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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for slint-ui/slint

Attack Surface: Malicious .slint File (Parsing & Processing)

  • Description: An attacker crafts a malicious .slint file to exploit vulnerabilities in Slint's parsing, processing, or rendering logic.
  • How Slint Contributes: Slint's core functionality relies on parsing and interpreting .slint files, making this a primary attack vector directly controlled by Slint's implementation.
  • Example:
    • A .slint file containing an extremely large number of nested components, designed to exhaust memory.
    • A .slint file with invalid property values or malformed syntax intended to trigger parser errors or unexpected behavior.
    • A .slint file referencing a huge image file, causing a denial of service.
  • Impact:
    • Denial of Service (DoS)
    • Application crashes
    • Potential (though less likely) code execution if combined with other vulnerabilities (but the .slint file is the initial vector).
    • Resource exhaustion.
  • Risk Severity: High (if .slint files can be loaded from untrusted sources).
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Strict Input Validation:
      • Schema Validation: Define a formal schema for valid .slint files and reject any file that doesn't strictly conform.
      • Whitelisting: Only allow known-good elements, attributes, and property types. Reject anything unexpected.
      • Resource Limits: Impose strict limits on file size, number of components, image dimensions, string lengths, and animation counts.
      • "Slint Security Policy": A conceptual CSP analogue for defining allowed operations and resources within .slint.
    • Sandboxing (If Feasible): Render the Slint UI in a separate, sandboxed process.
    • Fuzz Testing: Regularly fuzz test the Slint parser and rendering engine.
    • Developer Training: Educate developers on secure Slint coding practices.

Attack Surface: Callback Exploitation (Data Sanitization)

  • Description: An attacker manipulates data within the Slint UI to inject malicious input into backend callbacks.
  • How Slint Contributes: Slint provides the mechanism (callbacks) for the UI to interact with the backend. While the backend's lack of sanitization is the root cause, Slint's callback system is the direct conduit for the attack. The attacker interacts directly with Slint components to trigger this.
  • Example:
    • A .slint file defines a text input and a callback. The attacker enters a SQL injection payload into the Slint text input. The Slint callback then passes this unsanitized data to the backend.
    • A callback passes a string from a Slint component to a backend function that executes a system command. The attacker crafts the string within Slint to contain shell metacharacters.
  • Impact:
    • Code Injection (SQL Injection, Command Injection, etc.)
    • Data Breaches
    • Privilege Escalation
    • System Compromise
  • Risk Severity: Critical (if backend code doesn't properly sanitize input from Slint callbacks). The vulnerability is triggered through Slint.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Backend Input Validation and Sanitization: (Primary Defense) The backend must treat all data from Slint callbacks as untrusted.
      • Parameterized Queries (for SQL).
      • Strict input validation against whitelists.
      • Output encoding.
      • Avoid system calls where possible; sanitize thoroughly if unavoidable.
      • Least privilege for backend code.
    • Slint-Side Input Filtering (Secondary Defense):
      • Input Masks within Slint components.
      • Type Validation between Slint and the backend.
    • Code Reviews: Review callback handling code.

Attack Surface: IPC Vulnerabilities (If Applicable and Slint-Managed)

  • Description: If Slint UI runs in separate process and Slint itself manages or dictates the IPC mechanism, vulnerabilities in that IPC can be exploited.
  • How Slint Contributes: If Slint provides or strongly recommends a specific IPC mechanism, then vulnerabilities in that mechanism are directly attributable to Slint. If the application uses a completely independent IPC method, this is not a direct Slint concern. This entry is conditional on Slint's involvement in the IPC choice/implementation.
  • Example:
    • If Slint provided a built-in, custom IPC system, and that system had flaws allowing MitM or message spoofing, this would be a direct Slint vulnerability.
  • Impact:
    • Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks
    • Message Spoofing
    • Denial of Service (DoS)
    • Data Breaches
    • Privilege Escalation
  • Risk Severity: High (if Slint-managed IPC is used and not properly secured).
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Secure IPC (If Slint-Provided):
      • If Slint provides an IPC mechanism, it must be secure by design (TLS/SSL, authenticated message queues, etc.).
      • Documentation must clearly outline security considerations for the provided IPC.
    • Message Validation: Both sides must validate all messages.
    • Rate Limiting: Implement rate limiting.
    • Input Sanitization (Always): Backend must still sanitize all data, even with secure IPC.