- Description: An attacker could craft a malicious URL by manipulating path parameters in a poorly configured Rocket route. This could allow them to access files or directories outside the intended web application's scope, potentially reading sensitive configuration files, source code, or user data.
- Impact: Confidentiality breach, potential data exfiltration, information disclosure, and potentially application compromise if sensitive files are accessed.
- Affected Rocket Component: Routing module,
rocket::get!
,rocket::post!
, path parameters. - Risk Severity: High
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Carefully review and test all route definitions.
- Use specific and restrictive path parameter patterns.
- Implement input validation and sanitization on path parameters within route handlers.
- Avoid serving static files directly from user-controlled paths. Use dedicated file serving mechanisms with restricted access.
- Description: An attacker could send maliciously crafted data in forms, JSON payloads, or other request bodies that are automatically deserialized by Rocket's data guards. If the deserialization process is flawed or if input validation is insufficient, this could lead to unexpected behavior, crashes, or potentially even code execution (though less likely in Rust, but still a concern with unsafe code or dependencies).
- Impact: Application crash, denial of service, data corruption, potential remote code execution (less likely in Rust but still a concern with unsafe code or dependencies).
- Affected Rocket Component: Data guards (
Form
,Json
, custom guards), deserialization libraries (e.g.,serde
). - Risk Severity: High
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Rely on robust and well-vetted deserialization libraries used by Rocket and its ecosystem.
- Implement thorough input validation after deserialization within route handlers and guards to enforce data constraints and business logic.
- Be cautious when deserializing complex or nested data structures from untrusted sources.
- Consider using schema validation libraries to enforce data structure and type constraints before deserialization.
- Description: An attacker could exploit vulnerabilities in custom Rocket fairings or guards developed by application developers or used from third-party sources. These vulnerabilities could range from logic flaws to code injection or other security issues, depending on the nature of the fairing or guard.
- Impact: Varies depending on the vulnerability, could range from information disclosure to remote code execution, authorization bypass, or denial of service.
- Affected Rocket Component: Custom fairings, custom guards, Rocket extension ecosystem.
- Risk Severity: High to Critical (depending on the severity of the vulnerability in the fairing/guard)
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Thoroughly review and test custom fairings and guards for security vulnerabilities before deployment.
- Follow secure coding practices when developing custom Rocket extensions.
- Use well-established and community-vetted fairings and guards whenever possible.
- Regularly update and audit third-party fairings and guards for known vulnerabilities.