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Mitigation Strategies Analysis for sergiobenitez/rocket

Mitigation Strategy: Thoroughly Review and Audit Custom Fairings

  • Mitigation Strategy: Thoroughly Review and Audit Custom Fairings
  • Description:
    1. Code Review Process: Establish a mandatory code review process for all custom Rocket fairings before merging. Reviews should be conducted by developers with security awareness, focusing on fairing-specific logic.
    2. Security-Focused Review Checklist (Fairing Specific): Create a checklist tailored for Rocket fairing security reviews, including:
      • Input validation and sanitization for data accessed within the fairing (e.g., request headers, cookies before passing to handlers).
      • Proper error handling and logging within the fairing's lifecycle methods (on_request, on_response, etc.).
      • Secure handling of sensitive data processed or accessed by the fairing.
      • Adherence to the principle of least privilege for fairing operations.
      • Review of dependencies used by the fairing for known vulnerabilities.
    3. Static Analysis Tools (Focus on Rust/Rocket): Utilize Rust-specific static analysis tools (like cargo clippy, rustsec) to scan fairing code for potential security issues and coding style problems relevant to Rust and Rocket.
    4. Dynamic Testing (Fairing Context): For complex fairings, consider dynamic testing techniques focused on fairing behavior within the Rocket application context, like testing how fairings interact with routes and handlers.
    5. Documentation and Justification (Fairing Specific): Document the purpose, functionality, and Rocket lifecycle interactions of each custom fairing. Justify the need for each fairing and its specific actions within the Rocket request/response flow.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Vulnerable Fairing Logic (High Severity): Flaws in custom Rocket fairing code can introduce vulnerabilities within the Rocket application's request processing pipeline.
    • Data Leakage through Fairings (Medium Severity): Rocket fairings might unintentionally log or expose sensitive data during request/response handling if not carefully implemented.
    • Denial of Service via Fairings (Medium Severity): Inefficient Rocket fairings can introduce performance bottlenecks within the Rocket application, leading to denial of service.
  • Impact:
    • Vulnerable Fairing Logic (High Reduction): Significantly reduces vulnerabilities in Rocket fairing code through proactive review and remediation.
    • Data Leakage through Fairings (Medium Reduction): Reduces data leakage in Rocket applications by enforcing secure coding in fairings.
    • Denial of Service via Fairings (Medium Reduction): Helps identify performance issues in Rocket fairings early in development.
  • Currently Implemented: Yes, partially implemented. Code reviews are mandatory, but a Rocket fairing specific security checklist is not in place. Static analysis with cargo clippy is integrated.
  • Missing Implementation: Creation and implementation of a dedicated security checklist for Rocket fairing reviews. Dynamic testing focused on fairing behavior within Rocket is not performed.

Mitigation Strategy: Utilize Well-Vetted, Community Fairings with Caution

  • Mitigation Strategy: Utilize Well-Vetted, Community Fairings with Caution
  • Description:
    1. Prioritize Reputable Sources (Rocket Ecosystem): When using community Rocket fairings, prioritize those from well-known authors or projects within the Rocket community. Check for active maintenance and community engagement specific to the Rocket ecosystem.
    2. Security Audit of Community Fairings (Rocket Context): Audit community Rocket fairings before integration, focusing on their code, dependencies, and reported issues within the context of Rocket applications. Understand their functionality and security implications within the Rocket framework.
    3. Minimize Usage of External Fairings (Core Security in Rocket): Avoid relying on external fairings for core security functionalities that are critical to your Rocket application. Implement critical security features with custom, well-audited code where you have full control over the Rocket application's security.
    4. Dependency Review for Community Fairings (Rust/Rocket Crates): Examine dependencies of community Rocket fairings, ensuring they are well-maintained Rust crates and do not introduce vulnerabilities into your Rocket application. Use cargo audit to check for vulnerabilities in the fairing's dependency tree.
    5. Regular Updates and Monitoring (Rocket Fairing Updates): Regularly check for updates and security advisories related to used community Rocket fairings and their dependencies. Monitor Rocket community channels for security-related discussions and updates. Update fairings promptly when patches are released.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Vulnerabilities in Third-Party Rocket Fairings (High Severity): Community Rocket fairings can contain vulnerabilities exploitable in Rocket applications.
    • Supply Chain Attacks (Medium Severity): Compromised community Rocket fairings or their dependencies can introduce malicious code into Rocket applications.
    • Lack of Maintenance and Support (Medium Severity): Abandoned Rocket fairings may not receive security updates, leaving Rocket applications vulnerable.
  • Impact:
    • Vulnerabilities in Third-Party Rocket Fairings (High Reduction): Reduces risk by careful selection, auditing, and monitoring of community Rocket fairings.
    • Supply Chain Attacks (Medium Reduction): Minimizes supply chain attack risk by cautious dependency management in Rocket projects.
    • Lack of Maintenance and Support (Medium Reduction): Reduces long-term risk by encouraging proactive monitoring and updates of Rocket fairings.
  • Currently Implemented: Yes, partially implemented. We prefer in-house solutions for critical security features in Rocket apps. Dependency scanning with cargo audit is in place, but security audits of community Rocket fairings are not consistently performed.
  • Missing Implementation: Formalize security auditing of community Rocket fairings before integration. Implement a system for tracking updates for used Rocket fairings.

