mitigations.md

Mitigation Strategies Analysis for seanmonstar/warp

Mitigation Strategy: Strict Filter Composition and Routing Logic Validation (Warp-Specific)

Description:

1. Modular Filter Design: Break down complex routing logic into smaller, single-responsibility warp::Filter implementations. This improves readability and testability.
2. Filter Composition Review: During code reviews, meticulously examine the warp::Filter chain, paying close attention to the order of operations and how filters are combined using and, or, and_then, etc. Trace the execution path.
3. Unit Testing of Individual Filters: Write unit tests for each warp::Filter in isolation, using warp::test::request() to simulate requests and verify the filter's behavior.
4. Integration Testing of Filter Chains: Write integration tests that use warp::test::request() to simulate complete HTTP requests and verify that the entire warp::Filter chain (as composed in your routes) behaves as expected.
5. Property-Based Testing (with warp::test): Use proptest in conjunction with warp::test::request() to generate a wide range of inputs and automatically test your warp::Filter chains.
6. Regular Expression Review (within warp::path filters): If using warp::path with regular expressions (e.g., warp::path::param().and_then(...)), carefully review the regex for ReDoS vulnerabilities.
7. Explicit Error Handling with warp::reject: Ensure that all filter rejections (using warp::reject) result in consistent, well-defined HTTP responses. Use custom rejections (warp::reject::custom) for specific error types.

Threats Mitigated:

• Authentication Bypass: (Severity: Critical)
• Authorization Bypass: (Severity: Critical)
• Unintended Route Exposure: (Severity: High)
• Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) (within warp::path): (Severity: High)
• Information Leakage (via warp::reject): (Severity: Medium)

Impact: (Same as previous, but focused on the warp-specific aspects)

• Authentication/Authorization Bypass: Risk reduced from Critical to Low.
• Unintended Route Exposure: Risk reduced from High to Low.
• ReDoS: Risk reduced from High to Low.
• Information Leakage: Risk reduced from Medium to Low.

Currently Implemented: (Placeholder - Project Specific) Missing Implementation: (Placeholder - Project Specific)

Mitigation Strategy: Robust Request Body Handling (Warp-Specific)

Description:

1. Implement warp::body::content_length_limit: Use warp::body::content_length_limit() on all routes that accept request bodies. Set the limit based on your application's requirements. Example: warp::body::content_length_limit(1024 * 16) // 16KB limit.
2. Streaming with warp::body::stream: For large bodies or when you don't need the entire body in memory, use warp::body::stream() to process the body as a stream of Bytes. This is crucial for file uploads or large data processing.
3. Combine with Timeouts (using tokio::time::timeout): Wrap your body handling logic (whether using warp::body::bytes or warp::body::stream) within a tokio::time::timeout to prevent slowloris attacks. Example:

   use tokio::time::timeout;
   use std::time::Duration;
   
   // ... inside your filter ...
   .and_then(|body: warp::hyper::Body| async move {
       timeout(Duration::from_secs(30), async {
           // Process the body here (e.g., collect bytes, stream to a file)
           let bytes = warp::hyper::body::to_bytes(body).await?;
           // ...
           Ok::<_, warp::Rejection>(...) // Return a result
       }).await
       .map_err(|_| warp::reject::reject()) // Handle timeout as a rejection
       .and_then(|result| async move { result }) // Flatten the Result
   })

4. Test with warp::test: Use warp::test::request().body(...) to send large and slowly-delivered request bodies in your tests.

Threats Mitigated:

• Denial of Service (DoS) via Large Requests: (Severity: High)
• Denial of Service (DoS) via Slowloris Attack: (Severity: High)
• Resource Exhaustion: (Severity: High)

Impact: (Same as previous, focused on warp usage)

• DoS (Large Requests): Risk reduced from High to Low.
• DoS (Slowloris): Risk reduced from High to Low.
• Resource Exhaustion: Risk reduced from High to Low.

