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Attack Tree Analysis for sergiobenitez/rocket

Objective: Gain unauthorized access to application data or functionality by exploiting vulnerabilities in the Rocket framework or its usage.

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Rocket Application **[CRITICAL NODE]**
├───(OR)─ Exploit Rocket Framework Vulnerabilities **[CRITICAL NODE]**
│   ├───(OR)─ Routing Vulnerabilities
│   │   ├─── Route Parameter Injection **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   ├───(OR)─ Request Handling Vulnerabilities **[CRITICAL NODE]**
│   │   ├─── Data Guard Vulnerabilities
│   │   │   ├─── Insecure Deserialization in Data Guards **[HIGH RISK PATH]** **[CRITICAL NODE]**
│   │   ├─── Form Handling Vulnerabilities **[CRITICAL NODE]**
│   │   │   ├─── Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via Form Input **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   │   │   ├─── Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via Form Input **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   ├───(OR)─ Concurrency/Asynchronous Vulnerabilities
│   │   ├─── Race Conditions in Handlers **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   ├───(OR)─ Configuration and Deployment Vulnerabilities **[CRITICAL NODE]**
│   │   ├─── Insecure TLS Configuration **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   │   ├─── Dependency Vulnerabilities **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   │   ├─── Insecure Secrets Management **[HIGH RISK PATH]** **[CRITICAL NODE]**
│   └───(OR)─ Logic/Application-Specific Vulnerabilities Exploited via Rocket Features **[CRITICAL NODE]**
│       ├─── Business Logic Bypasses via Routing or Data Guards **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│       ├─── Authorization Bypasses via Route Guards **[HIGH RISK PATH]**

Attack Tree Path: Compromise Rocket Application

  • This is the ultimate goal of the attacker. Success at any of the sub-branches leads to achieving this goal.
  • Represents the overall system being targeted.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Rocket Framework Vulnerabilities

  • Focuses on attacks that directly target weaknesses or misconfigurations within the Rocket framework itself, rather than general web application vulnerabilities in application logic.
  • Highlights the importance of understanding Rocket's security model and potential framework-specific attack vectors.

Attack Tree Path: Request Handling Vulnerabilities

  • Emphasizes the request processing pipeline in Rocket as a critical area for security. Vulnerabilities here can arise from how Rocket parses, validates, and processes incoming requests.
  • Includes Data Guards and Form Handling, both key components in request processing within Rocket.

Attack Tree Path: Data Guard Vulnerabilities

  • Data Guards are a powerful feature in Rocket for request validation and data extraction. However, insecurely implemented data guards can introduce significant vulnerabilities.
  • Specifically, Insecure Deserialization within Data Guards is highlighted as a high-risk path.

Attack Tree Path: Form Handling Vulnerabilities

  • Form handling is a common entry point for web application attacks. Rocket applications, like any web application, are susceptible to form-based vulnerabilities if input is not properly handled.
  • XSS and SSRF via form inputs are identified as high-risk paths within this category.

Attack Tree Path: Configuration and Deployment Vulnerabilities

  • Secure configuration and deployment are crucial for any application, including those built with Rocket. Misconfigurations can negate even secure code.
  • Insecure TLS, Dependency Vulnerabilities, and Insecure Secrets Management are highlighted as critical configuration and deployment related risks.

Attack Tree Path: Insecure Deserialization in Data Guards

  • Attack Vector: If custom Data Guards perform deserialization of data from requests (e.g., JSON, XML, binary formats) without proper validation and security measures, an attacker can inject malicious serialized data. When deserialized, this data can lead to Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the server.
  • Why Critical: RCE is the most severe type of vulnerability, allowing the attacker to completely control the server. Detection and mitigation are complex.

Attack Tree Path: Insecure Secrets Management

  • Attack Vector: Storing sensitive information like API keys, database credentials, or encryption keys directly in code, configuration files, or in easily accessible locations. Attackers can easily find and exploit these leaked secrets.
  • Why Critical: Compromised secrets can grant attackers full access to backend systems, databases, and external services, leading to complete application compromise and data breaches.

