Attack Surface: Complex Filter Chains & Logic Errors (Direct warp Feature)
Description: Intricate warp filter compositions, especially with custom filters, can introduce logical flaws leading to bypasses or unexpected behavior. This is directly tied to warp's filter-based architecture.
How warp Contributes: warp's core design is composing filters. The framework's flexibility allows for complex configurations, making this a direct concern.
Example: A filter intended to block access to /admin is incorrectly ordered, allowing unauthorized access. A custom filter using a flawed regular expression allows bypass of intended restrictions.
Impact: Authentication/Authorization bypass, Information disclosure, potentially Remote Code Execution (RCE) if a filter interacts with the system unsafely.
Risk Severity: Critical to High (depending on the specific logic flaw).
Mitigation Strategies:
* Simplify Filters: Keep filter chains as simple and linear as possible.
* Unit Testing: Thoroughly unit test each filter individually and in combination.
* Code Review: Mandatory code review of filter chain logic.
* Input Validation (Early): Validate before complex filter logic.
* "Fail Closed" Design: Filters should deny access by default.
Attack Surface: Unbounded Request Body Handling (Direct warp Interaction)
Description: Failure to limit request body sizes can lead to Denial of Service (DoS). This is a direct interaction with how warp handles incoming data.
How warp Contributes: warp (via hyper) handles request bodies. While it provides limiting mechanisms, not using them is a direct vulnerability within warp's usage.
Example: An endpoint accepting uploads doesn't use warp's body::content_length_limit(), allowing a massive upload to consume resources.
Impact: Denial of Service (DoS).
Risk Severity: High
Mitigation Strategies:
* body::content_length_limit(): Always use warp's body::content_length_limit() filter. This is a direct warp mitigation.
* Streaming with Limits (If Applicable): For very large uploads, use streaming with warp's limits.
Attack Surface: WebSocket Security - CSWSH (Direct warp Feature)
Description: warp's WebSocket support introduces risks related to Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH) if origin validation is not correctly implemented within the warp filter.
How warp Contributes: warp provides the WebSocket functionality. The framework provides the upgrade mechanism, and the developer must use warp's features to validate the origin.
Example: A WebSocket endpoint doesn't use warp's capabilities to check the Origin header, allowing a malicious site to connect.
Impact: Unauthorized actions, data theft, session hijacking.
Risk Severity: High to Critical
Mitigation Strategies:
* warp::ws() Origin Validation: Strictly validate the Origin header within the warp::ws() filter setup. This is a direct use of warp's features for security.
* Authentication within WebSocket Context: Implement authentication after the WebSocket upgrade, using warp's context to manage the authenticated session.