Currently Implemented: (Placeholder - Project Specific) Missing Implementation: (Placeholder - Project Specific)

Mitigation Strategy: Secure WebSocket Handling (Warp-Specific)

Description:

1. Use warp::ws(): Use warp::ws() to define WebSocket endpoints.
2. Implement warp::ws::Ws2::on_upgrade: Within the on_upgrade callback, handle the established WebSocket connection.
3. Message Size Limits (within on_message): Inside the on_message callback of your warp::ws::WebSocket handler, check the size of incoming messages (msg.as_bytes().len()) and reject messages that exceed a predefined limit.
4. Authentication/Authorization (before on_upgrade): Perform authentication and authorization before calling ws.on_upgrade. You can use other warp filters (e.g., for checking headers, cookies, or tokens) to achieve this. Reject the connection if authentication/authorization fails.
5. Idle Connection Timeouts (using tokio::time::timeout): Wrap your WebSocket message handling logic within tokio::time::timeout to close connections that have been idle for too long. You'll need to track the last message time.
6. Origin Validation (using warp::header): Use warp::header::header("origin") to get the Origin header and validate it against a whitelist before upgrading to a WebSocket connection.
7. Input Validation (within on_message): Thoroughly validate and sanitize all data received within the on_message callback. Assume all input is potentially malicious.
8. Test with warp::test::ws(): Use warp::test::ws() to simulate WebSocket clients and test your WebSocket handling logic, including sending large messages, invalid data, and testing authentication/authorization.

Threats Mitigated:

• Denial of Service (DoS) via Connection Exhaustion: (Severity: High)
• Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH): (Severity: High)
• Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via WebSockets: (Severity: Critical)
• Unauthorized Access: (Severity: Critical)
• Resource Exhaustion (via large messages): (Severity: High)

Impact: (Same as previous, focused on warp usage)

• DoS (Connection Exhaustion): Risk reduced from High to Low.
• CSWSH: Risk reduced from High to Low.
• XSS: Risk reduced from Critical to Low.
• Unauthorized Access: Risk reduced from Critical to Low.
• Resource Exhaustion (large messages): Risk reduced from High to Low.

Currently Implemented: (Placeholder - Project Specific) Missing Implementation: (Placeholder - Project Specific)

Mitigation Strategy: Safe Rejection Handling (Warp-Specific)

Description:

1. Define Standard warp::reject::Rejection Types: Create custom rejection types using warp::reject::custom for specific error conditions in your application. This allows you to handle different types of rejections differently.
2. Avoid Information Leakage in warp::Reply: When creating a warp::Reply from a warp::reject::Rejection, ensure that the HTTP response does not reveal sensitive information. Use generic error messages for client-facing errors.
3. Use recover to Handle Rejections: Use warp::Filter::recover to handle warp::reject::Rejections and convert them into appropriate warp::Reply implementations (e.g., HTTP error responses).
4. Custom Rejection Handlers (with recover): Implement custom rejection handlers using recover to customize the way specific rejection types are handled. Keep these handlers simple and focused on generating the correct HTTP response.
5. Test Rejection Handling with warp::test: Use warp::test::request() to simulate requests that should be rejected and verify that your rejection handling logic (including custom handlers) works correctly and returns the expected HTTP responses.
6. Consistent Error Responses: Ensure that all parts of your application (including different filters) return consistent error responses (using the same custom rejection types and recover logic) for the same types of errors.

Threats Mitigated:

• Information Leakage: (Severity: Medium)
• Vulnerabilities in Custom Rejection Handlers: (Severity: Variable, depends on the handler)
• Inconsistent Error Handling: (Severity: Low)

Impact:

• Information Leakage: Risk reduced from Medium to Low.
• Vulnerabilities in Handlers: Risk depends on the quality of the handler implementation.
• Inconsistent Error Handling: Risk reduced from Low to Negligible.

Currently Implemented: (Placeholder - Project Specific) Missing Implementation: (Placeholder - Project Specific)