attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for neondatabase/neon

Objective: Gain unauthorized access to application data, disrupt application functionality, or gain control over the application's environment by exploiting vulnerabilities or weaknesses inherent in the Neon database platform.

Attack Tree Visualization

• Root: Compromise Application Using Neon Database [CRITICAL NODE]
  • 1. Exploit Neon Control Plane Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
    • 1.1. Authentication/Authorization Bypass [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
      • 1.1.1. Weak Credentials/Default Passwords (Control Plane APIs/Admin Interfaces) [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • 1.1.2. API Authentication Flaws (e.g., JWT vulnerabilities, insecure API keys) [HIGH RISK PATH]
    • 1.2. Control Plane Infrastructure Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
      • 1.2.1. Vulnerabilities in Control Plane Services (e.g., Kubernetes, Orchestration tools, Custom Services) [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • 1.2.2. Insecure Configuration of Control Plane Components [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • 1.2.3. Denial of Service (DoS) against Control Plane [HIGH RISK PATH]
    • 1.3. Data Exfiltration via Control Plane [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
      • 1.3.1. API Abuse for Data Extraction (Exploit Control Plane APIs to access/dump data) [HIGH RISK PATH]
  • 2. Exploit Neon Compute Node (Postgres) Vulnerabilities (Neon-Specific) [HIGH RISK PATH]
    • 2.3. Data Access via Compromised Compute Node [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
      • 2.3.1. Direct Database Access after Compute Node Compromise (Standard SQL injection, etc. - but in Neon context) [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
  • 3. Exploit Neon Storage Layer (Pageserver/Safekeepers) Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
    • 3.1. Pageserver/Safekeeper Code Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
      • 3.1.1. Memory Corruption Vulnerabilities (Buffer overflows, use-after-free, etc.) [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • 3.1.2. Logic Bugs in Pageserver/Safekeeper (Leading to data corruption, access bypass, etc.) [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • 3.1.3. Denial of Service against Pageserver/Safekeeper [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • 3.1.4. Insecure Deserialization Vulnerabilities (If Pageserver/Safekeeper uses serialization) [HIGH RISK PATH]
    • 3.2. Access Control Vulnerabilities in Storage Layer [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • 3.2.1. Bypass Access Controls to Pageserver/Safekeeper APIs (If exposed) [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • 3.2.2. Data Leakage due to Insecure Storage Layer Permissions [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • 3.2.3. Cross-Tenant Data Access Vulnerabilities (If Neon is multi-tenant) [HIGH RISK PATH]
    • 3.3. Data Corruption/Integrity Attacks on Storage Layer [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • 3.3.1. Malicious Data Modification in Pageserver/Safekeeper (Leading to data integrity issues) [HIGH RISK PATH]
  • 4. Exploit Neon Network Infrastructure Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH]
    • 4.1. Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) Attacks on Neon Internal Communication [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • 4.1.1. Intercepting Communication between Compute Nodes and Pageserver/Safekeepers [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • 4.1.2. Intercepting Communication between Control Plane and other Neon Components [HIGH RISK PATH]
    • 4.3. External Network Exposure of Internal Neon Services [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
      • 4.3.1. Accidental Exposure of Control Plane APIs to Public Internet [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
      • 4.3.2. Unintended Exposure of Pageserver/Safekeeper Ports to Public Internet [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
  • 5. Social Engineering/Phishing Attacks Targeting Neon Operators/Administrators [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
    • 5.1. Phishing for Credentials to Neon Control Plane/Infrastructure [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Exploit Neon Control Plane Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

• 1.1. Authentication/Authorization Bypass [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

  • 1.1.1. Weak Credentials/Default Passwords (Control Plane APIs/Admin Interfaces) [HIGH RISK PATH]:
    • Attack Vector: Brute-forcing or guessing weak passwords, exploiting default credentials on control plane APIs or admin interfaces.
    • Vulnerabilities: Lack of strong password policies, presence of default credentials, missing multi-factor authentication.
  • 1.1.2. API Authentication Flaws (e.g., JWT vulnerabilities, insecure API keys) [HIGH RISK PATH]:
    • Attack Vector: Exploiting vulnerabilities in JWT implementation (e.g., algorithm confusion, signature bypass), stealing or compromising API keys, insecure key storage or rotation.
    • Vulnerabilities: Weak API design, flawed JWT validation logic, insecure API key management.

