attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for rust-lang/cargo

Objective: RCE or Data Exfiltration via Cargo !!!

Attack Tree Visualization

[Attacker's Goal: RCE or Data Exfiltration via Cargo] !!! | | [1. Compromise Dependencies] !!! |*** |--------------------------------- | | [1.1 Typosquatting]!!! [1.3 Malicious Package Published]!!!

Attack Tree Path: [1. Compromise Dependencies] !!!

• Description: This is the overarching critical node representing the attacker's strategy of introducing malicious code through the application's dependencies. It's the primary attack vector for achieving the overall goal.
  • Why Critical: Compromising dependencies provides a direct path to injecting arbitrary code into the application, making it a highly effective and therefore critical attack vector.

Attack Tree Path: [1.1 Typosquatting] ***!!!

• Description: The attacker publishes a malicious package with a name very similar to a legitimate, popular package (e.g., reqwest vs. reqwests). A developer mistakenly includes the malicious package due to a typo or oversight.
  • Why High-Risk: This attack is relatively easy to execute and relies on common human error, making it a high-probability threat.
  • Why Critical: Successful execution directly leads to the inclusion of malicious code, granting the attacker significant control over the application.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: Very High
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Mitigation:
    • Careful Dependency Specification: Double-check package names and versions.
    • Dependency Locking: Use and commit Cargo.lock.
    • Package Auditing: Use cargo audit.
    • Consider Private Registry: Use a private registry to vet packages.
    • Use cargo-crev: Review community trust ratings.

Attack Tree Path: [1.3 Malicious Package Published (Compromised Upstream)] ***!!!

• Description: A legitimate, previously trusted package is compromised (e.g., maintainer account hacked, malicious contributor). A new version containing malicious code is published.
  • Why High-Risk: While less frequent than typosquatting, the impact can be widespread, affecting many applications that depend on the compromised package.
  • Why Critical: This attack, like typosquatting, directly introduces malicious code into the application.
  • Likelihood: Low
  • Impact: Very High
  • Effort: Varies Greatly
  • Skill Level: Varies Greatly
  • Detection Difficulty: Hard
  • Mitigation:
    • Dependency Locking: Use Cargo.lock (but update regularly).
    • cargo audit: Check for known vulnerabilities.
    • cargo crev: Use community trust ratings.
    • Vendor Dependencies (with caution): For critical dependencies.
    • Code Review: Review dependency source code, especially after updates.