Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
61 lines (52 loc) · 6.16 KB

File metadata and controls

61 lines (52 loc) · 6.16 KB

Attack Surface Analysis for solana-labs/solana

  • Description: Exploitable flaws in the logic or implementation of Solana smart contracts (programs).
    • Solana Contribution: Solana's performance encourages complex smart contract development, increasing the risk of subtle bugs. The programming model (Rust, #[program] macro, account-based state) requires specific security considerations. Cross-Program Invocations (CPIs) introduce unique attack vectors if not handled securely. Program Derived Addresses (PDAs), if derived incorrectly, can lead to vulnerabilities.
    • Example: A reentrancy vulnerability in a Solana-based DeFi protocol allows an attacker to drain funds by recursively calling a withdrawal function before the balance is updated.
    • Impact: Loss of funds, manipulation of contract state, denial of service, complete compromise of applications relying on the vulnerable contract.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Formal Verification: Employ formal verification tools to mathematically prove contract correctness.
      • Audits: Conduct thorough, independent security audits by reputable Solana-focused auditors.
      • Secure Coding Practices: Adhere strictly to Solana-specific secure coding guidelines (check-effects-interactions, proper error handling, input validation, safe math, secure CPI handling, correct PDA derivation).
      • Bug Bounties: Implement a bug bounty program targeting Solana-specific vulnerabilities.
      • Audited Libraries: Utilize well-vetted and audited Solana libraries for common functionalities.
      • Limit Complexity: Decompose complex contracts into smaller, auditable modules.
      • Secure Upgradeability: If using upgradeable contracts, implement robust governance and multi-signature controls to prevent malicious upgrades.
  • Description: Insecure handling of private keys and account derivation specifically within the Solana ecosystem.
    • Solana Contribution: Solana's account model relies on public-key cryptography. Compromised private keys grant full control. Incorrect Program Derived Address (PDA) derivation is a Solana-specific vulnerability.
    • Example: An application incorrectly derives a PDA, leading to an address collision with another account, allowing unauthorized access. Or, a user's Solana private key is exposed due to a phishing attack or malware.
    • Impact: Complete loss of funds, unauthorized transactions, identity theft within the Solana ecosystem.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Hardware Wallets: Strongly encourage users to use hardware wallets for Solana key storage.
      • Secure Enclaves (for applications): If the application handles keys, use secure enclaves or TEEs.
      • Solana Key Derivation Standards: Strictly adhere to Solana's key derivation standards and best practices.
      • Never Store Private Keys Client-Side: Absolutely avoid storing Solana private keys in client-side code or storage.
      • Multi-Signature Wallets (for high-value): Use Solana multi-signature wallets requiring multiple approvals.
      • Correct PDA Derivation: Rigorously validate and test all PDA derivation logic, ensuring uniqueness and preventing collisions. Use established libraries for PDA derivation where possible.
  • Description: Blindly trusting data received from the Solana RPC endpoint without validation, specifically concerning Solana data structures and formats.
    • Solana Contribution: Applications must use the RPC to interact with Solana. A compromised or malicious RPC node can return manipulated Solana-specific data (e.g., account data, transaction details, program data).
    • Example: An application displays a Solana account's token balance directly from the RPC without verifying the data type or that it conforms to the expected SPL token metadata structure. A malicious node returns crafted data, leading to incorrect display or further exploitation.
    • Impact: Data manipulation, incorrect application logic, potential financial losses, exploitation of vulnerabilities due to incorrect data interpretation.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Solana-Specific Input Validation: Implement strict input validation, verifying Solana data types (e.g., Pubkey, AccountInfo), ranges, and expected formats (e.g., SPL token metadata).
      • Multiple RPC Nodes: Query multiple, independent Solana RPC nodes and compare responses to detect discrepancies.
      • Checksums/Signatures (where applicable): Utilize checksums or digital signatures provided by Solana APIs to verify data integrity.
      • Sanitization: Sanitize all Solana data received from the RPC before use.
  • Description: Exposing Solana RPC endpoint directly to untrusted clients.
    • Solana Contribution: Solana's architecture relies on RPC interface.
    • Example: Web application connects user's browser to public Solana RPC endpoint.
    • Impact: Denial of service, information disclosure, potential transaction manipulation.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Backend Proxy: Implement secure backend server that acts as a proxy.
      • API Gateway: Use API gateway.
      • Authentication and Authorization: Implement authentication and authorization.
      • IP Whitelisting: Restrict access to known IP addresses.
      • Private Validator/RPC Node: Run private validator.
      • Use RPC provider with security features: Use RPC provider that has built-in security features.