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Threat Model Analysis for rust-lang/cargo

Threat: Malicious Build Script (build.rs) Execution

Description: A dependency includes a build.rs file that contains malicious code. This code is executed by Cargo during the cargo build process with the privileges of the user running the build. The attacker might use this to steal secrets, modify the build output, or install malware. This is a direct threat because Cargo is the component executing the untrusted code.

  • Impact:

    • Compromise of the build environment (developer machine or build server).
    • Theft of secrets (API keys, SSH keys) from the build environment.
    • Modification of the build output, potentially injecting malicious code into the final binary.
    • Installation of malware on the build machine.

  • Affected Cargo Component:

    • build.rs execution during cargo build.
    • Cargo's build process itself.

  • Risk Severity: High

  • Mitigation Strategies:

    • Sandboxing: Run cargo build within a sandboxed environment (e.g., Docker container, VM) to limit the impact of malicious code. This is the most effective mitigation.
    • Least Privilege: Run cargo build with a user account that has minimal privileges.

Threat: Compromised crates.io Registry

Description: An attacker gains unauthorized access to the crates.io infrastructure and replaces legitimate packages with malicious versions or modifies package metadata. This is a direct threat to Cargo because crates.io is the official and default package registry used by Cargo. Cargo directly interacts with crates.io to download dependencies.

  • Impact:

    • Widespread distribution of malicious code to Rust developers and applications using Cargo.
    • Loss of trust in the Rust ecosystem.
    • Potential for significant damage to many systems.

  • Affected Cargo Component:

    • crates.io registry (Cargo's default registry).
    • Cargo's dependency resolution and download mechanisms that interact with crates.io.

  • Risk Severity: Critical (but low probability)

  • Mitigation Strategies:

    • Mirroring (Advanced): Maintain a local mirror of crates.io for greater control. This is a significant undertaking.
    • Trust in Rust Security Practices: Rely on the Rust project's security measures for crates.io. This is a fundamental reliance.
    • Crate Signing (Future): Signed crates will significantly mitigate this threat once fully implemented. This is a future Cargo feature.