• 1.2. Control Plane Infrastructure Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

  • 1.2.1. Vulnerabilities in Control Plane Services (e.g., Kubernetes, Orchestration tools, Custom Services) [HIGH RISK PATH]:
    • Attack Vector: Exploiting known or zero-day vulnerabilities in Kubernetes, orchestration tools, or custom services that comprise the control plane.
    • Vulnerabilities: Unpatched software, misconfigurations in control plane services, vulnerable dependencies.
  • 1.2.2. Insecure Configuration of Control Plane Components [HIGH RISK PATH]:
    • Attack Vector: Exploiting misconfigurations in Kubernetes, orchestration tools, or other control plane components (e.g., overly permissive RBAC, insecure network policies, exposed management interfaces).
    • Vulnerabilities: Default configurations, lack of security hardening, misapplied security settings.
  • 1.2.3. Denial of Service (DoS) against Control Plane [HIGH RISK PATH]:
    • Attack Vector: Flooding control plane services with requests, resource exhaustion attacks, exploiting application-level DoS vulnerabilities in control plane components.
    • Vulnerabilities: Lack of rate limiting, insufficient resource allocation, vulnerable control plane service implementations.

• 1.3. Data Exfiltration via Control Plane [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

  • 1.3.1. API Abuse for Data Extraction (Exploit Control Plane APIs to access/dump data) [HIGH RISK PATH]:
    • Attack Vector: Abusing legitimate control plane APIs (after gaining unauthorized access) to extract sensitive data, potentially bypassing intended access controls or audit logging.
    • Vulnerabilities: Overly permissive API access controls, insufficient rate limiting, inadequate audit logging, lack of input validation or output encoding in APIs handling sensitive data.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit Neon Compute Node (Postgres) Vulnerabilities (Neon-Specific) [HIGH RISK PATH]:

• 2.3. Data Access via Compromised Compute Node [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:
  • 2.3.1. Direct Database Access after Compute Node Compromise (Standard SQL injection, etc. - but in Neon context) [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:
    • Attack Vector: Exploiting SQL injection vulnerabilities in the application interacting with the Neon Postgres compute node, or other database vulnerabilities after gaining some level of access to the compute node.
    • Vulnerabilities: Lack of input validation, use of dynamic SQL queries, database misconfigurations, weak database access controls.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Exploit Neon Storage Layer (Pageserver/Safekeepers) Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

• 3.1. Pageserver/Safekeeper Code Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

  • 3.1.1. Memory Corruption Vulnerabilities (Buffer overflows, use-after-free, etc.) [HIGH RISK PATH]:
    • Attack Vector: Exploiting memory corruption vulnerabilities in the Pageserver or Safekeeper code to gain control of the process, potentially leading to data access, corruption, or DoS.
    • Vulnerabilities: Unsafe memory handling in C/C++ code, lack of memory safety checks, vulnerabilities introduced during development.
  • 3.1.2. Logic Bugs in Pageserver/Safekeeper (Leading to data corruption, access bypass, etc.) [HIGH RISK PATH]:
    • Attack Vector: Exploiting logical flaws in the Pageserver or Safekeeper code to bypass access controls, corrupt data, or cause unexpected behavior.
    • Vulnerabilities: Complex logic in distributed systems, insufficient testing, overlooked edge cases.
  • 3.1.3. Denial of Service against Pageserver/Safekeeper [HIGH RISK PATH]:
    • Attack Vector: Sending crafted requests or exploiting resource exhaustion vulnerabilities in Pageserver or Safekeeper to disrupt storage layer availability.
    • Vulnerabilities: Lack of rate limiting, inefficient resource management, vulnerable code paths exposed to external input.
  • 3.1.4. Insecure Deserialization Vulnerabilities (If Pageserver/Safekeeper uses serialization) [HIGH RISK PATH]:
    • Attack Vector: Exploiting insecure deserialization vulnerabilities in Pageserver or Safekeeper (if they use serialization) to execute arbitrary code or gain control.
    • Vulnerabilities: Deserialization of untrusted data, use of vulnerable serialization libraries.

