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Attack Tree Analysis for mimblewimble/grin

Objective: Compromise Application Using Grin

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Application Using Grin [CRITICAL NODE]
├── OR
│   ├── [HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit Interactive Transaction Weaknesses (Grin Specific) [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   ├── OR
│   │   │   ├── [HIGH-RISK PATH] Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) Attack during Slatepack Exchange [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   │   ├── [HIGH-RISK PATH] Denial of Service (DoS) during Interactive Transaction [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   │   │   ├── OR
│   │   │   │   │   ├── [HIGH-RISK PATH] Flood with Invalid Slatepacks
│   │   │   │   │   └── [HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit Slatepack Processing Vulnerabilities (Parsing, Deserialization)
│   │   │   ├── [HIGH-RISK PATH] Key Compromise during Interactive Transaction [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   │   │   ├── AND
│   │   │   │   │   ├── [HIGH-RISK PATH] Target User's Private Keys used for Grin Transactions [CRITICAL NODE]
│   ├── [HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit Slatepack Vulnerabilities (Format, Parsing, Logic) [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   ├── OR
│   │   │   ├── [HIGH-RISK PATH] Malicious Slatepack Injection [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   │   │   ├── AND
│   │   │   │   │   ├── [HIGH-RISK PATH] Find Injection Point in Application (e.g., API endpoint, file upload)
│   │   │   ├── [HIGH-RISK PATH] Slatepack Format Vulnerabilities (in Grin Library itself) [CRITICAL NODE]
│   ├── [HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit Grin Node Vulnerabilities (Underlying Grin Daemon) [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   ├── OR
│   │   │   ├── [HIGH-RISK PATH] Vulnerabilities in Grin Node Software (Memory Safety, Logic Errors) [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   │   ├── [HIGH-RISK PATH] Grin Node Configuration Weaknesses [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   │   │   ├── AND
│   │   │   │   │   ├── [HIGH-RISK PATH] Misconfigured Grin Node (e.g., open RPC ports, weak authentication)

This is the root goal. Success means the attacker has achieved unauthorized access, control, or disruption of the application using Grin. * It is a critical node because all high-risk paths lead to this objective.

This branch focuses on vulnerabilities arising from Grin's interactive transaction process. * It is a critical node as it encompasses several high-risk attack vectors related to transaction handling.

  • Attack Vector: Attacker intercepts communication channels during the exchange of Slatepack messages between transacting parties. * Impact: Attacker can read, modify, or drop Slatepack messages, potentially leading to transaction manipulation, theft of funds, or denial of service. * Critical Node: Direct path to critical impact.
  • Attack Vector: Attacker disrupts the application's ability to process Grin transactions, causing unavailability or resource exhaustion. * Impact: Application downtime, inability to process transactions, financial losses, reputational damage. * Critical Node: High likelihood and potential for significant disruption.
  • Attack Vector: Attacker sends a large volume of malformed or invalid Slatepack messages to overwhelm the application's processing capabilities. * Impact: Application slowdown or crash, resource exhaustion, preventing legitimate transactions.
  • Attack Vector: Attacker crafts malicious Slatepacks designed to exploit vulnerabilities in the application's Slatepack parsing or deserialization logic (e.g., buffer overflows, format string bugs). * Impact: Application crash, potential code execution, denial of service, data corruption.
  • Attack Vector: Attacker gains access to user's private keys used for Grin transactions. * Impact: Complete loss of user funds, unauthorized transactions, reputational damage. * Critical Node: Direct path to critical impact (loss of funds).
  • Attack Vector: Attacker employs various methods (phishing, malware, social engineering, application vulnerabilities) to steal user's private keys. * Impact: User key compromise, leading to potential fund theft and transaction manipulation. * Critical Node: The step that directly leads to key compromise and its severe consequences.

This branch focuses on vulnerabilities related to the Slatepack format itself and how the application processes it. * It is a critical node as vulnerabilities here can have wide-ranging impacts.

  • Attack Vector: Attacker injects crafted, potentially malicious Slatepacks into the application through various input points (API endpoints, file uploads, etc.). * Impact: DoS, code execution, data manipulation, depending on the vulnerability exploited. * Critical Node: Common and potentially high impact vulnerability type.
  • Attack Vector: Attacker identifies weaknesses in the application's input handling that allow for the injection of arbitrary Slatepack data. * Impact: Enables malicious Slatepack injection attacks.
  • Attack Vector: Vulnerabilities exist within the Grin library's code responsible for handling Slatepack format, parsing, or processing. * Impact: Critical, potentially widespread exploitation across all applications using the vulnerable Grin library version, leading to DoS, code execution, or other severe consequences. * Critical Node: Widespread impact if exploited due to dependency on Grin library.

This branch focuses on vulnerabilities in the Grin node software that the application relies upon. * It is a critical node because compromising the Grin node can directly impact the application.

  • Attack Vector: Exploiting software vulnerabilities (memory safety issues, logic errors) within the Grin node daemon itself. * Impact: Grin node compromise, potentially leading to application compromise, data loss, or denial of service. * Critical Node: Direct path to node compromise and cascading application impact.
  • Attack Vector: Exploiting misconfigurations in the Grin node setup, such as open RPC ports with weak or no authentication. * Impact: Unauthorized access to the Grin node, potentially leading to node control, data access, denial of service, and application compromise. * Critical Node: Common misconfiguration issues leading to node compromise.
  • Attack Vector: The Grin node is deployed with insecure configurations, making it vulnerable to external access and control. * Impact: Enables exploitation of Grin node configuration weaknesses.