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threat-modeling.md

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Threat Model Analysis for seanmonstar/warp

Threat: Insufficient Input Validation in Warp Filters/Extractors

Description: An attacker crafts malicious input in requests, exploiting the application's failure to properly validate this input within custom Warp filters or extractors. This can lead to unexpected behavior or bypass security checks.

Impact: Application crashes, logic errors, buffer overflows (less likely in Rust), bypass of security checks, data corruption.

Affected Warp Component: Custom Warp Filters and Extractors, path!, query!, header!, body! extractors.

Risk Severity: Critical

Mitigation Strategies:

  • Implement strict input validation within all custom Warp filters and extractors.
  • Use Rust's type system and libraries like serde for safe deserialization.
  • Employ validation crates to enforce data constraints.
  • Sanitize and escape user inputs before processing.

Threat: Overly Permissive Route Matching in Warp

Description: An attacker exploits broadly defined routes (using wildcards like * or ..) that unintentionally expose sensitive endpoints or resources. They can access these unintended paths by crafting URLs that match the overly permissive route definitions.

Impact: Unauthorized access to sensitive functionalities or data, path traversal vulnerabilities, exposure of internal application structure.

Affected Warp Component: Warp's Route Matching system, path! macro, wildcard route segments (*, ..).

Risk Severity: Critical

Mitigation Strategies:

  • Define routes with precision, avoiding overly broad wildcards unless necessary.
  • Use specific path segments and parameters instead of relying solely on wildcards.
  • Thoroughly test route definitions to ensure they only match intended paths.
  • Implement route-based access control and authorization.

Threat: Concurrency Issues in Custom Asynchronous Filters/Handlers

Description: An attacker exploits race conditions, deadlocks, or data corruption vulnerabilities arising from concurrency bugs in custom asynchronous filters or route handlers. These bugs occur when shared mutable state is not properly managed in asynchronous contexts.

Impact: Data corruption, inconsistent application state, unexpected application behavior, crashes, potential for security vulnerabilities if concurrency issues bypass security checks or lead to data breaches.

Affected Warp Component: Custom Warp Filters and Handlers that involve asynchronous operations and shared mutable state, Tokio runtime.

Risk Severity: Critical

Mitigation Strategies:

  • Follow best practices for asynchronous programming in Rust and Tokio.
  • Minimize shared mutable state.
  • Use appropriate synchronization primitives (e.g., Mutex, RwLock, Channels) when dealing with shared mutable state in asynchronous contexts.
  • Thoroughly test concurrent code paths for race conditions.

Threat: DoS due to Asynchronous Resource Exhaustion

Description: An attacker sends a large number of requests or requests that trigger resource-intensive asynchronous operations in Warp applications. Improperly designed asynchronous operations without resource limits can lead to unbounded resource consumption (CPU, memory, connections), causing denial of service.

Impact: Application becomes unresponsive, crashes under load, denial of service for legitimate users.

Affected Warp Component: Asynchronous filters and handlers, Tokio runtime, Warp's request handling.

Risk Severity: High

Mitigation Strategies:

  • Implement resource limits and rate limiting in Warp applications.
  • Carefully design asynchronous operations to avoid unbounded resource consumption.
  • Use Tokio's features for task management and resource control.
  • Perform load testing to identify potential resource exhaustion vulnerabilities.

Threat: Vulnerabilities in Warp Dependencies (Crates)

Description: An attacker exploits known vulnerabilities in Warp's dependencies (crates like tokio, hyper, bytes, http). These vulnerabilities can be indirectly exploited through the Warp application.

Impact: Varies depending on the dependency vulnerability, potentially including remote code execution, data breaches, and denial of service.

Affected Warp Component: Warp's dependency management, all parts of Warp that rely on vulnerable dependencies.

Risk Severity: Critical (depending on the dependency vulnerability)

Mitigation Strategies:

  • Regularly audit and update Warp dependencies to the latest versions.
  • Use tools like cargo audit to scan for known vulnerabilities in dependencies.
  • Monitor security advisories for Warp and its dependencies.

Threat: Insecure Warp Server Setup

Description: An attacker exploits insecure Warp server configurations, such as running the application with overly permissive network exposure or without proper TLS configuration when needed.

Impact: Unauthorized access to the application or server, exposure of sensitive data, denial of service.

Affected Warp Component: Warp server setup, TLS configuration (using Warp's TLS features or external proxies).

Risk Severity: Critical

Mitigation Strategies:

  • Follow secure deployment practices for web applications.
  • Configure TLS properly for HTTPS using Warp's TLS support or reverse proxies.
  • Restrict network access to only necessary ports and interfaces.
  • Avoid binding to 0.0.0.0 in production without proper firewall configuration.

Threat: DoS through Abuse of Warp's Request Body Handling

Description: An attacker sends excessively large request bodies to the Warp application, exploiting the lack of request body size limits. This can exhaust server resources (memory, disk space), leading to denial of service.

Impact: Denial of service due to resource exhaustion, server instability.

Affected Warp Component: Warp's Request Body handling, body::bytes(), body::json(), body::form(), etc.

Risk Severity: High

Mitigation Strategies:

  • Implement request body size limits in Warp applications using filters like body::content_length_limit.
  • Consider using streaming body handling to avoid buffering large bodies in memory.
  • Implement rate limiting to restrict the number of requests from a single source.

Threat: DoS through Abuse of WebSocket or Server-Sent Events (SSE) features

Description: An attacker floods the server with WebSocket connections or SSE subscriptions, or sends a high volume of messages through these channels. This can exhaust server resources, leading to denial of service.

Impact: Denial of service due to connection or message flooding, server instability.

Affected Warp Component: Warp's WebSocket and SSE support, connection handling.

Risk Severity: High

Mitigation Strategies:

  • Implement connection limits and rate limiting for WebSocket and SSE endpoints.
  • Validate and sanitize messages received through WebSockets or SSE.
  • Properly manage resources associated with long-lived connections.