Objective: Exfiltrate Sensitive Data from Neon Database
Goal: Exfiltrate Sensitive Data from Neon Database
├── 1. Compromise Neon Control Plane [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├── 1.1 Exploit Vulnerabilities in Neon API [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ ├── 1.1.1 Authentication Bypass in API [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ └── 1.1.1.1 Flaw in JWT Validation (Neon-specific implementation) │ │ ├── 1.1.2 Authorization Bypass in API [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ └── 1.1.2.1 Role Escalation due to misconfigured permissions in Neon's internal RBAC ├── 2. Compromise Compute Instance (Postgres) [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├── 2.1 Exploit Neon-Specific Postgres Extensions or Modifications [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ ├── 2.1.1 Vulnerability in Pageserver communication [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ └── 2.1.1.1 Intercept or manipulate data transfer between compute and storage layers. │ ├── 2.2 Exploit Weaknesses in Compute Instance Configuration [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├── 2.2.1 Default or Weak Postgres Credentials [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ │ └── 2.2.1.1 Neon's provisioning process uses default or easily guessable credentials. │ │ ├── 2.2.2 Misconfigured Network Policies [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ │ └── 2.2.2.1 Compute instance is exposed to the public internet or has overly permissive firewall rules. └── 3. Compromise Storage Layer (Pageserver) [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] ├── 3.1 Exploit Vulnerabilities in Pageserver Code [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├── 3.1.1 Buffer Overflow in Pageserver │ │ └── 3.1.1.1 Exploit a buffer overflow to execute arbitrary code on the Pageserver. │ ├── 3.1.2 Authentication/Authorization Bypass in Pageserver [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ └── 3.1.2.1 Bypass authentication to directly access data stored on the Pageserver. └── 3.3 Exploit Weaknesses in Data Encryption └── 3.3.2 Key Management Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE] └── 3.3.2.1 Exploit flaws in Neon's key management system to gain access to encryption keys.
Attack Tree Path: 1. Compromise Neon Control Plane [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
- Description: Gaining unauthorized access to the Neon control plane, which manages all aspects of the Neon service. This is the most critical attack vector, as it provides the attacker with the highest level of privilege.
- Impact: Complete control over the Neon service, including the ability to create, delete, modify, and access any database. Potential for widespread data exfiltration, service disruption, and reputational damage.
- Sub-Vectors:
Attack Tree Path: 1.1 Exploit Vulnerabilities in Neon API [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
* **Description:** Leveraging flaws in the Neon API to bypass security controls. The API is the primary interface for interacting with Neon, making it a high-value target.
* **Impact:** Similar to compromising the entire control plane, but potentially limited to the scope of the exploited API vulnerability.
* **Sub-Vectors:**
Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1 Authentication Bypass in API [HIGH-RISK PATH]
* **1.1.1.1 Flaw in JWT Validation (Neon-specific implementation):**
* **Description:** Exploiting a weakness in how Neon validates JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) to impersonate a legitimate user or gain unauthorized access.
* **Likelihood:** Low
* **Impact:** Very High
* **Effort:** Medium
* **Skill Level:** Advanced
* **Detection Difficulty:** Medium
Attack Tree Path: 1.1.2 Authorization Bypass in API [HIGH-RISK PATH]
* **1.1.2.1 Role Escalation due to misconfigured permissions in Neon's internal RBAC:**
* **Description:** Exploiting a misconfiguration in Neon's role-based access control (RBAC) system to gain privileges beyond those intended for the attacker's role.
* **Likelihood:** Medium
* **Impact:** High
* **Effort:** Medium
* **Skill Level:** Intermediate
* **Detection Difficulty:** Medium
Attack Tree Path: 2. Compromise Compute Instance (Postgres) [HIGH-RISK PATH]
- Description: Gaining unauthorized access to the Postgres compute instance running the user's database.
