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Attack Tree Analysis for leptos-rs/leptos

Objective: Execute Arbitrary Code (Server/Client)

Attack Tree Visualization

                                  [Attacker's Goal: Execute Arbitrary Code (Server/Client)]
                                                  |
                                  -------------------------
                                  |
                  {Compromise Server-Side Logic}
                                  |
                  ---------------------------------
                  |                               |

{{Exploit Server Functions}} [Manipulate SSR/Hydration] | | ------------------------- ------------------------- | | | <> | <<Send Crafted in Server Function] | Data to Server>> | | Before Hydration | | | {Craft Malicious | | Payload to Bypass | | Input Validation} | | | | | | | | <<RCE via crafted | {XSS/Data Leakage data to server>> | via Malformed | Initial State}

  • Description: This is the overarching high-risk area, encompassing attacks that target the server-side components of a Leptos application. Successful attacks here often grant the attacker significant control.
  • Why High-Risk: Server-side compromise typically leads to the most severe consequences, including complete data breaches, system takeover, and the ability to launch further attacks.
  • Description: This path focuses on vulnerabilities within Leptos server functions, which are Rust functions exposed to the client.
  • Why High-Risk: Server functions directly interact with server-side resources (databases, filesystems, etc.), making them prime targets for attackers.

Attack Tree Path: <> (Critical Node)

  • Description: This is the most common and dangerous vulnerability. It occurs when a server function doesn't properly validate or sanitize data received from the client.
  • Attack Vector Details:
    • Mechanism: The attacker sends specially crafted input (e.g., SQL injection payloads, command injection strings, path traversal sequences) to the server function.
    • Exploitation: If the server function uses this input without proper validation, the attacker's code can be executed in the context of the server.
    • Example: A server function that takes a user-provided filename and uses it directly in a file system operation without sanitization is vulnerable to path traversal.
  • Why Critical: This is a fundamental security flaw that is easy to introduce and often leads to high-impact exploits.
  • Description: This represents the attacker's active effort to circumvent any existing (but flawed) input validation.
  • Attack Vector Details:
    • Mechanism: The attacker studies the application's input validation logic (if any) and crafts input that bypasses these checks. This might involve using alternative encodings, exploiting logic flaws, or finding edge cases.
    • Exploitation: Successful bypass allows the attacker to proceed to the next stage (RCE).
  • Why High-Risk: Even with some input validation in place, attackers can often find ways to bypass it if it's not comprehensive and robust.

Attack Tree Path: <> (Critical Node)

  • Description: This is the ultimate goal of many server-side attacks – achieving Remote Code Execution (RCE).
  • Attack Vector Details:
    • Mechanism: The attacker's crafted input, having bypassed validation, is now executed by the server. This could be direct code execution (e.g., through command injection) or indirect execution (e.g., through SQL injection leading to stored procedure execution).
    • Exploitation: The attacker gains the ability to run arbitrary code on the server, potentially with the privileges of the web application user.
    • Consequences: Complete system compromise, data theft, denial of service, and lateral movement within the network.
  • Why Critical: RCE is the highest-impact outcome, giving the attacker near-total control.

Attack Tree Path: [Manipulate SSR/Hydration]

  • Description: This path targets the server-side rendering (SSR) and hydration process, where the server generates the initial HTML and the client-side JavaScript takes over.
  • Why High-Risk (in this context): While SSR/Hydration attacks are generally a concern, the critical aspect is the ability to inject malicious data before hydration, as detailed below.

Attack Tree Path: <> (Critical Node)

  • Description: This is a particularly dangerous attack vector because it exploits the inherent trust placed in server-rendered content.
  • Attack Vector Details:
    • Mechanism: The attacker finds a way to influence the data that the server uses to generate the initial HTML and JavaScript state. This might involve manipulating query parameters, form submissions, or other data sources used during SSR.
    • Exploitation: The server embeds the attacker's malicious data (e.g., an XSS payload) into the initial HTML. When the client loads this HTML, the malicious code is executed before the Leptos client-side code has a chance to take over and potentially mitigate the attack.
    • Example: If the server renders a user's profile name directly into the HTML without escaping, and the attacker has managed to set their profile name to an XSS payload, that payload will be executed when other users view the attacker's profile.
  • Why Critical: This bypasses many client-side defenses because the malicious code is executed before those defenses are fully initialized. It leverages the trust model of SSR.
  • Description: This is the successful outcome of the SSR manipulation attack.
  • Attack Vector Details:
    • Mechanism: The attacker's injected code (typically JavaScript) runs in the context of the victim's browser.
    • Exploitation: The attacker can steal cookies, session tokens, or other sensitive data, redirect the user to a malicious site, deface the page, or perform other actions on behalf of the user.
  • Why High-Risk: XSS is a widespread and versatile attack that can lead to account compromise, data theft, and reputational damage.