attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for rwf2/rocket

Objective: Achieve RCE or DoS via Rocket Exploitation

Attack Tree Visualization

Goal: Achieve RCE or DoS via Rocket Exploitation ├── 1. Achieve RCE [CRITICAL] │ ├── 1.1 Exploit Fairing Vulnerabilities │ │ └── 1.1.1 Bypass Fairing Restrictions (if custom fairings are poorly implemented) [HIGH RISK] │ │ └── 1.1.1.1 Inject malicious code into request/response modification logic. [CRITICAL] │ ├── 1.2 Exploit Request Guard Vulnerabilities │ │ └── 1.2.1 Bypass Request Guard Validation [HIGH RISK] │ │ ├── 1.2.1.1 Craft malicious input that bypasses type checking or custom validation logic. [CRITICAL] │ │ └── 1.2.1.2 Exploit errors in custom FromRequest implementations. [CRITICAL] │ ├── 1.3 Exploit Codegen/Macro Vulnerabilities │ │ └── 1.3.1 Inject Malicious Code via Template Injection (if using a templating engine through Rocket) [HIGH RISK] │ │ └── 1.3.1.1 Exploit vulnerabilities in the templating engine integration (e.g., Tera, Handlebars). [CRITICAL] │ └── 1.5 Exploit Form Handling Vulnerabilities │ └── 1.5.1 Bypass Form Validation [HIGH RISK] │ └── 1.5.1.1 Craft malicious input that bypasses form validation logic, leading to unexpected data being processed. [CRITICAL] ├── 2. Achieve DoS ├── 2.1 Resource Exhaustion │ └── 2.1.1 Flood the Server with Requests [HIGH RISK] │ └── 2.1.1.1 Send a large number of requests to overwhelm Rocket's connection handling. └── 2.3 Configuration-Based DoS [HIGH RISK] └── 2.3.1 Misconfigure Rocket's Limits └── 2.3.1.1 Set overly restrictive limits (e.g., request size, connections) that make the application easily DoSable.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1.1 Inject malicious code into request/response modification logic.

• Description: Attackers exploit vulnerabilities in custom Rocket fairings that modify requests or responses. If the fairing doesn't properly sanitize or validate data before manipulating it, an attacker can inject malicious code (e.g., Rust code, shell commands) that will be executed by the server.
• Likelihood: Medium
• Impact: High (RCE)
• Effort: Medium
• Skill Level: Intermediate
• Detection Difficulty: Medium
• Example: A fairing that adds a custom header based on user input without proper sanitization. An attacker could inject a header value containing malicious code.
• Mitigation:
  • Strictly validate and sanitize all user-supplied data used within fairings.
  • Avoid executing arbitrary code based on user input.
  • Use parameterized queries or safe APIs when interacting with databases or other external systems from within a fairing.
  • Thoroughly test fairings with a wide range of inputs, including malicious ones.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2.1.1 Craft malicious input that bypasses type checking or custom validation logic.

• Description: Attackers craft specific input that evades the validation checks performed by Rocket's request guards (including FromRequest implementations). This could involve exploiting type confusion, logic flaws in custom validation, or edge cases not considered by the developer.
• Likelihood: Medium
• Impact: High (RCE, Data Modification)
• Effort: Medium
• Skill Level: Intermediate
• Detection Difficulty: Medium
• Example: A request guard that expects an integer ID but doesn't properly handle non-numeric input, leading to unexpected behavior or code execution.
• Mitigation:
  • Use strong typing and validation provided by Rocket and Rust.
  • Avoid overly complex custom validation logic.
  • Fuzz test request guards with a wide variety of inputs, including invalid and unexpected data.
  • Use a web application firewall (WAF) to filter out malicious requests.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2.1.2 Exploit errors in custom FromRequest implementations.

