Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
118 lines (105 loc) · 16.7 KB

File metadata and controls

118 lines (105 loc) · 16.7 KB

Mitigation Strategies Analysis for seanmonstar/warp

Mitigation Strategy: Strict Route Definitions

  • Description:
    1. Review Existing Routes: Examine all warp::path! definitions in your application's routing logic (e.g., in src/api.rs or dedicated routing modules).
    2. Refine Path Segments: Replace any overly generic path segments (like warp::path::param::<String>() without validation) with more specific, fixed path segments where possible. For example, instead of /users/{id}, use /users/profile/{username} if the route is specifically for user profiles by username.
    3. Validate Path Parameters: When using path parameters (warp::path::param::<Type>()), always apply validation filters immediately after extracting the parameter. Use and_then with custom validation functions to ensure parameters conform to expected types, formats, and constraints (e.g., numeric IDs within a valid range, alphanumeric usernames).
    4. Avoid Wildcards (Carefully): Minimize the use of wildcard routes or overly broad parameter matching. If wildcards are necessary, implement very strict validation and authorization checks on the matched path segments.
    5. Principle of Least Privilege for Routes: Only define routes that are absolutely necessary for the application's functionality. Avoid creating routes that might expose internal functionalities or resources unintentionally.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Path Traversal (High Severity) - Attackers could manipulate URL paths to access files or resources outside of the intended scope if routes are too broad or lack validation.
    • Unintended Endpoint Exposure (Medium Severity) - Overly permissive routes can accidentally expose administrative interfaces, debugging endpoints, or internal functionalities that should not be publicly accessible.
  • Impact:
    • Path Traversal: High Reduction - Significantly reduces the attack surface for path traversal vulnerabilities by limiting the flexibility of URL paths.
    • Unintended Endpoint Exposure: Medium Reduction - Makes it less likely to accidentally expose sensitive endpoints by enforcing explicit route definitions.
  • Currently Implemented: Partially implemented in API routes defined in src/api.rs, but some older routes in src/main.rs might still use less specific path parameters.
  • Missing Implementation: Review and refactor older routes in src/main.rs and any other modules to ensure all path parameters are strictly validated and routes are as specific as possible.
  • Description:
    1. Identify Path Parameters: Locate all instances where warp::path::param::<Type>() is used in your route definitions.
    2. Create Validation Functions: For each path parameter, write a dedicated validation function. This function should take the parameter value as input and return Result<ValidValue, Rejection>. Inside the function, implement checks to ensure the parameter meets expected criteria (e.g., type, format, range, allowed characters).
    3. Apply Validation with and_then: Chain the validation function to the warp::path::param filter using and_then. If validation fails (returns Err(Rejection)), Warp will automatically reject the request.
    4. Sanitize (If Necessary): Within the validation function, you can also sanitize the input if needed (e.g., remove potentially harmful characters). However, validation should primarily focus on rejecting invalid input rather than trying to fix it.
    5. Centralize Validation Logic: Consider creating a module or utility functions to store and reuse validation logic across different routes for consistency and maintainability.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Path Traversal (High Severity) - Prevents attackers from injecting malicious path segments or characters into path parameters to bypass access controls or access unintended files.
    • Injection Attacks (Medium Severity) - Reduces the risk of SQL injection or command injection if path parameters are used to construct database queries or system commands (though this practice should be minimized).
    • Business Logic Errors (Low to Medium Severity) - Prevents unexpected application behavior or errors caused by invalid or malformed path parameters.
  • Impact:
    • Path Traversal: High Reduction - Significantly reduces path traversal risks by ensuring path parameters are well-formed and within expected boundaries.
    • Injection Attacks: Medium Reduction - Lessens the risk of injection attacks if path parameters are misused, but proper query parameterization and command sanitization are still crucial.
    • Business Logic Errors: Medium Reduction - Improves application stability and predictability by ensuring data integrity at the input stage.
  • Currently Implemented: Partially implemented for user ID parameters in API endpoints, but validation might be missing for other path parameters like filenames or resource identifiers.
  • Missing Implementation: Systematically review all routes with path parameters and implement dedicated validation functions for each parameter type. Prioritize validation for parameters that are used to access resources or influence critical application logic.

