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Threat Model Analysis for rwf2/rocket

Threat: Unexpected Request Parsing Leading to DoS/RCE

  • 1. Threat: Unexpected Request Parsing Leading to DoS/RCE

    • Description: An attacker sends a specially crafted request (e.g., malformed form data, unusual query parameters, or a crafted request body) that exploits a vulnerability in Rocket's parsing logic. The attacker aims to either cause a denial-of-service (DoS) by crashing the server or consuming excessive resources, or, in a more severe scenario, achieve remote code execution (RCE).
    • Impact:
      • DoS: Application becomes unavailable to legitimate users.
      • RCE: Attacker gains full control over the server, potentially accessing sensitive data, modifying the application, or using the server for further attacks.
    • Affected Component: rocket::Request, rocket::Data, custom FromData implementations, custom FromRequest implementations, request guards, form handling (rocket::form), body data handling.
    • Risk Severity: Critical (if RCE is possible), High (for DoS).
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Fuzz Testing: Extensively fuzz test all request handlers, particularly those with custom data guards or request guards.
      • Input Validation: Implement strict input validation before Rocket's parsing, if possible (e.g., at a reverse proxy). Validate data after Rocket's parsing as well.
      • Resource Limits: Enforce strict limits on request body size, number of form fields, and other request parameters using Rocket's configuration options.
      • Update Rocket: Keep Rocket and its dependencies updated to the latest versions to benefit from security patches.
      • Error Handling: Implement robust error handling to prevent crashes and gracefully handle unexpected input.
      • Monitoring: Monitor server logs for unusual request patterns and errors.

Threat: Route Collision/Overlap Leading to Incorrect Handler Execution

  • 2. Threat: Route Collision/Overlap Leading to Incorrect Handler Execution

    • Description: An attacker crafts a request that matches multiple, ambiguously defined routes. Due to the overlap, Rocket might execute the wrong handler, potentially bypassing intended security checks or leading to unintended behavior.
    • Impact:
      • Bypassed Authentication/Authorization: An attacker might access a resource they shouldn't.
      • Information Disclosure: The wrong handler might expose sensitive data.
      • Unexpected Application State: The application might enter an inconsistent or unexpected state.
    • Affected Component: rocket::Route, route definition logic, route ranking system.
    • Risk Severity: High.
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Route Review: Carefully review all route definitions to ensure there are no overlaps or ambiguities.
      • Explicit Ranking: Use Rocket's route ranking system (rank attribute) explicitly to define the precedence of routes.
      • Testing: Thoroughly test all possible request paths to ensure the correct handlers are executed.
      • Linting/Static Analysis: Use a linter or static analysis tool that can detect potential route conflicts.

Threat: Unintended Exposure of Internal Routes

  • 3. Threat: Unintended Exposure of Internal Routes

    • Description: An attacker discovers and accesses routes intended for internal use only (e.g., debugging endpoints, administrative interfaces) that were accidentally exposed to the public internet.
    • Impact:
      • Information Disclosure: Exposure of sensitive internal data or configuration.
      • Unauthorized Access: Attackers might gain administrative privileges or modify the application.
      • System Compromise: Internal routes might provide entry points for further attacks.
    • Affected Component: rocket::Route, route definition logic, deployment configuration.
    • Risk Severity: High.
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Conditional Compilation: Use #[cfg(debug_assertions)] or similar mechanisms to conditionally compile internal routes only in development builds.
      • Authentication/Authorization: Implement strong authentication and authorization checks on all routes, including those intended for internal use.
      • Network Segmentation: Deploy internal services on a separate, firewalled network.
      • Reverse Proxy Configuration: Configure the reverse proxy (e.g., Nginx, Apache) to block access to internal routes from external networks.

Threat: Fairing-Induced Vulnerability (High-Risk Fairings)

  • 4. Threat: Fairing-Induced Vulnerability (High-Risk Fairings)

    • Description: A custom fairing that has significant control over request/response processing (e.g., modifies request bodies, headers, or interacts extensively with managed state) introduces a vulnerability, such as bypassing security checks, injecting malicious data, or causing a denial-of-service. This is specifically focused on fairings with a high potential for impact.
    • Impact: Varies depending on the specific vulnerability. Could range from information disclosure to RCE, depending on the fairing's actions.
    • Affected Component: Custom fairing implementations (rocket::fairing::Fairing), request/response processing pipeline.
    • Risk Severity: High to Critical (depending on the fairing's functionality and the introduced vulnerability).
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Code Review: Thoroughly review and audit all custom, high-risk fairings for potential security issues. Prioritize security over performance.
      • Secure Coding Practices: Follow secure coding practices, paying close attention to input validation, output encoding, and error handling.
      • Testing: Extensively test high-risk fairings with a wide variety of inputs, including malicious and edge-case inputs.
      • Minimal Functionality: Keep fairings as simple and focused as possible. Avoid unnecessary complexity.
      • Avoid State Manipulation: If a fairing must manipulate state, do so carefully and with proper synchronization, using established concurrency patterns.

Threat: Custom Data/Request Guard Bypass

  • 5. Threat: Custom Data/Request Guard Bypass

    • Description: An attacker crafts a request that bypasses the intended logic of a custom FromData or FromRequest implementation (data guard or request guard). This could allow them to bypass authentication, authorization, or input validation.
    • Impact:
      • Bypassed Authentication/Authorization: Access to protected resources.
      • Invalid Data: Acceptance of malicious or invalid data.
      • Unexpected Behavior: The application behaves in an unintended way.
    • Affected Component: Custom FromData implementations, custom FromRequest implementations, request guards.
    • Risk Severity: High to Critical.
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Thorough Testing: Extensively test custom guards with a wide variety of inputs, including malicious and edge-case inputs.
      • Code Review: Carefully review the code of custom guards for potential bypass vulnerabilities.
      • Principle of Least Privilege: Ensure guards only grant the minimum necessary access.
      • Fail-Safe Design: Design guards to fail securely (i.e., deny access) if any error or unexpected condition occurs.
      • Input Validation: Perform thorough input validation within the guard.