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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for rg3dengine/rg3d

Attack Surface: Malicious Asset Injection

  • Description: Exploiting vulnerabilities by injecting crafted or malicious asset files (models, textures, scenes, audio) into the application.
  • rg3d Contribution: rg3d's core functionality relies on loading and parsing various asset formats. Vulnerabilities in rg3d's asset loaders or underlying libraries can be directly triggered by malicious assets.
  • Example: A user provides a crafted glTF model file that exploits a buffer overflow in rg3d's glTF parser. When rg3d loads this model, it leads to arbitrary code execution.
  • Impact: Arbitrary Code Execution, Denial of Service, Memory Corruption, Path Traversal.
  • Risk Severity: Critical to High.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Input Validation: Implement robust validation of asset file types and basic structure before loading.
    • Secure Asset Sources: Load assets only from trusted sources or utilize content delivery networks with integrity checks.
    • Sandboxing: If loading user-provided assets is necessary, process them in a sandboxed environment to limit potential damage.
    • Regular Updates: Keep rg3d and its dependencies updated to patch known vulnerabilities in asset loaders and parsers.

Attack Surface: Vulnerabilities in Asset Parsers

  • Description: Exploiting bugs within the code directly responsible for parsing different asset formats (FBX, glTF, PNG, etc.) used by rg3d.
  • rg3d Contribution: rg3d inherently includes and uses parsers for various asset formats as part of its asset loading pipeline. Bugs in these parsers are a direct vulnerability within the engine.
  • Example: A specially crafted PNG texture file triggers an integer overflow vulnerability in rg3d's PNG parser. Loading this texture results in memory corruption and potentially arbitrary code execution.
  • Impact: Arbitrary Code Execution, Denial of Service, Memory Corruption.
  • Risk Severity: High to Critical.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Regular Updates: Ensure rg3d is updated to the latest version to benefit from bug fixes in asset parsers.
    • Fuzzing: Consider performing fuzzing on rg3d's asset parsers to proactively identify potential vulnerabilities.
    • Static Analysis: Utilize static analysis tools to scan rg3d's codebase for potential parser vulnerabilities if possible.

Attack Surface: Shader Vulnerabilities (Custom Shaders)

  • Description: Exploiting vulnerabilities in custom shaders or the shader compilation/processing pipeline, if the application allows the use of custom shaders within rg3d.
  • rg3d Contribution: If the application leverages rg3d's capabilities to load and utilize custom shaders, vulnerabilities in rg3d's shader handling and rendering pipeline become relevant.
  • Example: A malicious custom shader is loaded that contains an infinite loop or excessively complex computations. When this shader is used by rg3d during rendering, it causes a Denial of Service by overloading the GPU and potentially crashing the application.
  • Impact: Denial of Service, GPU Instability.
  • Risk Severity: High (if custom shaders are allowed from untrusted sources).
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Shader Whitelisting: Restrict the use of shaders to a pre-approved, vetted set.
    • Shader Code Review: Implement a mandatory code review process for all custom shaders before they are allowed to be used in the application.
    • Shader Compilation Limits: Enforce limits on shader complexity and resource usage during compilation to prevent resource exhaustion.
    • Disable Custom Shaders: If custom shader functionality is not a core requirement, consider disabling the feature entirely to eliminate this attack surface.

Attack Surface: Network Protocol Vulnerabilities (in rg3d Networking Integration)

  • Description: Exploiting vulnerabilities in the network protocol implementation if the application uses external networking libraries and integrates them with rg3d in a way that exposes rg3d's data handling or scene management to network traffic.
  • rg3d Contribution: If the application's networking integration directly interacts with rg3d's data structures or scene management, vulnerabilities in handling network data within this integration can become rg3d-related attack surfaces.
  • Example: A buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the application's network message handling code when processing scene data received over the network and passed to rg3d. Sending a crafted network packet with oversized scene data triggers the overflow, potentially leading to remote code execution.
  • Impact: Remote Code Execution, Denial of Service, Data Manipulation, Data Spoofing.
  • Risk Severity: Critical to High (if networking integration with rg3d is vulnerable).
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Secure Network Integration Design: Design and implement network integration with security as a primary concern, focusing on robust input validation and bounds checking when handling network data within rg3d context.
    • Regular Updates (Networking Libraries): Keep any external networking libraries used in conjunction with rg3d updated to patch known vulnerabilities.
    • Network Fuzzing (Integration Points): Fuzz test the network integration points where network data interacts with rg3d to identify potential vulnerabilities.
    • Encryption and Authentication: Implement strong encryption (e.g., TLS/SSL) and authentication mechanisms for all network communication.

Attack Surface: Serialization/Deserialization Vulnerabilities (Network Messages related to rg3d Data)

  • Description: Exploiting vulnerabilities during the serialization and deserialization of data exchanged over the network, specifically when this data is directly related to rg3d's internal data structures or scene representation.
  • rg3d Contribution: If network communication involves serialization of rg3d-related data, vulnerabilities in these serialization/deserialization processes become directly relevant to rg3d's attack surface.
  • Example: A vulnerability exists in the deserialization routine for network messages that contain serialized scene objects. Sending a crafted network message with malicious serialized scene data triggers a buffer overflow during deserialization within rg3d's scene loading or object creation process, leading to memory corruption and potential code execution.
  • Impact: Arbitrary Code Execution, Denial of Service, Memory Corruption.
  • Risk Severity: High to Critical.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Use Secure Serialization Libraries: Utilize well-vetted and secure serialization libraries for handling network data related to rg3d.
    • Input Validation (Deserialized rg3d Data): Implement rigorous validation of deserialized data before it is used to update rg3d's scene or game state. Ensure data conforms to expected formats and ranges.
    • Regular Updates (Serialization Libraries): Keep serialization libraries updated to patch known vulnerabilities.
    • Minimize Deserialization of Untrusted Data: Limit the deserialization of data originating from untrusted network sources as much as possible.

Attack Surface: Scripting Engine Vulnerabilities (if used within rg3d application)

  • Description: Exploiting vulnerabilities in the scripting engine integrated with the rg3d application, or in the integration layer between rg3d and the scripting engine.
  • rg3d Contribution: If the application utilizes a scripting engine (like Lua, or a custom one) and integrates it with rg3d to control game logic or engine features, vulnerabilities in the scripting engine or its rg3d bindings become a direct attack surface.
  • Example: A malicious script is injected into the game (e.g., through a mod or configuration file) that exploits a vulnerability in the scripting engine to execute arbitrary code within the application's context, potentially gaining control over rg3d engine functionalities.
  • Impact: Arbitrary Code Execution, Sandbox Escape (if scripting is sandboxed), Data Manipulation, Data Theft.
  • Risk Severity: Critical to High.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Secure Scripting Engine: Choose and use a well-established and security-focused scripting engine.
    • Sandboxing (Scripting Environment): Implement a robust sandbox for the scripting environment to strictly limit its access to system resources and rg3d engine functionalities.
    • Script Whitelisting/Blacklisting: Implement strict control over which scripts are allowed to be executed, ideally using a whitelisting approach.
    • Code Review (Scripts): Conduct thorough security code reviews of all scripts before they are deployed or allowed to be executed in the application.
    • Principle of Least Privilege (Scripting API): Expose only the absolutely necessary rg3d API functionalities to the scripting environment, following the principle of least privilege.