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Threat Model Analysis for rg3dengine/rg3d

Threat: Malicious Model Loading (Buffer Overflow)

  • Threat: Malicious Model Loading (Buffer Overflow)

    • Description: An attacker crafts a malicious 3D model file (e.g., FBX, glTF) containing specially crafted data designed to trigger a buffer overflow in rg3d's model parsing code. The vulnerability lies within rg3d's handling of the model data.
    • Impact: Code execution within the Wasm module, potentially leading to game manipulation, data theft, or (in a worst-case scenario, if a Wasm sandbox escape is possible) compromise of the user's browser.
    • Affected rg3d Component: rg3d::resource::model (Model loading and parsing functions), potentially specific format parsers (e.g., FBX, glTF importers).
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Input Validation: Implement rigorous validation of all model file data before parsing. Check for expected data sizes, types, and structures.
      • Fuzz Testing: Fuzz the model loading functions with a variety of malformed and edge-case inputs to identify potential vulnerabilities.
      • Memory Safety: Utilize Rust's memory safety features (borrow checker, etc.) to prevent buffer overflows and other memory-related errors.
      • Sandboxing: If feasible, isolate the model parsing process in a separate Wasm module or thread with limited privileges.
      • Asset Integrity: Verify the integrity of model files using cryptographic hashes (e.g., SHA-256) before loading.

Threat: Malicious Texture Loading (Code Injection)

  • Threat: Malicious Texture Loading (Code Injection)

    • Description: An attacker creates a malicious texture file (e.g., PNG, JPEG) that exploits a vulnerability in rg3d's image decoding library. This is a direct vulnerability within rg3d's texture handling or its chosen image decoding libraries.
    • Impact: Code execution within the Wasm module, similar to the malicious model loading threat.
    • Affected rg3d Component: rg3d::resource::texture (Texture loading and decoding functions), potentially specific image format decoders (e.g., PNG, JPEG libraries).
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Secure Image Libraries: Use well-vetted and up-to-date image decoding libraries with a strong security track record.
      • Input Validation: Validate image file headers and data before decoding.
      • Fuzz Testing: Fuzz the texture loading and decoding functions.
      • Asset Integrity: Verify texture file integrity using cryptographic hashes.
      • Sandboxing: Consider isolating the image decoding process.

Threat: Physics Engine Exploit (Deterministic Simulation Bypass)

  • Threat: Physics Engine Exploit (Deterministic Simulation Bypass)

    • Description: An attacker identifies a flaw in the rg3d physics engine's calculations or exploits non-deterministic behavior to gain an unfair advantage. This focuses on vulnerabilities within the physics engine's logic, not just general game logic.
    • Impact: Disruption of gameplay, unfair advantage for the attacker, potential for denial-of-service if the exploit causes instability due to a physics engine bug.
    • Affected rg3d Component: rg3d::physics (Physics engine module, including collision detection, rigid body simulation, and constraint solvers).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Server-Side Authority: Implement server-side validation of all physics-related events and game state. The server should be the ultimate authority on object positions, velocities, and interactions. This mitigates the impact of a physics engine bug.
      • Deterministic Physics: Use deterministic physics simulations whenever possible to ensure consistency. Avoid randomness in critical physics calculations within rg3d.
      • Input Sanitization: Sanitize and validate all user input that affects physics parameters (forces, impulses, object properties) before they reach the rg3d physics engine.
      • Anti-Cheat Measures: Implement anti-cheat systems to detect and prevent common physics exploits. This is a secondary mitigation.
      • Fuzz Testing: Fuzz test the physics engine with a variety of inputs and edge cases.

Threat: Sound Engine Exploit (Malicious Audio File)

  • Threat: Sound Engine Exploit (Malicious Audio File)

    • Description: An attacker crafts a malicious audio file (e.g., WAV, OGG) that exploits a vulnerability in rg3d's sound engine or its chosen audio decoding library. This is a direct vulnerability within rg3d's audio handling.
    • Impact: Code execution within the Wasm module.
    • Affected rg3d Component: rg3d::sound (Sound engine module, including audio decoding and playback).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Secure Audio Libraries: Use well-vetted and up-to-date audio decoding libraries.
      • Input Validation: Validate audio file headers and data before decoding.
      • Fuzz Testing: Fuzz the audio decoding functions.
      • Asset Integrity: Verify audio file integrity.
      • Sandboxing: Consider isolating the audio decoding process.

Threat: Scripting Engine Vulnerability (Malicious Script Injection)

  • Threat: Scripting Engine Vulnerability (Malicious Script Injection)

    • Description: If the game uses rg3d's scripting capabilities, and if user-provided scripts are allowed or if the scripting engine has access to sensitive rg3d APIs, an attacker could inject a malicious script. The vulnerability is in how rg3d exposes its API to the scripting engine or in the scripting engine itself.
    • Impact: Code execution within the Wasm module, potentially with access to game state and other sensitive data managed by rg3d.
    • Affected rg3d Component: rg3d::script (Scripting engine integration), and the specific scripting engine used (e.g., Lua runtime).
    • Risk Severity: High (if user-provided scripts are allowed or if rg3d APIs are exposed),
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Restricted Scripting Environment: Carefully restrict the capabilities of the scripting engine. Limit access to sensitive rg3d APIs and resources. Use a sandbox.
      • Input Validation: Sanitize and validate all user-provided scripts before execution.
      • Secure Scripting Engine: Use a well-vetted and up-to-date scripting engine.
      • Code Review: Thoroughly review the code that integrates the scripting engine with rg3d to ensure that it is secure. Focus on the API exposed to scripts.