- Impact: Direct access to the database, allowing for data exfiltration, modification, or deletion.
- Sub-Vectors:
* **Description:** Targeting vulnerabilities in code that is unique to Neon's implementation of Postgres.
* **Impact:** High, as these vulnerabilities are specific to Neon and may not be widely known or patched.
* **Sub-Vectors:**
Attack Tree Path: 2.1.1 Vulnerability in Pageserver communication [HIGH-RISK PATH]
* **2.1.1.1 Intercept or manipulate data transfer between compute and storage layers:**
* **Description:** Exploiting a flaw in the communication between the Postgres compute instance and the Pageserver (storage layer) to intercept or modify data in transit.
* **Likelihood:** Low
* **Impact:** High
* **Effort:** High
* **Skill Level:** Expert
* **Detection Difficulty:** Hard
* **Description:** Taking advantage of misconfigurations in the compute instance's setup.
* **Impact:** Variable, depending on the specific misconfiguration, but can range from denial of service to complete data compromise.
* **Sub-Vectors:**
Attack Tree Path: 2.2.1 Default or Weak Postgres Credentials [CRITICAL NODE]
* **2.2.1.1 Neon's provisioning process uses default or easily guessable credentials:**
* **Description:** Neon's automated provisioning process uses default or easily guessable credentials for the Postgres database. This is a critical vulnerability if present.
* **Likelihood:** Low (Neon should *not* do this)
* **Impact:** Very High
* **Effort:** Very Low
* **Skill Level:** Novice
* **Detection Difficulty:** Easy
Attack Tree Path: 2.2.2 Misconfigured Network Policies [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
* **2.2.2.1 Compute instance is exposed to the public internet or has overly permissive firewall rules:**
* **Description:** The compute instance is accessible from the public internet or has firewall rules that allow unauthorized access.
* **Likelihood:** Medium
* **Impact:** High
* **Effort:** Low
* **Skill Level:** Intermediate
* **Detection Difficulty:** Easy
- Description: Gaining unauthorized access to the Pageserver, which stores the actual database data.
- Impact: Direct access to the raw data, bypassing any security controls within the Postgres compute instance.
- Sub-Vectors:
* **Description:** Targeting vulnerabilities in the code that implements the Pageserver.
* **Impact:** Very High, as this provides direct access to the data.
* **Sub-Vectors:**
Attack Tree Path: 3.1.1 Buffer Overflow in Pageserver
* **3.1.1.1 Exploit a buffer overflow to execute arbitrary code on the Pageserver:**
* **Description:** Exploiting a buffer overflow vulnerability in the Pageserver code to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the Pageserver process.
* **Likelihood:** Low
* **Impact:** Very High
* **Effort:** High
* **Skill Level:** Expert
* **Detection Difficulty:** Hard
Attack Tree Path: 3.1.2 Authentication/Authorization Bypass in Pageserver [HIGH-RISK PATH]
* **3.1.2.1 Bypass authentication to directly access data stored on the Pageserver:**
* **Description:** Bypassing the authentication mechanisms of the Pageserver to directly access the stored data without proper credentials.
* **Likelihood:** Low
* **Impact:** Very High
* **Effort:** High
* **Skill Level:** Expert
* **Detection Difficulty:** Hard
Attack Tree Path: 3.3 Exploit Weaknesses in Data Encryption
* **Description:** Circumventing encryption mechanisms to access data at rest.
* **Impact:** Very High, as it exposes the raw data.
* **Sub-Vectors:**
Attack Tree Path: 3.3.2 Key Management Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]
* **3.3.2.1 Exploit flaws in Neon's key management system to gain access to encryption keys:**
* **Description:** Exploiting weaknesses in how Neon manages encryption keys to gain access to the keys used to encrypt data at rest.
* **Likelihood:** Low
* **Impact:** Very High
* **Effort:** High
* **Skill Level:** Expert
* **Detection Difficulty:** Very Hard