Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
76 lines (62 loc) · 5.84 KB

attack-tree.md

File metadata and controls

76 lines (62 loc) · 5.84 KB

Attack Tree Analysis for rg3dengine/rg3d

Objective: To achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the server or client application using rg3d, leading to data exfiltration, denial of service, or system compromise.

Attack Tree Visualization

                                      [Root: Achieve RCE via rg3d]
                                                 |
                      [Exploit Resource Loading Vulnerabilities] [HR]
                                                 |
        -------------------------------------------------------------------------
        |                                 |                                 |
[Malicious Scene][HR]         [Malicious Model][HR]         [Malicious Texture][HR]
        |                                 |                                 |
  ---[HR]--->                       ---[HR]--->                       ---[HR]--->
        |                                 |                                 |
     [URL][HR]                         [URL][HR]                         [URL][HR]

Attack Tree Path: [Exploit Resource Loading Vulnerabilities] [HR]

  • Description: This is the primary high-risk attack vector. It involves exploiting vulnerabilities in how rg3d loads and processes various resource types (scenes, models, textures). The attacker crafts a malicious resource that, when loaded by the application, triggers a vulnerability, leading to RCE.
    • Why High-Risk:
      • Higher Likelihood: Resource parsing code is often complex, handling various formats and edge cases, making it prone to vulnerabilities.
      • High Impact: Successful exploitation typically leads to RCE, granting the attacker significant control over the application and potentially the underlying system.
      • Easier Exploitation (URL Vector): The ability to load resources from a URL controlled by the attacker significantly simplifies the attack.
    • Mitigation Strategies (High-Level):
      • Strict input validation and sanitization of URLs and file paths.
      • Loading resources only from trusted sources.
      • Implementing integrity checks (checksums, digital signatures) for loaded resources.
      • Using secure resource loading mechanisms (sandboxing, separate processes).
      • Thorough format validation of loaded resources before processing.
      • Fuzz testing of resource loading and parsing functions.

Attack Tree Path: [Malicious Scene] [HR]

  • Description: The attacker creates a specially crafted scene file (.rgs or other supported formats) that exploits vulnerabilities in the scene parser within rg3d.
    • Attack Steps (Example):
      1. The attacker identifies a vulnerability in the rg3d scene parser (e.g., a buffer overflow, an integer overflow, a type confusion error).
      2. The attacker crafts a scene file that triggers this vulnerability when parsed.
      3. The attacker hosts the malicious scene file on a web server they control.
      4. The attacker tricks the application into loading the scene file from the malicious URL (e.g., through social engineering, a phishing link, or exploiting another vulnerability that allows them to control the scene loading process).
      5. When rg3d parses the malicious scene file, the vulnerability is triggered, leading to RCE.
    • Example Vulnerability Types:
      • Buffer overflows in string handling.
      • Integer overflows in array indexing.
      • Type confusion errors when handling different scene node types.
      • Use-after-free errors due to incorrect memory management.

Attack Tree Path: [Malicious Model] [HR]

  • Description: Similar to a malicious scene, but the attacker crafts a malicious model file (e.g., FBX, glTF, or other formats supported by rg3d).
    • Attack Steps (Example): Analogous to the Malicious Scene attack steps, but targeting the model loading and processing code.
    • Example Vulnerability Types:
      • Vulnerabilities in the parsing of complex model formats (e.g., handling animation data, skeletal structures, material properties).
      • Buffer overflows when processing vertex data or texture coordinates.
      • Integer overflows in calculations related to model geometry.

Attack Tree Path: [Malicious Texture] [HR]

  • Description: The attacker crafts a malicious image file (PNG, JPG, etc.) that exploits vulnerabilities in the image decoding libraries used by rg3d (e.g., image-rs or other dependencies).
    • Attack Steps (Example): Analogous to the Malicious Scene attack steps, but targeting the image decoding process.
    • Example Vulnerability Types:
      • Vulnerabilities in specific image format parsers (e.g., a heap overflow in a PNG decoder).
      • Integer overflows in image dimension calculations.
      • Out-of-bounds reads or writes during image processing.

Attack Tree Path: [URL] [HR]

  • Description: This represents the delivery mechanism for the malicious resource. The attacker hosts the malicious file on a web server under their control and induces the application to load it via a URL.
    • Why High-Risk:
      • Remote Exploitation: This allows for remote attacks without requiring prior access to the target system.
      • Ease of Delivery: Attackers can use various techniques (phishing, social engineering, XSS) to trick users or applications into loading resources from malicious URLs.
      • Bypass Local Protections: Loading from a URL can bypass some local security measures that might be in place for files on the local filesystem.