RISK PATH)

    • InfluxDB Directly Exposed to Public Internet (CRITICAL NODE)
      • Attack Vector: Access InfluxDB API directly from the public internet without proper security controls
        • Description: Exposing InfluxDB directly to the public internet without any intermediary security layers (like a firewall, VPN, or application gateway) makes it highly vulnerable. Attackers can easily discover the exposed instance and attempt various attacks.
        • Likelihood: Low-Medium (Considered a bad security practice, but still occurs due to misconfiguration, oversight, or lack of security awareness).
        • Impact: High (Maximum exposure. All other attack vectors become significantly easier to exploit. Data breaches, data manipulation, denial of service, and system compromise are highly likely).
        • Effort: Low (Internet-wide scanning can easily identify exposed InfluxDB instances. Direct access is then trivial).
        • Skill Level: Low (Beginner level skill required).
        • Detection Difficulty: Low (External network scans will readily identify open InfluxDB ports. Security monitoring tools will flag direct public access as a high-risk issue).
        • Actionable Insight: Never expose InfluxDB directly to the public internet. Always place it behind a firewall and access it through a secure application layer, VPN, or other secure access control mechanisms.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Exploit InfluxQL Injection (HIGH-RISK PATH)

  • Parameterized Queries Not Used (CRITICAL NODE)
    • Attack Vector: Application constructs InfluxQL queries by directly concatenating user input
      • Description: InfluxQL injection vulnerabilities arise when the application dynamically builds InfluxQL queries by directly embedding user-provided input without proper sanitization or parameterization. Attackers can manipulate this input to inject malicious InfluxQL code, altering the query's intended logic and potentially gaining unauthorized access to data, modifying data, or even causing denial of service.
      • Likelihood: Medium (A common coding mistake, especially when developers are not fully aware of injection risks or when dealing with dynamic query construction).
      • Impact: Medium-High (Depending on the nature of the injection, attackers can achieve data breaches by extracting sensitive information, manipulate data integrity by modifying or deleting data, or potentially cause denial of service by crafting resource-intensive or malformed queries).
      • Effort: Low-Medium (Requires understanding InfluxQL syntax and the application's query logic. However, readily available tools and techniques for SQL injection can be adapted for InfluxQL).
      • Skill Level: Medium (Requires an intermediate understanding of web security principles and SQL-like injection techniques. Familiarity with InfluxQL is beneficial).
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Web Application Firewalls (WAFs) can detect some common injection patterns, but context-aware detection and evasion techniques can make it challenging to detect all injection attempts. Code review and static analysis are crucial for prevention).
      • Actionable Insight: Always use parameterized queries or prepared statements when interacting with InfluxDB. This ensures that user input is treated as data and not as executable code, effectively preventing InfluxQL injection. Additionally, implement robust input validation and sanitization on the application side to further mitigate risks.