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Threat Model Analysis for influxdata/influxdb

Threat: Unauthorized Data Read via API Exploitation

  • Threat: Unauthorized Data Read via API Exploitation

    • Description: An attacker leverages a vulnerability or misconfiguration in the InfluxDB HTTP API (e.g., a missing authentication check, a bypass of authorization logic, or an information disclosure vulnerability) to issue unauthorized queries and retrieve sensitive time-series data. The attacker might use tools like curl, custom scripts, or exploit kits targeting known InfluxDB vulnerabilities.
    • Impact:
      • Confidentiality breach: Sensitive data is exposed to unauthorized parties.
      • Reputational damage: Loss of trust from users and stakeholders.
      • Regulatory non-compliance: Violation of data privacy regulations (e.g., GDPR, CCPA).
      • Potential for further attacks: Exposed data could be used to plan or execute further attacks on the system or related systems.
    • Affected InfluxDB Component: httpd service (the HTTP API endpoint), authorization logic within the API handlers, potentially specific query processing functions if a vulnerability exists there.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Enforce Strict Authentication: Require strong authentication for all API requests. Use API tokens with the principle of least privilege.
      • Robust Authorization: Implement granular authorization checks within the API handlers to ensure users can only access data they are permitted to see. Verify authorization before executing any query.
      • Input Validation and Sanitization: Validate all API request parameters (e.g., database names, measurement names, tag values, field values) to prevent injection attacks or unexpected behavior.
      • Regular Security Audits and Penetration Testing: Conduct regular security audits of the API code and penetration testing to identify and address vulnerabilities.
      • Keep InfluxDB Updated: Apply security patches promptly to address known vulnerabilities in the API.
      • Web Application Firewall (WAF): Consider using a WAF to filter malicious API requests.

Threat: Data Injection via Unvalidated Write API

  • Threat: Data Injection via Unvalidated Write API

    • Description: An attacker sends crafted data to the InfluxDB write API (e.g., using the /write endpoint) that bypasses validation checks or exploits a vulnerability in the data ingestion pipeline. This could involve injecting malicious data, incorrect data types, or excessively large data payloads.
    • Impact:
      • Data corruption: Invalid data is written to the database, leading to inaccurate reports and analysis.
      • Denial of service: Excessively large or malformed data could overwhelm the database, causing it to become unavailable.
      • Potential for code execution (if a vulnerability exists): In rare cases, crafted data could trigger a vulnerability that allows the attacker to execute arbitrary code on the InfluxDB server.
    • Affected InfluxDB Component: httpd service (write API endpoint), tsdb package (time-series database engine), specifically the data ingestion and validation functions within the storage engine.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Strict Input Validation: Implement rigorous input validation on the write API to ensure that all data conforms to expected formats, types, and sizes. Reject any data that does not meet these criteria.
      • Schema Enforcement (if applicable): If using a schema, enforce it strictly to prevent the insertion of unexpected data types or fields.
      • Rate Limiting: Limit the rate at which data can be written to the database to prevent denial-of-service attacks.
      • Sanitize Input: Sanitize all input data to remove or escape any potentially harmful characters or sequences.
      • Regular Security Updates: Apply security patches promptly to address known vulnerabilities in the write API or storage engine.

Threat: Denial of Service via Query Overload

  • Threat: Denial of Service via Query Overload

    • Description: An attacker sends a large number of complex or resource-intensive queries to the InfluxDB API, overwhelming the database server and causing it to become unresponsive. This could involve using inefficient queries, querying large time ranges, or exploiting vulnerabilities in the query engine.
    • Impact:
      • System unavailability: The InfluxDB database becomes unavailable, preventing legitimate users from accessing data.
      • Business disruption: Applications that rely on InfluxDB for data may fail or become unusable.
      • Potential for data loss (if the server crashes): In extreme cases, a DoS attack could lead to data loss if the server crashes before data is properly flushed to disk.
    • Affected InfluxDB Component: httpd service (query API endpoint), query package (query engine), tsdb package (storage engine), potentially the scheduler and resource management components.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Query Timeouts: Set reasonable timeouts for all queries to prevent long-running or inefficient queries from consuming excessive resources.
      • Resource Limits: Configure InfluxDB to limit the resources (CPU, memory, I/O) that can be consumed by individual queries or users.
      • Rate Limiting: Limit the rate at which queries can be executed to prevent an attacker from flooding the server with requests.
      • Query Analysis and Optimization: Monitor query performance and identify any inefficient queries that could be optimized.
      • Load Balancing and Scaling: Deploy InfluxDB in a high-availability configuration with load balancing to distribute the query load across multiple servers.
      • Intrusion Detection/Prevention System (IDS/IPS): Use an IDS/IPS to detect and block malicious query patterns.

Threat: Unauthorized Access via Weak Authentication

  • Threat: Unauthorized Access via Weak Authentication

    • Description: An attacker gains access to the InfluxDB instance by guessing or brute-forcing weak passwords, exploiting default credentials, or leveraging a vulnerability in the authentication mechanism.
    • Impact:
      • Complete system compromise: The attacker could gain full control over the InfluxDB instance, allowing them to read, modify, or delete data, or even execute arbitrary code.
      • Data breach: Sensitive data could be stolen or exposed.
      • System disruption: The attacker could disrupt the operation of the database or use it for malicious purposes.
    • Affected InfluxDB Component: httpd service (authentication logic), user package (user management), potentially the underlying authentication library used by InfluxDB.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Strong Password Policy: Enforce a strong password policy that requires complex passwords and regular password changes.
      • Disable Default Credentials: Change the default administrator password immediately after installation.
      • Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA): Implement MFA for all user accounts, especially administrative accounts.
      • Account Lockout: Configure account lockout policies to prevent brute-force attacks.
      • Regular Security Audits: Regularly audit user accounts and permissions to ensure they are appropriate.
      • Use of secure authentication protocols: Use secure authentication protocols like OAuth 2.0 or integrate with a secure identity provider.

Threat: Data Deletion via Unauthorized Write Access

  • Threat: Data Deletion via Unauthorized Write Access

    • Description: An attacker gains unauthorized write access to InfluxDB and issues commands to delete data, either specific measurements, entire databases, or retention policies, leading to data loss.
    • Impact:
      • Permanent data loss: Deleted data may be unrecoverable, leading to loss of historical information.
      • Business disruption: Applications that rely on the deleted data may fail or produce incorrect results.
      • Regulatory non-compliance: Loss of data may violate data retention requirements.
    • Affected InfluxDB Component: httpd service (write API endpoint, specifically the DELETE operations), tsdb package (storage engine), potentially the authorization logic within the API handlers.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Strict Authorization: Implement granular authorization controls to restrict write access to only authorized users and applications. Specifically, limit the ability to execute DELETE operations.
      • Principle of Least Privilege: Grant users and applications only the minimum necessary permissions.
      • Regular Backups: Implement a robust backup and recovery strategy to ensure that data can be restored in case of accidental or malicious deletion.
      • Audit Logging: Enable detailed audit logging to track all write operations, including deletions, and identify the source of any unauthorized activity.
      • Data Retention Policies: Carefully configure and manage data retention policies to prevent accidental data loss.