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Attack Surface Analysis for neondatabase/neon

  • 1. Compromised Neon Credentials

    • Description: Unauthorized access to the Neon database due to leaked or stolen API keys, connection strings, or Neon user account credentials.
    • How Neon Contributes: Neon's authentication relies entirely on these credentials. API keys and connection strings are the method for programmatic access; user accounts control console access.
    • Example: A developer accidentally commits a Neon connection string to a public GitHub repository. An attacker finds the string and uses it to connect to the database. Alternatively, an attacker phishes a Neon user's console credentials.
    • Impact: Complete database compromise (data theft, modification, deletion). Potential for lateral movement if the compromised credentials have broader access.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Never commit credentials to source control. Use environment variables or dedicated secrets management services.
      • Implement robust key rotation policies. Rotate API keys regularly.
      • Enforce strong password policies and mandatory multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all Neon user accounts (console access).
      • Use short-lived tokens instead of long-lived API keys where possible (if supported by Neon).
      • Monitor API key usage for anomalies.
      • Principle of Least Privilege: Grant only the minimum necessary permissions.
  • 2. Exploitation of Neon Platform Vulnerabilities

    • Description: Zero-day vulnerabilities or misconfigurations in Neon's own infrastructure (compute instances, API, control plane, etc.). This is a vulnerability within Neon itself.
    • How Neon Contributes: This is inherent to using a managed service. The security of the underlying platform is Neon's responsibility.
    • Example: A newly discovered vulnerability in Neon's API allows an attacker to bypass authentication and access databases belonging to other users.
    • Impact: Potentially wide-ranging, from data breaches to denial-of-service, depending on the vulnerability.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Stay informed about Neon's security advisories and apply updates promptly. This is the most critical mitigation for a managed service.
      • Have a robust incident response plan, including procedures for dealing with vulnerabilities in third-party services like Neon.
      • Consider architectural approaches to reduce reliance on a single vendor (e.g., multi-cloud, database replication). This is a higher-effort, long-term mitigation.
      • Monitor Neon's status pages and communications.
  • 3. Data Exfiltration from Compromised Neon Compute

    • Description: An attacker gains access to a Neon compute instance (the serverless environment that executes queries) and exfiltrates data. This is an attack on Neon's infrastructure.
    • How Neon Contributes: Neon's serverless architecture relies on these compute instances. Their security is entirely Neon's responsibility.
    • Example: A zero-day vulnerability in the Postgres version used by Neon allows an attacker to gain shell access to a compute instance and copy data.
    • Impact: Data breach. The attacker could potentially access data from multiple databases if the compute instance is shared.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Primarily, rely on Neon's security patching and vulnerability management. This is a core responsibility of the service provider.
      • If Neon provides any visibility into compute instance activity (logs, metrics), monitor for unusual behavior (though this is unlikely to be detailed).
      • Consider data loss prevention (DLP) solutions if available and applicable within the Neon environment (unlikely, but worth checking).
      • Encrypt sensitive data at rest within the database itself (application-level or using pgcrypto). This adds a layer of defense even if the compute instance is compromised, but it's not a direct mitigation against compute compromise itself. It mitigates the impact.
  • 4. Network-Based Attacks (MitM) targeting Neon connection
  • Description: Interception of communication between the application and the Neon database, despite the use of HTTPS. * How Neon Contributes: Neon relies on network communication (over the internet) for all interactions. While Neon uses HTTPS, vulnerabilities in TLS or compromised CAs are still a risk that affects connection to Neon. * Example: An attacker on a compromised network uses a fake certificate to perform a Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack, intercepting the connection between the application and Neon. * Impact: The attacker can potentially capture sensitive data in transit, including queries and results. They might also be able to modify data being sent to or from the database. * Risk Severity: High * Mitigation Strategies:
    • Ensure the application uses up-to-date TLS libraries and correctly validates certificate chains.
    • Consider certificate pinning (with careful management to avoid operational issues).
    • Use a trusted network and avoid public Wi-Fi for sensitive operations.
    • If supported by Neon and your cloud provider, use VPC peering or private links to establish a more secure network connection.