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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for rg3dengine/rg3d

Attack Surface: Malicious Asset Loading

  • Description: Exploiting vulnerabilities in rg3d's asset parsing logic by providing crafted asset files (models, textures, scenes).
  • rg3d Contribution: rg3d's core functionality relies on loading and parsing various asset formats. The engine's parsers for these formats are direct points of vulnerability.
  • Example: A malicious actor crafts a specially crafted PNG texture file that, when loaded by rg3d, triggers a buffer overflow in the image decoding library used by the engine. This overflow allows the attacker to overwrite memory and potentially execute arbitrary code.
  • Impact: Arbitrary code execution, denial of service, information disclosure.
  • Risk Severity: High to Critical.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Asset Source Control: Load assets only from trusted sources. Avoid loading assets directly from user-provided input or untrusted external servers without thorough validation.
    • Input Validation: Implement robust validation and sanitization of asset files before loading them into rg3d. This could include format checks, size limits, and potentially using sandboxed parsing environments for untrusted assets.
    • Dependency Updates: Keep rg3d and its asset loading dependencies (image libraries, model loaders) updated to the latest versions to patch known vulnerabilities.
    • Resource Limits: Implement resource limits during asset loading to prevent denial of service attacks caused by excessively large or complex assets.
    • Fuzzing: Use fuzzing techniques to test rg3d's asset parsers for vulnerabilities.

Attack Surface: Network Packet Parsing Vulnerabilities (If Networking Features Used)

  • Description: Exploiting vulnerabilities in rg3d's network packet parsing logic by sending crafted network packets.
  • rg3d Contribution: If the application uses rg3d's networking features, the engine handles network communication and packet parsing, directly introducing potential vulnerabilities in this area.
  • Example: A multiplayer game using rg3d's networking has a vulnerability in how it parses player position updates. A malicious player sends a crafted packet with an extremely large position value, causing a buffer overflow in the packet processing code on the server, leading to server crash or remote code execution.
  • Impact: Remote code execution, denial of service, server compromise, client compromise.
  • Risk Severity: High to Critical.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Secure Network Protocol Design: Design network protocols with security in mind, focusing on robust parsing and validation of incoming data.
    • Input Validation and Sanitization: Thoroughly validate and sanitize all data received from the network before processing it.
    • Rate Limiting and Throttling: Implement rate limiting and throttling of network traffic to mitigate denial of service attacks.
    • Regular Security Audits: Conduct regular security audits of network code and packet handling logic within rg3d integration.
    • Use Secure Network Libraries: If possible, leverage well-vetted and secure network libraries instead of implementing custom network protocols from scratch within rg3d's networking layer.

Attack Surface: Script Injection (If Scripting Features Used)

  • Description: Injecting malicious scripts into the application if it uses scripting features provided by or integrated with rg3d and loads scripts from untrusted sources.
  • rg3d Contribution: If the application utilizes rg3d's scripting capabilities (e.g., Lua integration), and allows loading external scripts, rg3d's scripting integration becomes a direct attack vector.
  • Example: A game allows users to create custom levels and upload them. A malicious user uploads a level containing a Lua script that, when executed by the game through rg3d's scripting engine, escapes the intended sandbox and executes system commands to delete critical game files or install malware on the player's machine.
  • Impact: Arbitrary code execution, system compromise, data theft, malware installation.
  • Risk Severity: Critical.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Avoid Loading Untrusted Scripts: Ideally, avoid loading scripts from untrusted sources altogether when using rg3d's scripting features.
    • Strict Sandboxing: If loading external scripts is necessary with rg3d, implement a robust and well-tested scripting sandbox to restrict script capabilities and prevent access to sensitive resources.
    • Input Validation and Sanitization: If script content is user-provided, validate and sanitize it to prevent obvious injection attempts. However, sandboxing is the primary defense.
    • Principle of Least Privilege: Run the scripting engine within rg3d with the minimum necessary privileges.
    • Regular Sandbox Audits: Regularly audit the scripting sandbox implementation within rg3d for potential escape vulnerabilities.

Attack Surface: Shader Vulnerabilities (If Custom Shaders Allowed)

  • Description: Exploiting vulnerabilities in shader compilation or rendering pipeline, facilitated by rg3d's shader handling, by providing malicious shaders.
  • rg3d Contribution: If the application allows loading or using custom shaders through rg3d's rendering pipeline, vulnerabilities in rg3d's shader handling or the underlying graphics API, as used by rg3d, can be exploited.
  • Example: A game allows users to create custom visual effects using shaders within rg3d. A malicious user uploads a shader that contains an infinite loop or excessively complex computations, causing the GPU to hang and leading to a denial of service for other players or even the entire system. Alternatively, a shader could be crafted to read from unintended memory locations in the framebuffer, potentially leaking sensitive information.
  • Impact: Denial of service, information disclosure, potential graphics driver instability.
  • Risk Severity: High.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Shader Whitelisting/Pre-defined Shaders: Prefer using a curated set of pre-defined shaders within rg3d instead of allowing arbitrary user-provided shaders.
    • Shader Validation and Sanitization: Implement validation and sanitization of shader code before compilation and use within rg3d. This is complex but can involve static analysis or runtime checks.
    • Resource Limits for Shaders: Implement resource limits for shader compilation and execution within rg3d to prevent denial of service attacks caused by overly complex shaders.
    • Shader Compilation in a Sandbox: Consider compiling shaders in a sandboxed environment to limit the impact of potential compiler vulnerabilities when integrated with rg3d.
    • Graphics Driver Updates: Encourage users to keep their graphics drivers updated to patch known vulnerabilities in the driver itself, which rg3d relies upon.