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Threat Model Analysis for sharkdp/bat

  • Threat: Denial of Service (DoS) via Resource Exhaustion

    • Description: An attacker submits a very large file, a file with extremely long lines, or a large number of requests to display files. The attacker's goal is to overwhelm the server's resources (CPU, memory) by forcing bat to perform excessive computations for syntax highlighting, Git diffing, or line numbering. The attacker might use automated tools to generate many requests in a short period. bat's features, while useful, inherently increase resource consumption compared to a simple cat command.
    • Impact: The application becomes unresponsive or crashes, denying service to legitimate users. This can lead to data loss if the application is in the middle of processing other requests.
    • Affected bat Component: Primarily the core processing engine of bat, including:
      • Syntax highlighting engine (syntect library).
      • Line wrapping and formatting logic.
      • Git integration (if enabled).
      • Paging logic.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Input Validation & Size Limits: Implement strict server-side checks to limit the maximum file size bat processes.
      • Line Length Limits: Enforce a maximum line length before passing data to bat.
      • Resource Limits (cgroups/ulimit): Use operating system tools to limit CPU and memory for the bat process.
      • Timeouts: Terminate bat processes that exceed a predefined execution time.
      • Rate Limiting: Limit the number of file display requests per user per time unit.
      • Disable Expensive Features: Selectively disable bat features like --diff or --paging=always if not crucial. Use --paging=auto or --paging=never strategically.
      • Queueing: Use a queue to manage requests, preventing overload.