Mitigation Strategy: Strict Route Definition and Validation

  • Mitigation Strategy: Strict Route Definition and Validation
  • Description:
    1. Precise Rocket Route Patterns: Define Rocket route patterns precisely, avoiding overly broad wildcards or catch-all routes in Rocket applications. Use specific path segments and parameter types in Rocket routes.
    2. Data Type Enforcement in Rocket Routes: Utilize Rocket's route parameter type guards (e.g., <i32>, <String>) to enforce expected data types in Rocket route parameters. This prevents unexpected input in Rocket handlers.
    3. Input Validation within Rocket Route Guards: Implement custom Rocket data guards or form guards to perform validation of route parameters and request data before Rocket request handlers execute. This allows early rejection of invalid requests in Rocket.
    4. Avoid Ambiguous Rocket Route Overlap: Design Rocket routes to avoid ambiguous overlaps or conflicts. Ensure Rocket routing logic is clear and predictable to prevent unintended route matching in Rocket applications.
    5. Regular Rocket Route Review: Periodically review all defined Rocket routes to ensure they are necessary, correctly defined, and do not introduce new security risks as the Rocket application evolves.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Path Traversal Vulnerabilities (High Severity): Broad Rocket routes, especially those handling file paths, can be exploited for path traversal in Rocket applications.
    • Insecure Parameter Handling (Medium Severity): Lack of validation in Rocket route parameters can lead to injection attacks in Rocket handlers.
    • Route Confusion/Bypass (Medium Severity): Ambiguous Rocket routes can lead to route confusion, potentially bypassing access controls in Rocket applications.
  • Impact:
    • Path Traversal Vulnerabilities (High Reduction): Reduces path traversal risk in Rocket apps by enforcing strict route definitions.
    • Insecure Parameter Handling (Medium Reduction): Reduces injection attack risk in Rocket handlers by enforcing data types and validating input at the route level.
    • Route Confusion/Bypass (Medium Reduction): Minimizes route confusion and bypasses in Rocket applications through clear route definitions.
  • Currently Implemented: Yes, partially implemented. We use Rocket route parameter type guards extensively. Custom data guards are used for some Rocket routes, but not consistently. Route reviews are performed during major feature releases, but not regularly.
  • Missing Implementation: Implement custom data guards for all Rocket routes accepting user input. Establish regular schedule for Rocket route reviews.

Mitigation Strategy: Robust Input Validation in Rocket Request Handlers and Guards

