attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for sergiobenitez/rocket

Objective: Gain Unauthorized Access/Disrupt Service via Rocket Exploits

Attack Tree Visualization

Goal: Gain Unauthorized Access/Disrupt Service via Rocket Exploits ├── 1. Exploit Request Handling Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK] │ ├── 1.1 Bypass Request Guards [HIGH RISK] │ │ ├── 1.1.1 Manipulate Request Data to Bypass FromRequest Implementations [HIGH RISK] │ │ │ ├── 1.1.1.2 Injection Attacks in Custom FromRequest Logic (e.g., SQLi) [CRITICAL] │ │ │ ├── 1.1.1.3 Exploit Edge Cases in FromRequest Validation │ │ │ └── 1.1.1.4 Bypass FromRequest by sending unexpected content types │ │ ├── 1.1.2 Exploit Weaknesses in Built-in Guards (e.g., Form, Json, Data) │ │ │ ├── 1.1.2.1 Large Payload Attacks against Data (DoS) [CRITICAL] │ │ └── 1.1.3 Circumvent Route Matching Logic │ │ ├── 1.1.3.1 Path Traversal via Dynamic Segments (if improperly handled) [CRITICAL] │ ├── 1.2 Trigger Unhandled Exceptions/Panics in Request Handlers │ │ ├── 1.2.2 Exploit Unsafe Code Blocks (if present) [CRITICAL] │ │ └── 1.2.3 Resource Exhaustion (e.g., trigger excessive memory allocation) [CRITICAL] ├── 2. Exploit Response Handling Vulnerabilities │ ├── 2.2 Manipulate Response Body │ │ └── 2.2.2 Exploit Template Rendering Vulnerabilities (if using a template engine) │ │ └── 2.2.2.1 Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via template injection [CRITICAL] │ └── 2.3 Exploit Custom Error Handling │ └── 2.3.1 Information Disclosure via Verbose Error Messages [CRITICAL] ├── 3. Exploit State Management Vulnerabilities │ ├── 3.1 Manipulate Managed State │ │ ├── 3.1.1 Race Conditions in Accessing/Modifying Shared State [CRITICAL] │ └── 3.2 Exploit Cookies and Sessions (if used) [HIGH RISK] │ ├── 3.2.1 Session Fixation [CRITICAL] │ ├── 3.2.2 Session Hijacking (if cookies are not properly secured) [CRITICAL] │ └── 3.2.3 Cookie Manipulation (if cookies are not signed/encrypted) [CRITICAL] └── 4. Exploit Configuration Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK] ├── 4.1 Misconfigured Rocket.toml [HIGH RISK] │ ├── 4.1.1 Exposed Debug Mode in Production [CRITICAL] │ ├── 4.1.2 Weak Secret Key (leading to cookie/session compromise) [CRITICAL] │ ├── 4.1.3 Insecure TLS Configuration [CRITICAL] │ └── 4.1.4 Incorrectly configured limits (leading to DoS) [CRITICAL] └── 4.2 Environment Variable Misconfiguration ├── 4.2.1 Sensitive Data Exposed in Environment Variables [CRITICAL]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Exploit Request Handling Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK]

• 1.1 Bypass Request Guards [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: Attackers attempt to circumvent the security checks implemented by Rocket's request guards (FromRequest implementations). This is a primary attack vector because request guards are the first line of defense.
  • 1.1.1 Manipulate Request Data to Bypass FromRequest Implementations [HIGH RISK]
    • 1.1.1.2 Injection Attacks in Custom FromRequest Logic (e.g., SQLi) [CRITICAL]
      • Attack Vector: If a custom FromRequest implementation interacts with a database (or other external system), and it doesn't properly sanitize user-provided input, an attacker can inject malicious code (e.g., SQL commands) to gain unauthorized access to data or execute arbitrary commands.
      • Example: A FromRequest implementation that fetches user data based on an ID provided in the request, without using parameterized queries, is vulnerable to SQL injection.
    • 1.1.1.3 Exploit Edge Cases in FromRequest Validation
      • Attack Vector: Attackers try to find the boundaries of validation logic, sending unexpected values, null bytes, very long strings, or other unusual inputs to trigger unexpected behavior and bypass validation.
    • 1.1.1.4 Bypass FromRequest by sending unexpected content types
      • Attack Vector: Attackers send requests with unexpected Content-Type headers to see if the application handles them incorrectly, potentially bypassing validation logic that is tied to specific content types.
  • 1.1.2 Exploit Weaknesses in Built-in Guards
    • 1.1.2.1 Large Payload Attacks against Data (DoS) [CRITICAL]
      • Attack Vector: Attackers send very large requests to consume server resources (memory, CPU, bandwidth), leading to a denial of service. Rocket's Data guard, if not properly configured with limits, is vulnerable to this.
      • Example: Sending a multi-gigabyte file in a POST request.
  • 1.1.3 Circumvent Route Matching Logic
    • 1.1.3.1 Path Traversal via Dynamic Segments (if improperly handled) [CRITICAL]
      • Attack Vector: If dynamic segments in routes (e.g., /user/<username>) are not properly sanitized, an attacker can use ".." sequences to traverse the file system and access files outside the intended web root.
      • Example: A route like /files/<filename> could be exploited with a request to /files/../../etc/passwd to read the system's password file.

