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Threat Model Analysis for rust-lang/mdbook

Threat: Compromised mdbook Binary

  • Threat: Compromised mdbook Binary
  • Description: An attacker compromises the official distribution channel of mdbook and replaces the legitimate binary with a malicious one. Users downloading and using this compromised binary will unknowingly execute attacker-controlled code on their systems during the book building process. This could allow the attacker to steal sensitive data from the user's machine, inject malicious content into the generated documentation, or further compromise the user's system.
  • Impact:
    • Critical: Full compromise of the developer's machine used to build the documentation.
    • Potential injection of malicious code into the generated documentation, leading to further attacks on users viewing the documentation.
    • Data theft from the developer's machine, including source code, credentials, and other sensitive information.
  • Affected mdbook component: Download and distribution infrastructure of mdbook.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Verify Checksums/Signatures: Always verify the integrity of downloaded mdbook binaries using checksums or digital signatures provided by the official rust-lang/mdbook project.
    • Use Trusted Sources: Download mdbook binaries only from official and trusted sources, such as the official Rust website or GitHub releases page.
    • Package Managers: If possible, use package managers from trusted repositories to install mdbook, as they often include integrity checks.

Threat: Compromised Dependency (Supply Chain Attack via Crates.io)

  • Threat: Compromised Dependency
  • Description: An attacker compromises a dependency (Rust crate) used by mdbook on crates.io (the Rust package registry). When developers build their documentation using mdbook, cargo (Rust's package manager) downloads this compromised dependency. The malicious code within the dependency is then executed during the mdbook build process, potentially leading to malicious modifications of the generated documentation or compromise of the build environment.
  • Impact:
    • High: Injection of malicious code into the generated documentation.
    • Potential compromise of the build environment, allowing attackers to access sensitive data or further compromise systems.
    • Subtle and hard-to-detect modifications to the documentation content.
  • Affected mdbook component: Dependency management (cargo), build process, plugin system (if dependency is a plugin).
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Use Cargo.lock: Utilize Cargo.lock files to ensure reproducible builds and to pin dependency versions, preventing unexpected updates to potentially compromised versions.
    • Dependency Auditing: Regularly audit dependencies for known vulnerabilities using tools like cargo audit.
    • Review Dependency Changes: Carefully review dependency updates and changes before incorporating them into your project.
    • Use Private Registries (for sensitive projects): For highly sensitive projects, consider using private Rust registries to control and vet dependencies.

Threat: Malicious Plugin

  • Threat: Malicious Plugin
  • Description: A user installs an mdbook plugin from an untrusted or malicious source. Plugins in mdbook can execute arbitrary code during the book building process. A malicious plugin can perform various harmful actions, such as stealing sensitive data from the book source files or the build environment, injecting malicious scripts into the generated HTML output (leading to XSS), or even compromising the system running the build process.
  • Impact:
    • High: Data theft from book source files or build environment.
    • High: Injection of malicious code (e.g., JavaScript for XSS) into the generated documentation.
    • High: Potential compromise of the build system.
  • Affected mdbook component: Plugin system, build process.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Use Trusted Plugins Only: Only install plugins from reputable and trusted sources. Prioritize plugins that are officially maintained or widely used and reviewed by the community.
    • Code Review Plugins: If possible, review the source code of plugins before installation, especially if they are from less well-known sources.
    • Minimize Plugin Usage: Use only necessary plugins and avoid installing plugins with excessive or unnecessary permissions.
    • Plugin Sandboxing/Containerization: Consider running the mdbook build process in a sandboxed environment or container to limit the potential impact of a malicious plugin.
    • Plugin Review Process: Implement a review process for plugins used in documentation projects, including security checks.

Threat: Vulnerable Plugin (Cross-Site Scripting - XSS)

  • Threat: Vulnerable Plugin (XSS)
  • Description: A plugin, even if not intentionally malicious, might contain vulnerabilities, such as improper handling of user-provided content or unsafe templating practices. This can lead to Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities in the generated documentation. An attacker could exploit this by crafting malicious content in the book source files that, when processed by the vulnerable plugin, results in the injection of JavaScript code into the HTML output. When users view the documentation, this malicious script executes in their browsers.
  • Impact:
    • Medium to High: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks against users viewing the documentation.
    • Potential for user account compromise, data theft from users viewing the documentation, and website defacement.
  • Affected mdbook component: Plugin system, templating engine (within plugins), HTML output generation.
  • Risk Severity: Medium to High (depending on the nature of the vulnerability and the plugin's usage). (Considered High for this list as XSS can be high impact)
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Update Plugins Regularly: Keep plugins updated to the latest versions to patch known security vulnerabilities.
    • Sanitize Plugin Output: If developing or using custom plugins, ensure that all user-provided content and plugin-generated output is properly sanitized and escaped before being included in the HTML output to prevent XSS.
    • Content Security Policy (CSP): Implement Content Security Policy (CSP) headers on the web server serving the documentation to mitigate the impact of potential XSS vulnerabilities by restricting the sources from which the browser can load resources.
    • Input Validation and Output Encoding: Plugins should rigorously validate input and properly encode output to prevent injection vulnerabilities.