Mitigation Strategy: Content-Type Enforcement

  • Description:
    1. Identify Routes with Request Bodies: Determine which routes in your application are designed to accept request bodies (e.g., POST, PUT, PATCH routes).
    2. Define Expected Content-Types: For each route that accepts a body, clearly define the expected Content-Type header values (e.g., application/json, application/x-www-form-urlencoded, text/plain).
    3. Use warp::filters::header::exact_header: In your route definitions, use warp::filters::header::exact_header (or header::header with value matching) to filter requests based on the Content-Type header.
    4. Reject Unexpected Content-Types: If a request arrives with a Content-Type that does not match the expected values, the exact_header filter will reject the request, preventing further processing.
    5. Document Expected Content-Types: Clearly document the expected Content-Type for each API endpoint in your API documentation or developer guides.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Bypass of Input Validation (Medium Severity) - Attackers might try to bypass input validation by sending requests with unexpected Content-Type headers that are not properly handled by the application's body parsing logic.
    • Denial of Service (DoS) (Low to Medium Severity) - Processing unexpected content types could lead to errors or resource exhaustion, potentially contributing to DoS.
    • Exploitation of Parsing Vulnerabilities (Medium Severity) - Unexpected content types might trigger vulnerabilities in the body parsing libraries or custom parsing code if not handled correctly.
  • Impact:
    • Bypass of Input Validation: Medium Reduction - Makes it harder for attackers to bypass validation by sending unexpected data formats.
    • Denial of Service (DoS): Low to Medium Reduction - Reduces the risk of DoS related to processing unexpected data formats.
    • Exploitation of Parsing Vulnerabilities: Medium Reduction - Minimizes the attack surface related to vulnerabilities in body parsing by rejecting unexpected input.
  • Currently Implemented: Implemented for API endpoints that accept application/json using warp::header::exact_header("content-type", "application/json").
  • Missing Implementation: Extend Content-Type enforcement to all routes that accept request bodies, including form data or text payloads. Ensure all expected content types are explicitly defined and enforced.

