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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for sergiobenitez/rocket

Attack Surface: 1. Route Handling Vulnerabilities

  • Description: Issues arising from incorrect or insecure route definitions and parameter handling within Rocket's routing system.
  • Rocket Contribution: Rocket's routing system, if misused, can lead to unintended route matching and insecure parameter handling. Overlapping routes, wildcard routes, and lack of parameter validation in route handlers are potential issues directly related to Rocket's features.
  • Example: Defining two routes /users/<id> and /users/admin where the first route unintentionally matches requests to /users/admin, potentially exposing admin functionality to unauthorized users due to Rocket's route matching logic.
  • Impact: Unauthorized access to functionality, information disclosure, denial of service.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Specific Route Definitions: Define routes with sufficient specificity to avoid unintended overlaps, leveraging Rocket's route syntax effectively.
    • Route Ordering Awareness: Understand Rocket's route matching order and arrange routes to prevent unintended matches, especially when mixing static and dynamic routes.
    • Parameter Validation in Handlers: Implement robust parameter validation within Rocket route handlers before using parameters in application logic. Utilize Rocket's data guards for structured validation where applicable.
    • Cautious Wildcard Usage: Use wildcard routes (<param..>) sparingly and with rigorous sanitization and validation of parameters within Rocket handlers, especially for file system access or dynamic routing.

Attack Surface: 2. Data Guard Vulnerabilities

  • Description: Security flaws introduced by custom data guards, which are a core Rocket feature for request validation and authorization.
  • Rocket Contribution: Rocket's data guard system is the mechanism for implementing request-level security. Vulnerabilities in custom Rocket data guards directly compromise application security.
  • Example: A custom authentication data guard in Rocket that incorrectly verifies user credentials due to flawed logic, allowing unauthorized access to protected routes. Or an authorization guard that grants excessive permissions based on incorrect role checks within Rocket's guard implementation.
  • Impact: Unauthorized access, privilege escalation, data breaches.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Thorough Data Guard Testing: Rigorously test custom Rocket data guards with unit and integration tests to ensure correct authentication and authorization logic within the Rocket framework context.
    • Principle of Least Privilege in Guards: Design Rocket authorization guards to grant only necessary permissions, adhering to the principle of least privilege within the Rocket application's security model.
    • Code Review for Guards: Conduct peer reviews of custom Rocket data guard code to identify potential security flaws and logic errors specific to Rocket's guard implementation.
    • Leverage Established Libraries (within Guards): Within custom Rocket data guards, utilize well-vetted and established Rust libraries for security tasks like JWT verification or password hashing, rather than implementing custom security primitives from scratch.

Attack Surface: 3. Custom Fairing Vulnerabilities

  • Description: Security flaws introduced by custom fairings, which are a Rocket extension mechanism with access to the request/response lifecycle.
  • Rocket Contribution: Rocket's fairing system allows developers to extend framework functionality deeply. Vulnerabilities in custom Rocket fairings can have significant impact due to their integration within Rocket's request handling pipeline.
  • Example: A custom logging fairing in Rocket that inadvertently logs sensitive user data in plain text due to improper handling of request or response data within the fairing's logic. Or a fairing that introduces a denial of service vulnerability by performing resource-intensive operations on every request processed by Rocket.
  • Impact: Wide range of impacts depending on the fairing's functionality and vulnerability, including information disclosure, denial of service, and potentially more severe exploits due to the fairing's position in Rocket's request flow.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Secure Fairing Design: Design custom Rocket fairings with security as a primary concern, following secure coding practices relevant to Rocket's fairing lifecycle and data access.
    • Principle of Least Privilege for Fairings: Grant custom Rocket fairings only the necessary access to request/response data and application resources, minimizing their potential impact if compromised.
    • Code Review of Fairings: Thoroughly review custom Rocket fairing code to identify potential security flaws and logic errors specific to their interaction with Rocket's internals.
    • Testing of Fairings: Rigorously test custom Rocket fairings, including unit and integration tests, to ensure they function correctly within the Rocket application and do not introduce unintended security vulnerabilities.