  • Mitigation Strategy: Robust Input Validation in Rocket Request Handlers and Guards
  • Description:
    1. Validate All Input Sources in Rocket Handlers: Validate all input sources within Rocket request handlers, including path parameters, query parameters, request bodies (JSON, forms, etc.), and request headers accessed by Rocket handlers.
    2. Whitelisting Approach (Rocket Context): Prefer whitelisting for input validation in Rocket handlers. Define valid input (allowed characters, formats, ranges) and reject anything non-conforming within Rocket handlers or guards.
    3. Data Type Validation (Rocket Guards): Enforce expected data types using Rocket's form guards and data guards for type safety in Rocket applications. Perform additional type checks within Rocket request handlers if needed.
    4. Format Validation (Rocket Handlers/Guards): Validate input format according to expected patterns (email, URLs) in Rocket handlers and guards. Use regular expressions or validation libraries within Rocket handlers or custom guards.
    5. Range and Length Validation (Rocket Handlers/Guards): Enforce ranges and lengths for input values in Rocket handlers and guards to prevent buffer overflows or DoS in Rocket applications.
    6. Context-Specific Validation (Rocket Handlers): Validation rules should be context-specific to how input is used within Rocket handlers. Validate input differently based on its usage in the Rocket application.
    7. Error Handling for Invalid Input (Rocket Handlers/Guards): Implement proper error handling for invalid input in Rocket handlers and guards. Return informative error messages (without sensitive info) and log validation failures within the Rocket application.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Injection Attacks (High Severity): Lack of input validation in Rocket handlers is a primary cause of injection attacks in Rocket applications.
    • Data Integrity Issues (Medium Severity): Invalid input in Rocket applications can lead to data corruption and application errors.
    • Application Logic Errors (Medium Severity): Unexpected input in Rocket handlers can cause incorrect application logic in Rocket applications.
    • Denial of Service (Low to Medium Severity): Processing large or malformed input in Rocket handlers can lead to DoS in Rocket applications.
  • Impact:
    • Injection Attacks (High Reduction): Significantly reduces injection attack risk in Rocket applications through input validation.
    • Data Integrity Issues (Medium Reduction): Improves data integrity in Rocket applications by ensuring valid data processing.
    • Application Logic Errors (Medium Reduction): Reduces application logic errors in Rocket apps caused by unexpected input.
    • Denial of Service (Medium Reduction): Mitigates some DoS forms in Rocket apps by preventing processing of excessive input.
  • Currently Implemented: Yes, partially implemented. Basic input validation is in many Rocket request handlers, but consistency and thoroughness are lacking. Standardized validation is not consistently used in Rocket projects.
  • Missing Implementation: Implement standardized input validation across the Rocket application. Review all Rocket request handlers for robust input validation.

Mitigation Strategy: Custom Error Handling for Production (Generic Rocket Responses, Secure Rocket Logging)

  • Mitigation Strategy: Custom Error Handling for Production (Generic Rocket Responses, Secure Rocket Logging)
  • Description:
    1. Disable Rocket Debug Mode in Production: Ensure Rocket's debug mode is disabled in production environments to prevent verbose error messages.
    2. Implement Custom Rocket Error Catchers: Implement custom Rocket error catchers for different HTTP error codes (404, 500, etc.) using Rocket's error handling features.
    3. Generic Error Responses for Rocket Clients: In production Rocket applications, return generic, user-friendly error messages to clients via Rocket responses. Avoid detailed error messages in Rocket client responses.
    4. Secure Logging of Detailed Errors (Rocket Logging): Log detailed error information (stack traces, request details) securely to server-side logs within the Rocket application's logging system. Ensure logs are secure and access-controlled.
    5. Error Logging Level Configuration (Rocket Logging): Configure Rocket's logging level appropriately for production. Log errors and warnings, but avoid excessive debug logging in Rocket applications.
    6. Log Rotation and Management (Server Level): Implement log rotation and management at the server level for Rocket application logs.
    7. Error Monitoring and Alerting (Rocket Application Errors): Set up error monitoring and alerting systems to detect and respond to errors within the Rocket application. Monitor Rocket error logs for anomalies.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Information Disclosure through Rocket Error Messages (Medium Severity): Verbose Rocket error messages in production can leak sensitive information about the Rocket application.
    • Exposure of Stack Traces (Medium Severity): Stack traces in Rocket error responses can reveal internal application logic.
    • Denial of Service (Low Severity): Excessive error logging in Rocket applications can contribute to DoS.
  • Impact:
    • Information Disclosure through Rocket Error Messages (Medium Reduction): Reduces information disclosure by preventing detailed error messages in Rocket client responses.
    • Exposure of Stack Traces (Medium Reduction): Eliminates stack trace exposure in Rocket production responses.
    • Denial of Service (Low Reduction): Reduces DoS potential related to error handling in Rocket applications.
  • Currently Implemented: Yes, partially implemented. Rocket debug mode is disabled in production. Custom Rocket error catchers are in place for some errors, but generic responses are not consistent. Secure logging is configured, but error monitoring and alerting are not fully implemented for Rocket errors.
  • Missing Implementation: Ensure generic error responses are consistent for all error scenarios in production Rocket applications. Implement error monitoring and alerting for Rocket application errors.