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Attack Tree Analysis for pyros2097/rust-embed

Objective: Compromise an application using rust-embed by exploiting vulnerabilities related to the library's functionality.

Attack Tree Visualization

[CR] Attack Goal: Compromise Application Using rust-embed

[CR] 1.0 Exploit Input to rust-embed (Compile-Time) └── [CR][HR] 1.1 Supply Malicious Files for Embedding ├── [CR][HR] 1.1.2 Embed HTML/JS with Malicious Scripts │ └── [HR] 1.1.2.1 Application serves embedded HTML without proper sanitization │ └── [HR] 1.1.2.1.1 Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via embedded HTML └── [CR][HR] 1.1.3 Embed Files with Path Traversal Payloads └── [HR] 1.1.3.1 Application uses embedded file paths directly without sanitization └── [HR] 1.1.3.1.1 Information Disclosure (accessing unintended files)

[CR] 3.0 Exploit Runtime Access to Embedded Assets └── [CR][HR] 3.1 Lack of Access Control on Embedded Assets └── [HR] 3.1.1 Direct Access to all Embedded Assets (if application doesn't implement access control) └── [HR] 3.1.1.1 Information Disclosure (accessing sensitive embedded data) └── [CR] 3.2 Vulnerabilities in Application Logic Using Embedded Assets └── [HR] 3.2.3 Path Traversal in Application Logic accessing Embedded Files └── [HR] 3.2.3.1 Application uses user-controlled input to access embedded file paths └── [HR] 3.2.3.1.1 Information Disclosure (accessing unintended embedded files)

Attack Tree Path: Critical Node: 1.0 Exploit Input to rust-embed (Compile-Time)

  • Attack Vector: This critical node represents the fundamental risk of attackers influencing the files that are embedded into the application during the build process. If an attacker can control or manipulate these input files, they can inject malicious content directly into the application binary.
  • Threat: Compromising the input to rust-embed can lead to various vulnerabilities, from client-side attacks like XSS to information disclosure and potentially even code execution depending on how the application uses the embedded assets.
  • Actionable Insights:
    • Input Validation: Implement strict validation and sanitization of all files intended for embedding.
    • Source Control: Maintain strict control over the source of embedded files, ideally from trusted and version-controlled repositories.
    • Build Environment Security: Secure the build environment to prevent unauthorized modification of files during the build process.

Attack Tree Path: Critical Node & High-Risk Path: 1.1 Supply Malicious Files for Embedding

  • Attack Vector: This is the most direct and impactful way to exploit the input to rust-embed. An attacker aims to provide malicious files that will be embedded into the application.
  • Threat: Successful supply of malicious files can lead to a wide range of attacks depending on the file type and how the application processes it. This includes XSS, information disclosure, and potentially code execution if the application mishandles embedded executables or data.
  • Actionable Insights:
    • File Type Restrictions: Restrict the types of files that are allowed to be embedded. Avoid embedding executables or other potentially dangerous file types unless absolutely necessary and with stringent security measures.
    • Content Scanning: Implement automated scanning of files before embedding to detect known malicious patterns or suspicious content.
    • Human Review: For sensitive applications, consider manual review of embedded files, especially those containing dynamic content like HTML or JavaScript.

Attack Tree Path: High-Risk Path: 1.1 -> 1.1.2 -> 1.1.2.1 -> 1.1.2.1.1 Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via embedded HTML

  • Attack Vector: An attacker injects malicious JavaScript code into HTML files that are then embedded using rust-embed. If the application serves these embedded HTML files to users without proper sanitization, the malicious JavaScript will execute in the user's browser.
  • Threat: XSS can allow attackers to steal user session cookies, redirect users to malicious websites, deface the application, or perform actions on behalf of the user.
  • Actionable Insights:
    • HTML Sanitization: Always sanitize embedded HTML content before serving it to users. Use a robust HTML sanitization library (like ammonia in Rust) to remove or escape potentially malicious JavaScript code.
    • Content Security Policy (CSP): Implement a strong Content Security Policy to limit the capabilities of JavaScript execution in the browser and mitigate the impact of XSS vulnerabilities.
    • Regular Audits: Regularly audit embedded HTML and JavaScript files for potential XSS vulnerabilities, especially if the content is dynamically generated or comes from less trusted sources.