• 1.2 Trigger Unhandled Exceptions/Panics in Request Handlers

  • 1.2.2 Exploit Unsafe Code Blocks (if present) [CRITICAL]
    • Attack Vector: If the application (or its dependencies) uses unsafe Rust code, and that code contains vulnerabilities (e.g., memory safety violations), an attacker can potentially exploit these vulnerabilities to gain arbitrary code execution.
    • Example: An unsafe block that performs pointer arithmetic incorrectly could be exploited to overwrite memory.
  • 1.2.3 Resource Exhaustion (e.g., trigger excessive memory allocation) [CRITICAL]
    • Attack Vector: Attackers craft requests that cause the application to consume excessive resources (memory, CPU, file handles, etc.), leading to a denial of service. This can be triggered by various means, such as allocating large data structures or triggering infinite loops.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit Response Handling Vulnerabilities

• 2.2 Manipulate Response Body

  • 2.2.2 Exploit Template Rendering Vulnerabilities
    • 2.2.2.1 Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via template injection [CRITICAL]
      • Attack Vector: If the application uses a template engine (e.g., Tera, Handlebars) and user-provided input is included in the template without proper escaping, an attacker can inject malicious JavaScript code that will be executed in the browser of other users.
      • Example: A comment system that displays user comments without escaping HTML tags is vulnerable to XSS.

• 2.3 Exploit Custom Error Handling

  • 2.3.1 Information Disclosure via Verbose Error Messages [CRITICAL]
    • Attack Vector: If custom error handlers reveal too much information about the application's internal state (e.g., stack traces, database queries, file paths), an attacker can use this information to learn about the system and plan further attacks.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Exploit State Management Vulnerabilities

• 3.1 Manipulate Managed State

  • 3.1.1 Race Conditions in Accessing/Modifying Shared State [CRITICAL]
    • Attack Vector: If multiple threads or asynchronous tasks access and modify shared state (e.g., data stored in Rocket's managed state) without proper synchronization (e.g., mutexes, atomic operations), race conditions can occur, leading to data corruption, inconsistent behavior, or crashes.

• 3.2 Exploit Cookies and Sessions (if used) [HIGH RISK]

  • 3.2.1 Session Fixation [CRITICAL]
    • Attack Vector: An attacker sets a user's session ID to a known value before the user logs in. If the application doesn't regenerate the session ID upon authentication, the attacker can then hijack the user's session.
  • 3.2.2 Session Hijacking (if cookies are not properly secured) [CRITICAL]
    • Attack Vector: An attacker steals a user's session cookie (e.g., through XSS, network sniffing, or physical access to the user's device) and uses it to impersonate the user. This is mitigated by using HTTPS, the Secure flag, and the HttpOnly flag on cookies.
  • 3.2.3 Cookie Manipulation (if cookies are not signed/encrypted) [CRITICAL]
    • Attack Vector: If cookies are used to store sensitive data (e.g., user roles, permissions) without being signed or encrypted, an attacker can modify the cookie values to gain unauthorized access.

Attack Tree Path: 4. Exploit Configuration Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK]

• 4.1 Misconfigured Rocket.toml [HIGH RISK]

  • 4.1.1 Exposed Debug Mode in Production [CRITICAL]
    • Attack Vector: Running Rocket in debug mode in a production environment often disables security features, exposes sensitive information (e.g., source code, environment variables), and provides more verbose error messages, making the application much easier to attack.
  • 4.1.2 Weak Secret Key (leading to cookie/session compromise) [CRITICAL]
    • Attack Vector: Rocket uses a secret key to sign cookies and manage sessions. If this key is weak (e.g., a short, easily guessable string) or is not kept secret, an attacker can forge cookies and hijack user sessions.
  • 4.1.3 Insecure TLS Configuration [CRITICAL]
    • Attack Vector: Using outdated TLS protocols (e.g., SSLv3, TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1), weak cipher suites, or improperly configured certificates can allow attackers to intercept and decrypt traffic between the client and the server (Man-in-the-Middle attacks).
  • 4.1.4 Incorrectly configured limits (leading to DoS) [CRITICAL]
    • Attack Vector: Rocket allows configuring limits on various resources (e.g., request body size, number of connections). If these limits are not set or are set too high, the application is vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks.

• 4.2 Environment Variable Misconfiguration

  • 4.2.1 Sensitive Data Exposed in Environment Variables [CRITICAL]
    • Attack Vector: Storing sensitive data (API keys, database credentials, secret keys) directly in environment variables without additional protection (e.g., encryption, access control) can expose this data if the environment is compromised (e.g., through a server misconfiguration, a compromised container, or a leaked .env file).