attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for rust-lang/cargo

Objective: Compromise application using Cargo

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Application Using Cargo [ROOT - CRITICAL NODE: Ultimate Goal] ├───[AND] Exploit Dependency Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH START] │ ├───[OR] Malicious Dependency Injection │ │ ├─── Typosquatting │ │ │ └─── User mistakenly depends on malicious crate [CRITICAL NODE: Typosquatting Success] │ │ ├─── Dependency Confusion │ │ │ └─── Cargo fetches malicious crate from public registry instead of intended private one [CRITICAL NODE: Dependency Confusion Success] │ │ └─── Malicious crate by compromised maintainer │ │ └─── Malicious crate version uploaded by compromised maintainer [CRITICAL NODE: Compromised Maintainer Upload] │ └───[OR] Vulnerable Dependency Exploitation [HIGH-RISK PATH CONTINUES] │ ├─── Known Vulnerabilities in Direct Dependencies │ │ └─── Exploit known vulnerability in application context [CRITICAL NODE: Direct Dependency Exploit] │ └─── Known Vulnerabilities in Transitive Dependencies │ └─── Exploit known vulnerability in application context [CRITICAL NODE: Transitive Dependency Exploit] ├───[AND] Exploit Build Process [HIGH-RISK PATH START] │ ├───[OR] Build Script Injection (build.rs) │ │ ├─── Dependency-Driven Build Script Injection │ │ │ └─── Malicious code executed during cargo build [CRITICAL NODE: Dependency-Driven Build Script Injection Success] │ │ ├─── Local Build Script Modification (If attacker has access to dev environment) │ │ │ └─── Malicious code executed during cargo build [CRITICAL NODE: Local Build Script Modification Success] │ │ └─── Environment Variable Injection into Build Script │ │ └─── Malicious code execution or build manipulation [CRITICAL NODE: Env Var Build Script Injection Success] ├───[AND] Exploit Cargo Configuration [HIGH-RISK PATH START] │ ├───[OR] Cargo.toml Manipulation │ │ ├─── Dependency Injection via Cargo.toml │ │ │ └─── Adds malicious dependencies [CRITICAL NODE: Cargo.toml Dependency Injection] │ │ └─── Build Script Configuration Manipulation via Cargo.toml │ │ └─── Configures malicious build scripts or build flags [CRITICAL NODE: Cargo.toml Build Config Manipulation] │ └───[OR] .cargo/config.toml Manipulation (Local or potentially shared config) │ ├─── Registry Redirection │ │ └─── Cargo fetches malicious crates from attacker-controlled registry [CRITICAL NODE: .cargo/config.toml Registry Redirection] │ └─── Build Flag Manipulation │ └─── Compiler executes malicious code or produces vulnerable binary [CRITICAL NODE: .cargo/config.toml Build Flag Injection]

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Dependency Vulnerabilities

• Attack Vectors:
  • Malicious Dependency Injection:
    • Typosquatting Success [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Attack Vector: Attacker registers crate names similar to popular crates (typos) on crates.io. Developers mistakenly type the malicious crate name in Cargo.toml.
      • Impact: Application pulls in and uses a malicious dependency, leading to code execution, data theft, or other compromises.
    • Dependency Confusion Success [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Attack Vector: Organization uses internal/private crate registry with names that collide with public crates on crates.io. Cargo, due to misconfiguration or lack of precedence, fetches a malicious public crate instead of the intended private one.
      • Impact: Application uses a malicious public dependency instead of the intended private one, leading to code execution, data theft, or other compromises.
    • Compromised Maintainer Upload [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Attack Vector: Attacker compromises a legitimate crate maintainer's account on crates.io (e.g., via phishing, credential stuffing). The attacker then uploads a malicious version of the legitimate crate.
      • Impact: Users updating to the compromised crate version unknowingly introduce malicious code into their applications.
  • Vulnerable Dependency Exploitation:
    • Direct Dependency Exploit [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Attack Vector: A direct dependency listed in Cargo.toml has a known security vulnerability (e.g., listed in CVE databases, identified by cargo audit). Attacker exploits this vulnerability in the context of the application.
      • Impact: Application is compromised due to the exploited vulnerability in a direct dependency. Potential impacts include Remote Code Execution (RCE), Denial of Service (DoS), or data breaches.
    • Transitive Dependency Exploit [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Attack Vector: A transitive dependency (dependency of a dependency) has a known security vulnerability. Attacker exploits this vulnerability in the context of the application.
      • Impact: Application is compromised due to the exploited vulnerability in a transitive dependency. Impacts are similar to direct dependency exploits (RCE, DoS, data breach).

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Build Process

• Attack Vectors:
  • Build Script Injection (build.rs):
    • Dependency-Driven Build Script Injection Success [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Attack Vector: A malicious dependency contains a build.rs script with malicious code. When cargo build is executed, this malicious build.rs is executed.
      • Impact: Arbitrary code execution on the build machine. If build artifacts are distributed, this can lead to supply chain compromise.
    • Local Build Script Modification Success [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Attack Vector: Attacker gains access to a developer's machine or CI/CD environment and directly modifies the build.rs file in the project.
      • Impact: Arbitrary code execution on the build machine. Potential to compromise build artifacts and the final application.
    • Env Var Build Script Injection Success [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Attack Vector: Build script (build.rs) logic is vulnerable to manipulation via environment variables. Attacker controls environment variables used during the build process to inject malicious code or alter the build process.
      • Impact: Build manipulation, potentially code execution on the build machine, depending on the vulnerability in the build script logic.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Cargo Configuration

• Attack Vectors:
  • Cargo.toml Manipulation:
    • Cargo.toml Dependency Injection [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Attack Vector: Attacker gains write access to the project repository (e.g., via compromised account, malicious PR) and modifies Cargo.toml to add malicious dependencies.
      • Impact: Introduction of malicious dependencies into the application, leading to compromise.
    • Cargo.toml Build Config Manipulation [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Attack Vector: Attacker gains write access to the project repository and modifies Cargo.toml to configure malicious build scripts or inject malicious build flags.
      • Impact: Manipulation of the build process, potentially leading to code execution or the creation of vulnerable binaries.
  • .cargo/config.toml Manipulation:
    • .cargo/config.toml Registry Redirection [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Attack Vector: Attacker gains local access to a developer machine or shared configuration and modifies .cargo/config.toml to redirect crate registry URLs to a malicious registry under their control.
      • Impact: Cargo fetches malicious crates from the attacker-controlled registry instead of crates.io or intended private registries, leading to application compromise.
    • .cargo/config.toml Build Flag Injection [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Attack Vector: Attacker gains local access and modifies .cargo/config.toml to inject malicious compiler flags.
      • Impact: Compiler executes malicious code during compilation or produces a vulnerable binary due to the injected flags.

This breakdown provides a focused view of the most critical attack paths and nodes within the Cargo ecosystem, enabling security efforts to be directed towards the highest-risk areas.