attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for pyros2097/rust-embed

Objective: Compromise Application via rust-embed

Attack Tree Visualization

Goal: Compromise Application via rust-embed
├── 1. Execute Arbitrary Code (Server-Side)
│   ├── 1.1  Exploit Deserialization Vulnerability in Asset Handling (IF EXISTS) [HIGH RISK]
│   │   ├── 1.1.1  Craft Malicious Asset with Deserialization Payload
│   │   │   └── 1.1.1.1  Identify Deserialization Logic (e.g., if custom `from_bytes` is used) [CRITICAL]
│   │   │   └── 1.1.1.2  Find Gadget Chain in Application or Dependencies [CRITICAL]
│   │   └── 1.1.2  Trigger Deserialization of Malicious Asset
│   │       └── 1.1.2.1  Manipulate Asset Request (if dynamic asset loading is used) [CRITICAL]
│   ├── 1.2  Exploit Memory Corruption Vulnerability in Asset Handling (IF EXISTS) [HIGH RISK]
│   │   ├── 1.2.1  Craft Malicious Asset to Trigger Buffer Overflow/Underflow
│   │   │   └── 1.2.1.1  Analyze `rust-embed` Code for Unsafe Operations [CRITICAL]
│   │   │   └── 1.2.1.2  Identify Vulnerable Code Path (e.g., in custom `from_bytes` or asset processing) [CRITICAL]
│   │   └── 1.2.2  Trigger Vulnerability via Asset Request
│   │       └── 1.2.2.1  Manipulate Asset Request (if dynamic asset loading is used) [CRITICAL]
│
├── 2. Execute Arbitrary Code (Client-Side)
│   ├── 2.1  Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via Embedded Asset [HIGH RISK]
│   │   ├── 2.1.1  Embed Malicious JavaScript in Asset (e.g., SVG, HTML) [CRITICAL]
│   │   │   └── 2.1.1.1  Bypass Content Security Policy (CSP) (if any)
│   │   │   └── 2.1.1.2  Find XSS Vector in Application's Handling of Embedded Asset [CRITICAL]
│   │   └── 2.1.2  Trigger Execution of Malicious JavaScript [CRITICAL]
│   │       └── 2.1.2.1  Ensure Asset is Loaded and Rendered by Browser
│
└── 3. Exfiltrate Sensitive Data
    ├── 3.1  Accidental Inclusion of Sensitive Data in Embedded Assets [HIGH RISK]
    │   ├── 3.1.1  Developer Error: Embed Secrets, API Keys, etc. [CRITICAL]
    │   └── 3.1.2  Attacker Accesses Embedded Assets [CRITICAL]
    │       └── 3.1.2.1  Direct Access to Binary (if publicly available)

Attack Tree Path: 1. Execute Arbitrary Code (Server-Side)

• 1.1 Exploit Deserialization Vulnerability:

  • Description: This attack exploits vulnerabilities that arise when the application deserializes data from embedded assets without proper validation. rust-embed itself doesn't deserialize the content of assets, but the application using it might.
  • 1.1.1.1 Identify Deserialization Logic: The attacker needs to find where the application deserializes data from the embedded assets. This often involves looking for custom from_bytes implementations or the use of deserialization libraries (like serde) on the asset data.
    • Likelihood: Low
    • Impact: Very High (RCE)
    • Effort: Medium to High
    • Skill Level: Advanced
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard
  • 1.1.1.2 Find Gadget Chain: If deserialization is present, the attacker needs to find a "gadget chain" – a sequence of existing code in the application or its dependencies that can be chained together to achieve arbitrary code execution during the deserialization process.
    • Likelihood: Low to Medium
    • Impact: Very High (RCE)
    • Effort: High to Very High
    • Skill Level: Expert
    • Detection Difficulty: Hard
  • 1.1.2.1 Manipulate Asset Request: If the application dynamically loads assets based on user input (which is not the intended use of rust-embed), the attacker might be able to manipulate the request to trigger the deserialization of a crafted malicious asset.
    • Likelihood: Low
    • Impact: Very High (RCE)
    • Effort: Medium
    • Skill Level: Intermediate to Advanced
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium

