attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for rust-analyzer/rust-analyzer

Objective: To achieve arbitrary code execution within the developer's environment or influence the build process of the application by exploiting rust-analyzer.

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Application via Rust-analyzer
├── OR: **HIGH RISK PATH** Supply Malicious Dependencies
│   └── AND: **CRITICAL NODE** Introduce malicious dependency in Cargo.toml
│       ├── Technique: Introduce malicious dependency in Cargo.toml
│       │   ├── Vulnerability: **CRITICAL NODE** Rust-analyzer analyzes and potentially processes dependencies.
│       │   ├── Impact: Moderate to High
│       │   ├── Likelihood: Moderate
│       │   ├── Effort: Low to Moderate
│       │   ├── Skill Level: Low to Moderate
│       │   ├── Detection Difficulty: Moderate
│       │   └── Mitigation: Dependency scanning, secure dependency management practices.
├── OR: **HIGH RISK PATH** Exploit External Command Execution (Indirect via Build System/Tools)
│   ├── **HIGH RISK PATH** AND: Command Injection via Formatting/Linting Tools (Triggered by Rust-analyzer)
│   │   └── Technique: **CRITICAL NODE** Configure rust-analyzer to use external formatting or linting tools that are vulnerable to command injection.
│   │       ├── Vulnerability: **CRITICAL NODE** If rust-analyzer allows configuration of external tools without proper sanitization of arguments, and those tools are vulnerable.
│   │       ├── Impact: High
│   │       ├── Likelihood: Moderate
│   │       ├── Effort: Moderate
│   │       ├── Skill Level: Moderate
│   │       ├── Detection Difficulty: Moderate
│   │       └── Mitigation: Secure configuration practices, validate and sanitize arguments passed to external tools, use trusted and updated formatting/linting tools.

Attack Tree Path: High-Risk Path: Supply Malicious Dependencies

• Critical Node: Introduce malicious dependency in Cargo.toml
  • Attack Vector: An attacker aims to introduce a malicious Rust crate as a dependency into the application's Cargo.toml file. This could be achieved through:
    • Directly compromising the repository: If the attacker gains access to the application's source code repository, they can directly modify Cargo.toml to add a malicious dependency.
    • Social Engineering: Tricking a developer into adding a malicious dependency. This could involve creating a seemingly useful crate with a similar name to a legitimate one (typosquatting) or convincing developers to use a compromised crate.
  • Critical Node: Rust-analyzer analyzes and potentially processes dependencies.
    • Vulnerability: Rust-analyzer, as part of its code analysis functionality, parses and analyzes the Cargo.toml file and the declared dependencies. If rust-analyzer processes these dependencies in a way that triggers execution of code within the malicious dependency (e.g., during build script analysis or some form of pre-processing), it could lead to compromise.
    • Impact: If successful, this attack can lead to:
      • Compromise of the developer's environment: Malicious code within the dependency can execute in the developer's environment when rust-analyzer analyzes the project.
      • Influence on the build process: Malicious dependencies can contain build scripts (build.rs) that execute arbitrary code during the build process, potentially injecting backdoors into the application artifacts or compromising the build system.
    • Mitigation:
      • Dependency Scanning: Regularly scan project dependencies using vulnerability scanners to detect known malicious or vulnerable crates.
      • Secure Dependency Management Practices:
        • Carefully review dependencies before adding them.
        • Use crates from trusted sources.
        • Pin dependency versions to avoid unexpected updates to malicious versions.
        • Employ dependency lock files (Cargo.lock) to ensure consistent dependency versions across environments.

Attack Tree Path: High-Risk Path: Exploit External Command Execution (Indirect via Formatting/Linting Tools)

• Critical Node: Configure rust-analyzer to use external formatting or linting tools that are vulnerable to command injection.
  • Attack Vector: Rust-analyzer allows users to configure external tools for code formatting (like rustfmt) and linting (like clippy). If rust-analyzer's configuration mechanism for these tools is flawed, or if the external tools themselves are vulnerable to command injection, an attacker can exploit this.
    • Malicious Configuration: An attacker could try to modify rust-analyzer's configuration (e.g., via project settings files or global settings) to inject malicious commands into the arguments passed to external formatting or linting tools.
    • Vulnerable External Tools: If the external formatting or linting tools themselves have command injection vulnerabilities, even with correct rust-analyzer configuration, an attacker might be able to exploit these vulnerabilities if rust-analyzer triggers these tools on attacker-controlled code.
  • Critical Node: If rust-analyzer allows configuration of external tools without proper sanitization of arguments, and those tools are vulnerable.
    • Vulnerability: The core vulnerability lies in the potential lack of proper input sanitization by rust-analyzer when constructing commands to execute external tools. If rust-analyzer doesn't sanitize arguments (e.g., user-provided paths, filenames, or configuration options) before passing them to the shell to execute external tools, command injection becomes possible.
    • Impact: Successful command injection can lead to:
      • Arbitrary code execution in the developer's environment: When rust-analyzer triggers the vulnerable external tool (e.g., on "format on save" or during code analysis), the injected commands will be executed with the privileges of the rust-analyzer process (which is typically the developer's user).
    • Mitigation:
      • Secure Configuration Practices:
        • Restrict access to rust-analyzer configuration files and settings.
        • Carefully review and validate any custom configurations for external tools.
      • Validate and Sanitize Arguments: (Rust-analyzer Development Team Action) Ensure that rust-analyzer properly validates and sanitizes all arguments passed to external tools to prevent command injection.
      • Use Trusted and Updated Tools: Only use trusted and regularly updated formatting and linting tools. Keep these tools updated to patch any known vulnerabilities.