1. Objective, Scope, and Methodology
- Objective: To conduct a thorough security analysis of the
rust-embed
library, focusing on its key components, identifying potential vulnerabilities, and providing actionable mitigation strategies. The primary goal is to assess howrust-embed
impacts the security posture of applications that use it. We will analyze the library's design, implementation (as inferred from documentation and code snippets), and interaction with the broader system. - Scope: This analysis covers the
rust-embed
library itself, its interaction with the Rust build system (Cargo), and the resulting compiled executable. It does not cover vulnerabilities in the Rust compiler, standard library, or operating system, although we acknowledge their potential impact. We will focus on the single-executable deployment model, as that is the primary use case forrust-embed
. We will consider the security implications of embedding various types of data, including potentially sensitive information. - Methodology:
- Architecture and Component Analysis: We will decompose
rust-embed
into its core components based on the provided design document and publicly available information (GitHub repository, documentation). We will infer the data flow between these components. - Threat Modeling: For each component and data flow, we will identify potential threats using a combination of STRIDE (Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, Elevation of Privilege) and known vulnerability patterns (e.g., path traversal, buffer overflows).
- Vulnerability Analysis: We will assess the likelihood and impact of each identified threat, considering existing security controls.
- Mitigation Recommendations: For each significant vulnerability, we will propose specific, actionable mitigation strategies tailored to
rust-embed
and the Rust ecosystem.
- Architecture and Component Analysis: We will decompose
2. Security Implications of Key Components
Based on the design review, we can identify the following key components and their security implications:
-
rust-embed
Macro (Code Generation): This is the core of the library. It takes file paths as input and generates Rust code that includes the file contents as byte arrays.- Threats:
- Path Traversal: If the macro doesn't properly sanitize file paths provided by the user, it could be tricked into reading files outside the intended directory. This is a critical vulnerability. The design document mentions "basic path sanitization," but the specifics are crucial. A poorly implemented sanitization routine could be bypassed.
- Code Injection: While less likely, if the macro somehow incorporates user-provided data directly into the generated code without proper escaping, it could lead to code injection vulnerabilities. This is unlikely given the nature of
include_bytes!
andinclude_str!
, but it's worth considering. - Denial of Service (DoS): Embedding extremely large files could lead to excessive code generation, potentially causing the compiler to run out of memory or take an unreasonable amount of time to compile. This could be a build-time DoS.
- Existing Controls: Rust's type system,
include_bytes!
andinclude_str!
macros, "basic path sanitization." - Security Implications: The security of the entire library hinges on the robustness of the path sanitization and the correct use of the Rust compiler's built-in macros.
- Threats:
-
Cargo Integration (Build Process):
rust-embed
integrates with Cargo, Rust's build system.- Threats:
- Dependency Management Issues: If
rust-embed
itself has vulnerabilities, or if it depends on vulnerable libraries, those vulnerabilities could be introduced into the application. This is a supply chain risk. - Build Script Vulnerabilities: If
rust-embed
uses a build script (build.rs
), any vulnerabilities in that script could be exploited during the build process.
- Dependency Management Issues: If
- Existing Controls: Cargo's dependency management,
crates.io
(assuming it's used), potential use ofcargo-audit
. - Security Implications: The build process needs to be secure to prevent the introduction of vulnerabilities before the application is even deployed.
- Threats:
-
Embedded Files (Data in Binary): The static assets are embedded directly into the executable.
- Threats:
- Information Disclosure: If sensitive data (API keys, passwords, etc.) is embedded without encryption, anyone with access to the binary can extract it. This is a major risk.
- Tampering: While modifying a compiled binary is difficult, it's not impossible. An attacker could potentially modify the embedded files within the binary to alter the application's behavior. This is less likely than information disclosure but still a concern.
- Denial of Service (DoS): Embedding very large files can significantly increase the size of the executable, potentially leading to slower startup times, increased memory usage, and even denial of service if the operating system has limits on executable size.
- Existing Controls: None specific to
rust-embed
. The user is responsible for encrypting sensitive data before embedding. - Security Implications: The embedded files are a potential attack surface, especially if they contain sensitive information.
- Threats:
-
Runtime Access (File Retrieval): The application uses
rust-embed
's API to access the embedded files at runtime.- Threats:
- Logic Errors: Bugs in the application's code that uses
rust-embed
could lead to incorrect file access or other unexpected behavior. This is more of an application-level issue, but it's worth noting. - Denial of Service: If the application attempts to load a very large embedded file into memory all at once, it could lead to excessive memory consumption and potentially a crash.
- Logic Errors: Bugs in the application's code that uses
- Existing Controls: Rust's memory safety.
- Security Implications: The runtime access mechanism itself is relatively simple, but the application's use of it needs to be carefully considered.
- Threats:
3. Architecture, Components, and Data Flow (Inferred)
graph LR
subgraph Build Time
Developer["Developer"] --> Cargo["Cargo (Build System)"]
Cargo --> RustEmbedMacro["rust-embed Macro"]
StaticAssets["Static Assets (Files)"] --> RustEmbedMacro
RustEmbedMacro --> GeneratedCode["Generated Rust Code"]
GeneratedCode --> RustCompiler["Rust Compiler"]
RustCompiler --> RustExecutable["Rust Executable (with embedded files)"]
end
subgraph Runtime
RustExecutable --> EmbeddedFiles["Embedded Files (in binary)"]
EmbeddedFiles --> ApplicationLogic["Application Logic"]
end
Data Flow:
- Build Time:
- The developer specifies the files to embed using the
rust-embed
macro. - Cargo invokes the
rust-embed
macro during the build process. - The macro reads the specified files from the file system.
- The macro generates Rust code containing the file contents as byte arrays.
- The Rust compiler compiles the generated code along with the rest of the application code.
- The compiled executable contains the embedded files as part of its data segment.
- The developer specifies the files to embed using the
- Runtime:
- The application uses
rust-embed
's API to access the embedded files. - The API retrieves the appropriate byte array from the executable's data segment.
- The application can then use the retrieved data (e.g., as a string, byte slice, etc.).
- The application uses
4. Tailored Security Considerations and Mitigation Strategies
Here's a breakdown of specific security considerations and mitigation strategies, tailored to rust-embed
:
| Threat | Component | Likelihood | Impact | Mitigation Strategy