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attack-tree.md

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Attack Tree Analysis for rwf2/rocket

Objective: Compromise application using Rocket framework by exploiting high-risk vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Rocket Application **[CRITICAL NODE]**
├───[OR]─ Exploit Rocket Configuration Weaknesses **[HIGH RISK PATH - Configuration Weaknesses]** **[CRITICAL NODE - Configuration]**
│   ├───[AND]─ Identify Misconfiguration in Rocket Application
│   │   ├─── Debug/Development Features Enabled in Production **[HIGH RISK PATH - Configuration Weaknesses]** **[CRITICAL NODE - Debug Features]**
│   │   │   └─── Exposure of sensitive information via debug endpoints or verbose logging **[HIGH RISK PATH - Configuration Weaknesses]** **[CRITICAL NODE - Error Handling]**
│   │   ├─── Resource Exhaustion Limits Misconfiguration **[HIGH RISK PATH - Configuration Weaknesses]** **[CRITICAL NODE - Resource Limits]**
│   │   │   └─── Lack of Rate Limiting or Connection Limits leading to DoS
│   └───[AND]─ Exploit Misconfiguration
│       └─── Leverage Misconfiguration to gain access or cause harm
├───[OR]─ Exploit Application Logic via Rocket Features **[HIGH RISK PATH - Application Logic Vulnerabilities]** **[CRITICAL NODE - Application Logic]**
│   ├───[AND]─ Identify Application Logic Vulnerability exposed by Rocket Features
│   │   ├─── Form Handling Vulnerabilities **[HIGH RISK PATH - Application Logic Vulnerabilities]** **[CRITICAL NODE - Form Handling]**
│   │   │   └─── Bypassing validation or exploiting deserialization flaws in form data
│   │   ├─── State Management Issues **[HIGH RISK PATH - Application Logic Vulnerabilities]** **[CRITICAL NODE - State Management]**
│   │   │   └─── Session hijacking or manipulation due to weak state management practices enabled by Rocket
│   │   └─── File Handling Vulnerabilities **[HIGH RISK PATH - Application Logic Vulnerabilities]** **[CRITICAL NODE - File Handling]**
│   │       └─── Path Traversal via file serving routes or insecure file uploads handled by Rocket
│   └───[AND]─ Exploit Application Logic Vulnerability
│       └─── Leverage vulnerability to gain unauthorized access or control
├───[OR]─ Discover Vulnerability in Rocket Dependencies **[HIGH RISK PATH - Dependency Vulnerabilities]** **[CRITICAL NODE - Dependencies]**
│   └─── Identify Vulnerable Crates used by Rocket
│       └─── Exploit known vulnerabilities in outdated or vulnerable dependencies
└───[OR]─ Social Engineering Developers/Operators **[HIGH RISK PATH - Social Engineering]** **[CRITICAL NODE - Security Culture/Supply Chain]**
    └─── Phishing or other social engineering to gain access to application deployment or configuration

Attack Tree Path: [HIGH RISK PATH - Configuration Weaknesses] / [CRITICAL NODE - Configuration]

  • Attack Vectors:
    • Debug/Development Features Enabled in Production [CRITICAL NODE - Debug Features]:
      • Exposure of sensitive information via debug endpoints or verbose logging [CRITICAL NODE - Error Handling]: Leaving debug mode or development endpoints active in production environments. This leads to the exposure of sensitive data like internal paths, configuration details, environment variables, and potentially even source code snippets through error messages or debug interfaces.
        • Why High Risk: Medium Likelihood (common oversight), Medium to High Impact (Information Disclosure), Very Low Effort, Low Skill Level, Very Easy Detection Difficulty (for attackers to find, but also for defenders to fix if they check).
    • Resource Exhaustion Limits Misconfiguration [CRITICAL NODE - Resource Limits]:
      • Lack of Rate Limiting or Connection Limits leading to DoS: Failing to configure or implement proper rate limiting and connection limits. Attackers can exploit this to launch Denial of Service (DoS) attacks by overwhelming the server with excessive requests, making the application unavailable to legitimate users.
        • Why High Risk: Medium Likelihood (if not explicitly configured), Medium Impact (DoS), Low Effort, Low Skill Level, Easy Detection Difficulty (for defenders via monitoring).

Attack Tree Path: [HIGH RISK PATH - Application Logic Vulnerabilities] / [CRITICAL NODE - Application Logic]

  • Attack Vectors:
    • Form Handling Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE - Form Handling]:
      • Bypassing validation or exploiting deserialization flaws in form data: Weak or missing server-side validation of form inputs. Attackers can manipulate form data to bypass intended application logic, inject malicious data, or exploit deserialization vulnerabilities if form data is automatically deserialized into objects without proper sanitization.
        • Why High Risk: Medium Likelihood (common web vulnerability), Medium to High Impact (Data Manipulation, Injection), Medium Effort, Medium Skill Level, Medium Detection Difficulty (requires input validation checks and potentially WAF).
    • State Management Issues [CRITICAL NODE - State Management]:
      • Session hijacking or manipulation due to weak state management practices enabled by Rocket: Insecure session management practices, such as predictable session IDs, lack of secure flags on cookies (HttpOnly, Secure), or insufficient session timeout mechanisms. Attackers can hijack or manipulate user sessions to gain unauthorized access to user accounts and data.
        • Why High Risk: Medium Likelihood (session management is complex), High Impact (Account Takeover), Medium Effort, Medium Skill Level, Medium Detection Difficulty (session monitoring and anomaly detection).
    • File Handling Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE - File Handling]:
      • Path Traversal via file serving routes or insecure file uploads handled by Rocket: Insecure implementation of file serving routes or file upload functionalities. Attackers can exploit path traversal vulnerabilities to access files outside the intended directories or upload malicious files that could lead to code execution or data breaches.
        • Why High Risk: Medium Likelihood (common web vulnerability), High Impact (Data Breach, potentially Code Execution in upload scenarios), Medium Effort, Medium Skill Level, Medium Detection Difficulty (path sanitization checks and WAF).

Attack Tree Path: [HIGH RISK PATH - Dependency Vulnerabilities] / [CRITICAL NODE - Dependencies]

  • Attack Vectors:
    • Exploit known vulnerabilities in outdated or vulnerable dependencies: Using outdated or vulnerable Rust crates (dependencies) that Rocket or the application relies on. Attackers can exploit publicly known vulnerabilities in these dependencies to compromise the application.
      • Why High Risk: Medium Likelihood (if dependencies are not managed), Varies Impact (Medium to Critical depending on dependency), Low Effort (if vulnerability is public, exploit might exist), Low to Medium Skill Level (depending on exploit complexity), Easy Detection Difficulty (for defenders using dependency scanning tools).

Attack Tree Path: [HIGH RISK PATH - Social Engineering] / [CRITICAL NODE - Security Culture/Supply Chain]

  • Attack Vectors:
    • Phishing or other social engineering to gain access to application deployment or configuration: Targeting developers or operations personnel through phishing emails, social manipulation, or other social engineering techniques to trick them into revealing credentials, granting unauthorized access, or performing actions that compromise the application's security or deployment infrastructure.
      • Why High Risk: Low to Medium Likelihood (depends on organization's security culture), Critical Impact (Full System Compromise), Medium Effort, Medium Skill Level, Hard Detection Difficulty (prevention through security awareness training and strong security culture is key).