• Description: Similar to 1.2.1.1, but specifically targets vulnerabilities within the custom logic of FromRequest implementations. If the FromRequest implementation contains bugs or unsafe code, it can be exploited to gain control.
• Likelihood: Medium
• Impact: High (RCE, Data Modification)
• Effort: Medium
• Skill Level: Intermediate
• Detection Difficulty: Medium
• Example: A custom FromRequest implementation that uses unsafe code to parse data from the request, but contains a memory safety vulnerability.
• Mitigation:
  • Minimize the use of unsafe code in FromRequest implementations.
  • Thoroughly review and test any unsafe code for memory safety issues.
  • Use tools like cargo miri to detect undefined behavior.
  • Prefer using Rocket's built-in request guards whenever possible.

Attack Tree Path: 1.3.1.1 Exploit vulnerabilities in the templating engine integration (e.g., Tera, Handlebars).

• Description: Attackers inject malicious code into template variables, exploiting vulnerabilities in the templating engine used by the Rocket application. This is a form of server-side template injection (SSTI).
• Likelihood: Medium
• Impact: High (RCE)
• Effort: Medium
• Skill Level: Intermediate
• Detection Difficulty: Medium
• Example: A template that renders user-provided input without proper escaping. An attacker could inject template syntax that executes arbitrary code.
• Mitigation:
  • Use a templating engine with auto-escaping enabled by default.
  • Sanitize all user-provided input before passing it to the templating engine.
  • Keep the templating engine and its dependencies up-to-date.
  • Use a Content Security Policy (CSP) to restrict the resources that can be loaded by the template.

Attack Tree Path: 1.5.1.1 Craft malicious input that bypasses form validation logic, leading to unexpected data being processed.

• Description: Attackers submit form data that bypasses the validation rules defined in the Rocket application. This can lead to the application processing invalid or malicious data, potentially causing data corruption, unexpected behavior, or even RCE.
• Likelihood: Medium
• Impact: Medium to High (Data Corruption, RCE)
• Effort: Medium
• Skill Level: Intermediate
• Detection Difficulty: Medium
• Example: A form that expects a positive integer but doesn't properly validate the input, allowing an attacker to submit a negative number or a very large number, potentially causing an integer overflow or denial of service.
• Mitigation:
  • Use Rocket's built-in form validation features (e.g., Form, Data).
  • Define strict data types and validation rules for all form fields.
  • Validate data on both the client-side (for usability) and the server-side (for security).
  • Test form handling with a variety of valid and invalid inputs.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1.1.1 Send a large number of requests to overwhelm Rocket's connection handling.

• Description: A classic denial-of-service (DoS) attack where the attacker floods the server with requests, exhausting its resources (e.g., connections, threads) and making it unavailable to legitimate users.
• Likelihood: High
• Impact: Medium (Service Unavailability)
• Effort: Low
• Skill Level: Novice
• Detection Difficulty: Easy
• Example: Using a tool like ab (Apache Bench) or a botnet to send thousands of requests per second to the server.
• Mitigation:
  • Implement rate limiting to restrict the number of requests from a single IP address or user.
  • Use a reverse proxy (e.g., Nginx, Apache) to handle load balancing and mitigate DoS attacks.
  • Configure Rocket's workers and max_connections settings appropriately for the expected load.
  • Use a web application firewall (WAF) to filter out malicious traffic.

Attack Tree Path: 2.3.1.1 Set overly restrictive limits (e.g., request size, connections) that make the application easily DoSable.

• Description: The application is configured with limits that are too low, making it vulnerable to accidental or intentional DoS attacks. Even a small number of legitimate requests could exceed these limits.
• Likelihood: Medium
• Impact: Medium (Service Unavailability)
• Effort: Very Low
• Skill Level: Novice
• Detection Difficulty: Very Easy
• Example: Setting the max_connections limit to a very low value, causing the server to reject connections even under normal load.
• Mitigation:
  • Carefully review and configure Rocket's limits (e.g., limits, workers, max_connections) based on the expected load and available resources.
  • Monitor resource usage and adjust limits as needed.
  • Test the application under load to ensure that the limits are appropriate.