Attack Tree Path: Logic/Application-Specific Vulnerabilities Exploited via Rocket Features

  • Highlights that even when using a secure framework like Rocket, vulnerabilities can arise from how application-specific logic interacts with framework features like routing and data guards.
  • Emphasizes the need to secure application logic in the context of Rocket's functionalities.

Attack Tree Path: Route Parameter Injection

  • Attack Vector: Attackers manipulate URL route parameters to bypass authorization checks, access unintended resources, or trigger unexpected application behavior. If route parameters are not properly validated and sanitized before being used in application logic, injection attacks are possible.
  • Why High-Risk: Relatively easy to exploit, common in web applications, and can lead to unauthorized access and data breaches.

Attack Tree Path: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via Form Input

  • Attack Vector: Attackers inject malicious JavaScript code into form inputs. If the application reflects this input in responses without proper output encoding (sanitization), the injected script will execute in the victim's browser when they view the page.
  • Why High-Risk: Common, easy to exploit, can lead to account takeover, data theft, website defacement, and malware distribution.

Attack Tree Path: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via Form Input

  • Attack Vector: Attackers provide a malicious URL in a form input. If the application server makes requests to this URL (e.g., for fetching data, processing images) without proper validation and sanitization of the URL, the attacker can force the server to make requests to internal resources, external sites, or cloud metadata services.
  • Why High-Risk: Can expose internal network infrastructure, lead to data breaches by accessing internal resources, and potentially be used to pivot to other internal systems.

Attack Tree Path: Race Conditions in Handlers

  • Attack Vector: In Rocket applications using asynchronous handlers, race conditions can occur when multiple handlers access and modify shared mutable state concurrently without proper synchronization. Attackers can manipulate request timing to exploit these race conditions, leading to data corruption, inconsistent application state, or authorization bypasses.
  • Why High-Risk: Difficult to detect and exploit, but can have serious and unpredictable consequences, especially in concurrent systems. Requires deep understanding of concurrency and timing vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Path: Insecure TLS Configuration

  • Attack Vector: Using outdated TLS protocols (like TLS 1.0 or 1.1) or weak cipher suites in the Rocket application's HTTPS configuration. This allows attackers to eavesdrop on encrypted communication between clients and the server, potentially decrypting sensitive data.
  • Why High-Risk: Compromises confidentiality of all communication, allowing interception of sensitive data like passwords, session tokens, and personal information.

Attack Tree Path: Dependency Vulnerabilities

  • Attack Vector: Rocket applications rely on external libraries (crates). If these dependencies contain known security vulnerabilities, attackers can exploit these vulnerabilities to compromise the application. This can range from information disclosure to Remote Code Execution, depending on the specific vulnerability.
  • Why High-Risk: Dependencies are often overlooked, and vulnerabilities in popular libraries can be widespread. Exploitation can be relatively easy if known vulnerabilities exist.

Attack Tree Path: Business Logic Bypasses via Routing or Data Guards

  • Attack Vector: Flaws in the application's business logic, especially when interacting with Rocket's routing or data guard mechanisms, can allow attackers to bypass intended business rules, workflows, or access controls. This can be due to incorrect assumptions in logic, incomplete validation, or unexpected interactions between Rocket features and application code.
  • Why High-Risk: Business logic is the core of the application. Bypasses can lead to unauthorized actions, data manipulation, financial loss, and disruption of services.

Attack Tree Path: Authorization Bypasses via Route Guards

  • Attack Vector: If authorization checks implemented using Rocket's route guards are flawed, incomplete, or misconfigured, attackers can circumvent these checks and gain unauthorized access to protected resources or functionalities. This can be due to errors in guard logic, incorrect role assignments, or missing authorization checks in certain routes.
  • Why High-Risk: Authorization is fundamental to security. Bypasses directly lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data and functionalities, potentially leading to privilege escalation and data breaches.