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Attack Tree Analysis for rust-lang/mdbook

Objective: Compromise mdBook Application

Attack Tree Visualization

Goal: Compromise mdBook Application ├── 1. Data Exfiltration │ ├── 1.1. Exploit Misconfigured Preprocessors [HIGH RISK] │ │ ├── 1.1.1. mdbook-linkcheck (Broken Link Checker) │ │ │ └── 1.1.1.1. SSRF via crafted links (if misconfigured to follow redirects to internal resources). │ │ ├── 1.1.2. Custom Preprocessor Vulnerability [CRITICAL] │ │ │ └── 1.1.2.1. Read arbitrary files via path traversal in a custom preprocessor. [HIGH RISK] ├── 2. Content Manipulation │ ├── 2.1. Inject Malicious Markdown [HIGH RISK] │ │ ├── 2.1.1. Compromise Source Repository [CRITICAL] │ │ │ └── 2.1.1.1. Directly modify Markdown files in the Git repository. [HIGH RISK] │ │ └── 2.1.2. Exploit Weaknesses in Preprocessors (to inject Markdown) │ │ └── 2.1.2.1. Similar to 1.1.2, but the goal is to inject malicious Markdown instead of reading files. [HIGH RISK] └── 4. Code Execution (Client-Side - XSS) [HIGH RISK] ├── 4.2. XSS via Theme Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK] │ └── 4.2.1. Custom theme includes user-provided data without proper escaping, leading to XSS. [HIGH RISK] └── 4.3. XSS via Preprocessor Output [HIGH RISK] └── 4.3.1. A preprocessor generates HTML/JavaScript that is not properly sanitized before being included in the output. [HIGH RISK]

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1.1. SSRF via crafted links (in mdbook-linkcheck)

  • Description: If mdbook-linkcheck is misconfigured to follow redirects to internal network resources (e.g., metadata services on cloud platforms, internal APIs), an attacker could craft malicious links within the Markdown that, when checked by mdbook-linkcheck, would cause the server to make requests to those internal resources. This could leak sensitive information.
  • Likelihood: Low
  • Impact: High
  • Effort: Medium
  • Skill Level: Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Mitigation:
    • Configure mdbook-linkcheck to not follow redirects to internal IP addresses or hostnames.
    • Use a whitelist of allowed domains for external links.
    • Run mdbook-linkcheck in a restricted network environment.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.2.1. Read arbitrary files via path traversal in a custom preprocessor.

  • Description: A custom preprocessor has a vulnerability that allows an attacker to read arbitrary files on the server by manipulating file paths. This is typically done by injecting ".." sequences into a file path that the preprocessor uses.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High
  • Effort: Medium
  • Skill Level: Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Hard
  • Mitigation:
    • Thoroughly sanitize any user-provided input used to construct file paths within the preprocessor.
    • Use a robust file path validation library.
    • Run the preprocessor with the least necessary privileges (e.g., don't allow it to read files outside the book's source directory).
    • Implement sandboxing techniques to isolate the preprocessor.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1.1.1. Directly modify Markdown files in the Git repository.

  • Description: An attacker gains unauthorized access to the Git repository (e.g., through compromised credentials, social engineering, or exploiting vulnerabilities in the Git server) and directly modifies the Markdown files to inject malicious content, links, or scripts.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High
  • Effort: Medium
  • Skill Level: Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium (depending on repository monitoring and access controls)
  • Mitigation:
    • Implement strong authentication (multi-factor authentication) for the Git repository.
    • Use strict access controls (least privilege principle).
    • Monitor repository activity for suspicious changes.
    • Use code signing to verify the integrity of commits.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1.2.1. Exploit Weaknesses in Preprocessors (to inject Markdown).

  • Description: Similar to 1.1.2.1, but instead of reading files, the attacker exploits a vulnerability in a custom preprocessor to inject malicious Markdown content. This could involve injecting HTML, JavaScript, or other code that would be rendered by mdBook.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High
  • Effort: Medium
  • Skill Level: Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Hard
  • Mitigation:
    • Same as 1.1.2.1 (sanitize input, validate file paths, least privilege, sandboxing).
    • Treat the output of preprocessors as untrusted input and ensure it's properly sanitized before being included in the final HTML.

Attack Tree Path: 4.2.1. Custom theme includes user-provided data without proper escaping, leading to XSS.

  • Description: A custom theme includes user-provided data (e.g., from the book.toml configuration, environment variables, or even potentially from Markdown content if the theme is poorly designed) without properly escaping it. This allows an attacker to inject malicious JavaScript that will be executed in the context of a user's browser.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High
  • Effort: Medium
  • Skill Level: Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium (with browser developer tools and careful code review)
  • Mitigation:
    • Use a templating engine that automatically escapes HTML output.
    • Manually escape any user-provided data before including it in the HTML.
    • Avoid using JavaScript to dynamically modify the DOM based on user input unless absolutely necessary, and then do so with extreme caution.
    • Use a Content Security Policy (CSP) to restrict the sources of scripts and other resources.

Attack Tree Path: 4.3.1. A preprocessor generates HTML/JavaScript that is not properly sanitized before being included in the output.

  • Description: A preprocessor generates HTML or JavaScript code as part of its output, but this code is not properly sanitized. An attacker could craft input to the preprocessor that would cause it to generate malicious HTML/JavaScript, leading to an XSS vulnerability.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High
  • Effort: Medium
  • Skill Level: Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium (with browser developer tools and careful code review)
  • Mitigation:
    • Ensure that the preprocessor uses a robust HTML sanitization library to remove any potentially malicious code from its output.
    • Treat the output of the preprocessor as untrusted input and validate it before including it in the final HTML.
    • Use a Content Security Policy (CSP) to restrict the sources of scripts and other resources.