Attack Tree Path: High-Risk Path: 1.1 -> 1.1.3 -> 1.1.3.1 -> 1.1.3.1.1 Information Disclosure (accessing unintended files)

  • Attack Vector: An attacker crafts file names with path traversal sequences (e.g., ../../sensitive_file.txt) and includes them in the files to be embedded. If the application later uses these embedded file paths directly without proper validation, an attacker might be able to access files outside the intended embedded directory.
  • Threat: Information disclosure, potentially exposing sensitive configuration files, source code, or other confidential data that should not be publicly accessible.
  • Actionable Insights:
    • Path Sanitization: When using embedded file paths in application logic, always sanitize and canonicalize them to prevent path traversal attacks. Ensure that paths are within the expected embedded directory.
    • Abstraction Layer: Create an abstraction layer for accessing embedded assets that does not directly expose file paths to user input or external manipulation.
    • File Access Controls: Implement file system access controls to limit the application's ability to access files outside the intended embedded directory, even if path traversal vulnerabilities exist in the code.

Attack Tree Path: Critical Node: 3.0 Exploit Runtime Access to Embedded Assets

  • Attack Vector: This critical node focuses on vulnerabilities that arise during the application's runtime when it accesses and uses the embedded assets. Even if the embedding process itself is secure, vulnerabilities can be introduced in how the application handles these assets.
  • Threat: Runtime vulnerabilities related to embedded assets can range from information disclosure and denial of service to arbitrary code execution, depending on the specific vulnerability and how the application is designed.
  • Actionable Insights:
    • Secure Coding Practices: Apply secure coding practices when working with embedded assets in application logic. Be particularly careful with user input, deserialization, template rendering, and file path handling.
    • Regular Security Testing: Perform regular security testing of the application's runtime behavior, specifically focusing on how it interacts with embedded assets.
    • Principle of Least Privilege: Design the application to operate with the minimum necessary privileges when accessing and processing embedded assets.

Attack Tree Path: Critical Node & High-Risk Path: 3.1 Lack of Access Control on Embedded Assets

  • Attack Vector: If the application directly serves embedded assets without any access control mechanisms, any user can potentially access all embedded files by simply knowing or guessing their paths.
  • Threat: Information disclosure, potentially exposing sensitive data embedded within the assets.
  • Actionable Insights:
    • Authentication and Authorization: Implement proper authentication and authorization mechanisms to control access to embedded assets. Do not assume that embedded assets are inherently protected.
    • Access Control Lists (ACLs): If necessary, implement fine-grained access control lists to restrict access to specific embedded assets based on user roles or permissions.
    • Default Deny: Adopt a "default deny" approach to access control. Explicitly define which assets are publicly accessible and restrict access to all others by default.

Attack Tree Path: High-Risk Path: 3.1 -> 3.1.1 -> 3.1.1.1 Information Disclosure (accessing sensitive embedded data)

  • Attack Vector: Attackers directly request embedded assets, exploiting the lack of access control to retrieve sensitive information that might be stored within these assets.
  • Threat: Exposure of confidential data, which could include API keys, configuration details, user data, or intellectual property, depending on what is embedded.
  • Actionable Insights:
    • Identify Sensitive Data: Carefully identify any sensitive data that might be embedded in assets.
    • Avoid Embedding Sensitive Data: If possible, avoid embedding highly sensitive data directly. Consider alternative storage and access methods for sensitive information, such as databases or secure configuration management systems.
    • Implement Access Control (as mentioned in 3.1): Crucially, implement access control to protect sensitive embedded assets from unauthorized access.

Attack Tree Path: High-Risk Path: 3.2 -> 3.2.3 -> 3.2.3.1 -> 3.2.3.1.1 Information Disclosure (accessing unintended embedded files)

  • Attack Vector: Similar to path traversal during embedding (1.1.3), but this occurs at runtime within the application logic. If the application uses user-controlled input to access embedded files and doesn't properly sanitize the input, attackers can use path traversal sequences to access embedded files they are not intended to see.
  • Threat: Information disclosure, potentially allowing attackers to read embedded files containing sensitive information or application logic.
  • Actionable Insights:
    • Input Validation and Sanitization (Runtime): Validate and sanitize any user input that is used to construct paths to embedded files at runtime.
    • Path Canonicalization: Canonicalize file paths to remove path traversal sequences before using them to access embedded assets.
    • Secure File Access API: Use a secure file access API or abstraction layer that prevents direct file path manipulation and enforces access controls.