Mitigation Strategy: Implement Security Headers

  • Description:
    1. Identify Necessary Security Headers: Determine the appropriate security headers for your application based on its security requirements and deployment context. Common headers include Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, Strict-Transport-Security, Referrer-Policy, and Permissions-Policy.
    2. Use warp::reply::with_header: In your route handlers or response filters, use warp::reply::with_header to add each security header to the HTTP responses.
    3. Configure Header Values: Carefully configure the values of each security header according to best practices and your application's specific needs. For example, set a restrictive Content-Security-Policy that only allows loading resources from trusted origins.
    4. Apply Headers Globally (Consider Middleware): For consistent application of security headers, consider creating a middleware or a reusable filter that adds these headers to all responses. This can be achieved using warp::Filter::map or custom filter combinators.
    5. Test Header Implementation: Use browser developer tools or online header analysis tools to verify that security headers are correctly set in your application's responses.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) (High Severity) - Content-Security-Policy significantly reduces the risk of XSS attacks by controlling resource loading.
    • Clickjacking (Medium Severity) - X-Frame-Options prevents clickjacking attacks by controlling frame embedding.
    • MIME-Sniffing Vulnerabilities (Medium Severity) - X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff prevents browsers from MIME-sniffing responses, reducing the risk of serving malicious content as a different type.
    • Man-in-the-Middle Attacks (High Severity) - Strict-Transport-Security enforces HTTPS and reduces the risk of downgrade attacks.
    • Information Leakage (Low to Medium Severity) - Referrer-Policy controls referrer information, potentially reducing information leakage.
    • Feature Abuse (Low to Medium Severity) - Permissions-Policy restricts browser features, mitigating potential abuse of features like geolocation or camera access.
  • Impact:
    • Cross-Site Scripting (XSS): High Reduction - CSP is a very effective mitigation against many types of XSS attacks.
    • Clickjacking: High Reduction - X-Frame-Options effectively prevents clickjacking.
    • MIME-Sniffing Vulnerabilities: Medium Reduction - Reduces the risk of MIME-sniffing exploits.
    • Man-in-the-Middle Attacks: High Reduction - HSTS is crucial for enforcing HTTPS and preventing downgrade attacks.
    • Information Leakage: Low to Medium Reduction - Can help control referrer information, but impact depends on application context.
    • Feature Abuse: Low to Medium Reduction - Limits potential abuse of browser features, but effectiveness depends on the specific features and policies.
  • Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. X-Frame-Options and X-Content-Type-Options are set in the main response handler in src/main.rs.
  • Missing Implementation: Implement Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, Referrer-Policy, and Permissions-Policy. Consider creating a middleware to apply all security headers consistently across the application. CSP needs careful configuration based on application assets.
  • Description:
    1. Define Custom Rejections: Create custom rejection types using warp::reject::custom to represent specific security-related error conditions (e.g., AuthorizationError, ValidationError).
    2. Implement recover Filter: Use warp::filters::recover::recover to create a recovery filter that handles these custom rejections. This filter will intercept rejections and transform them into custom error responses.
    3. Generic Error Responses for Security Failures: In the recover filter, for security-related rejections, return generic error responses to clients. Avoid exposing detailed error messages that could reveal sensitive information or aid attackers. For example, for authorization failures, return a generic "Unauthorized" or "Forbidden" message without specific details about why authorization failed.
    4. Log Detailed Errors Server-Side: Within the recover filter (or in a separate logging mechanism), log detailed error information server-side, including the specific rejection type, request details, and any relevant context. This detailed logging is crucial for debugging and security monitoring.
    5. Differentiate Client and Server Errors: Distinguish between client-side errors (e.g., invalid input) and server-side errors. For client errors, provide minimal feedback to the client while logging details server-side. For server errors, return generic error messages to the client and log comprehensive details for debugging.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Information Disclosure (Medium Severity) - Prevents the exposure of sensitive information in error messages, such as internal paths, database details, or stack traces.
    • Exploitation of Error Handling Logic (Low to Medium Severity) - Reduces the risk of attackers exploiting verbose error messages to gain insights into the application's internal workings or identify potential vulnerabilities.
  • Impact:
    • Information Disclosure: Medium Reduction - Significantly reduces the risk of information leakage through error messages.
    • Exploitation of Error Handling Logic: Low to Medium Reduction - Makes it slightly harder for attackers to exploit error handling for reconnaissance.
  • Currently Implemented: Basic error handling is in place using recover in src/main.rs, but it currently returns default Warp error responses which might be too verbose.
  • Missing Implementation: Implement custom rejection types for security-related errors and modify the recover filter to return generic, security-conscious error responses to clients while logging detailed errors server-side.
  • Description:
    1. Choose Rate Limiting Strategy: Decide on a rate limiting strategy that suits your application's needs. Common strategies include limiting requests per IP address, per user, or per endpoint.
    2. Implement Rate Limiting Filter/Middleware: Use a rate limiting library or implement custom rate limiting logic as a Warp filter or middleware. This filter should track request counts and reject requests that exceed defined limits.
    3. Configure Rate Limits: Carefully configure rate limits based on your application's expected traffic patterns and resource capacity. Set limits that are high enough to accommodate legitimate users but low enough to prevent abuse.
    4. Customize Rate Limit Responses: When a request is rate-limited, return a clear and informative error response to the client (e.g., HTTP 429 Too Many Requests) with appropriate headers (e.g., Retry-After).
    5. Consider Different Limits for Different Endpoints: You might need to apply different rate limits to different endpoints based on their sensitivity or resource consumption. For example, authentication endpoints or resource-intensive endpoints might require stricter limits.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Brute-Force Attacks (Medium to High Severity) - Rate limiting makes brute-force attacks (e.g., password guessing, credential stuffing) significantly slower and less effective.
    • Denial of Service (DoS) (Medium to High Severity) - Limits the impact of DoS attacks by preventing attackers from overwhelming the server with excessive requests.
    • Resource Exhaustion (Medium Severity) - Protects server resources (CPU, memory, bandwidth) from being exhausted by excessive traffic, ensuring application stability.
  • Impact:
    • Brute-Force Attacks: High Reduction - Rate limiting is a very effective mitigation against brute-force attacks.
    • Denial of Service (DoS): Medium to High Reduction - Can significantly reduce the impact of many types of DoS attacks, especially application-layer attacks.
    • Resource Exhaustion: Medium Reduction - Helps prevent resource exhaustion caused by excessive traffic.
  • Currently Implemented: No rate limiting is currently implemented.
  • Missing Implementation: Implement rate limiting middleware or filters for critical endpoints, such as authentication, API endpoints, and resource-intensive operations. Consider using a library like governor or implementing custom rate limiting logic within Warp filters.