• 3.2. Access Control Vulnerabilities in Storage Layer [HIGH RISK PATH]:

  • 3.2.1. Bypass Access Controls to Pageserver/Safekeeper APIs (If exposed) [HIGH RISK PATH]:
    • Attack Vector: Bypassing authentication or authorization mechanisms protecting Pageserver or Safekeeper APIs (if they are exposed for management or internal communication).
    • Vulnerabilities: Weak API authentication, flawed authorization logic, insecure API design.
  • 3.2.2. Data Leakage due to Insecure Storage Layer Permissions [HIGH RISK PATH]:
    • Attack Vector: Exploiting overly permissive file system permissions or access control lists on the storage layer to directly access data files or backups.
    • Vulnerabilities: Misconfigured file system permissions, weak access control policies on storage resources.
  • 3.2.3. Cross-Tenant Data Access Vulnerabilities (If Neon is multi-tenant) [HIGH RISK PATH]:
    • Attack Vector: Exploiting flaws in tenant isolation mechanisms to access data belonging to other tenants in a multi-tenant Neon deployment.
    • Vulnerabilities: Weak tenant separation in code, misconfigurations in multi-tenancy implementation, insufficient testing of tenant isolation.

• 3.3. Data Corruption/Integrity Attacks on Storage Layer [HIGH RISK PATH]:

  • 3.3.1. Malicious Data Modification in Pageserver/Safekeeper (Leading to data integrity issues) [HIGH RISK PATH]:
    • Attack Vector: Gaining write access to the storage layer (after compromising other components) and maliciously modifying data, leading to data integrity issues and application malfunction.
    • Vulnerabilities: Weak write access controls on storage layer, lack of data integrity checks, insufficient audit logging of data modifications.

Attack Tree Path: 4. Exploit Neon Network Infrastructure Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH]:

• 4.1. Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) Attacks on Neon Internal Communication [HIGH RISK PATH]:

  • 4.1.1. Intercepting Communication between Compute Nodes and Pageserver/Safekeepers [HIGH RISK PATH]:
    • Attack Vector: Performing a Man-in-the-Middle attack to intercept communication between compute nodes and Pageservers/Safekeepers, potentially stealing data in transit or manipulating communication.
    • Vulnerabilities: Lack of encryption on internal communication channels, missing mutual authentication between components.
  • 4.1.2. Intercepting Communication between Control Plane and other Neon Components [HIGH RISK PATH]:
    • Attack Vector: Performing a Man-in-the-Middle attack to intercept communication between the control plane and other Neon components, potentially compromising control plane operations or stealing sensitive information.
    • Vulnerabilities: Lack of encryption on control plane communication, insecure control plane network.

• 4.3. External Network Exposure of Internal Neon Services [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

  • 4.3.1. Accidental Exposure of Control Plane APIs to Public Internet [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:
    • Attack Vector: Control plane APIs unintentionally exposed to the public internet due to misconfiguration, allowing unauthorized access from external networks.
    • Vulnerabilities: Misconfigured network settings, overly permissive firewall rules, lack of network security audits.
  • 4.3.2. Unintended Exposure of Pageserver/Safekeeper Ports to Public Internet [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:
    • Attack Vector: Pageserver or Safekeeper ports unintentionally exposed to the public internet, potentially allowing direct access to storage layer services from external networks.
    • Vulnerabilities: Misconfigured network settings, overly permissive firewall rules, lack of network security audits, default configurations exposing internal ports.

Attack Tree Path: 5. Social Engineering/Phishing Attacks Targeting Neon Operators/Administrators [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

• 5.1. Phishing for Credentials to Neon Control Plane/Infrastructure [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:
  • Attack Vector: Phishing attacks targeting Neon operators or administrators to steal credentials for accessing the control plane or other Neon infrastructure components.
  • Vulnerabilities: Lack of security awareness training, absence of multi-factor authentication, reliance on password-based authentication alone.