• 1.2 Exploit Memory Corruption Vulnerability:

  • Description: This attack targets potential memory safety vulnerabilities (like buffer overflows or use-after-free errors) in the handling of embedded assets. While Rust aims for memory safety, bugs can still exist, especially in unsafe code or in the interaction with C libraries.
  • 1.2.1.1 Analyze rust-embed Code for Unsafe Operations: The attacker would need to analyze the source code of rust-embed and any related application code that processes the embedded assets, looking for unsafe blocks or potentially vulnerable operations.
    • Likelihood: Very Low
    • Impact: Very High (RCE)
    • Effort: Very High
    • Skill Level: Expert
    • Detection Difficulty: Very Hard
  • 1.2.1.2 Identify Vulnerable Code Path: The attacker needs to find a specific code path that can be triggered by a crafted asset to cause a memory corruption error. This often involves fuzzing or static analysis.
    • Likelihood: Very Low
    • Impact: Very High (RCE)
    • Effort: Very High
    • Skill Level: Expert
    • Detection Difficulty: Very Hard
  • 1.2.2.1 Manipulate Asset Request: Similar to the deserialization attack, if dynamic asset loading is used (incorrectly), the attacker might be able to control which asset is loaded, potentially triggering the vulnerability.
    • Likelihood: Very Low
    • Impact: Very High (RCE)
    • Effort: Very High
    • Skill Level: Expert
    • Detection Difficulty: Very Hard

Attack Tree Path: 2. Execute Arbitrary Code (Client-Side)

• 2.1 Cross-Site Scripting (XSS):
  • Description: This attack involves injecting malicious JavaScript code into the client's browser via an embedded asset. This can happen if the application doesn't properly sanitize or encode the content of embedded assets before displaying them.
  • 2.1.1 Embed Malicious JavaScript: The attacker crafts an asset (e.g., an SVG image or an HTML file) that contains malicious JavaScript code.
    • 2.1.1.1 Bypass Content Security Policy (CSP): If a CSP is in place, the attacker needs to find a way to bypass it, for example, by finding a whitelisted domain that can be abused or by exploiting a misconfiguration in the CSP.
      • Likelihood: Low (If CSP is well-configured)
      • Impact: High (Client-side compromise)
      • Effort: Medium to High
      • Skill Level: Intermediate to Advanced
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard
    • 2.1.1.2 Find XSS Vector: The attacker needs to identify how the application handles the embedded asset and find a way to inject the script so that it will be executed by the browser. This might involve embedding the script directly in an HTML file or using an SVG image with embedded scripts.
      • Likelihood: Medium
      • Impact: High
      • Effort: Medium
      • Skill Level: Intermediate
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • 2.1.2 Trigger Execution of Malicious JavaScript:
    • 2.1.2.1 Ensure Asset is Loaded and Rendered: The attacker needs to ensure that the crafted asset is loaded and rendered by the browser in a way that executes the embedded JavaScript.
      • Likelihood: High (If XSS vector exists)
      • Impact: High
      • Effort: Low
      • Skill Level: Intermediate
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium

Attack Tree Path: 3. Exfiltrate Sensitive Data

• 3.1 Accidental Inclusion of Sensitive Data:
  • Description: This is not a vulnerability in rust-embed itself, but rather a developer error. If sensitive information (API keys, passwords, secrets) is accidentally included in the embedded assets, an attacker can extract this information.
  • 3.1.1 Developer Error: The root cause is a mistake by the developer, either through a lack of awareness or inadequate security practices.
    • Likelihood: Medium (Human error)
    • Impact: High to Very High (Data breach)
    • Effort: Very Low (Accidental)
    • Skill Level: N/A
    • Detection Difficulty: Hard
  • 3.1.2 Attacker Accesses Embedded Assets:
    • 3.1.2.1 Direct Access to Binary: If the application binary is publicly available, the attacker can simply download it and extract the embedded assets.
      • Likelihood: High (If binary is public)
      • Impact: High to Very High
      • Effort: Low
      • Skill Level: Novice
      • Detection Difficulty: Very Hard