Mitigation Strategy: Strict CPI Ordering and Reentrancy Guards (Solana-Specific)
Description:
- Analyze CPI Flow (Solana Context): Thoroughly map out all cross-program invocations (CPIs) within your Solana program. Identify any potential for recursive calls back into your own program via other Solana programs. This is crucial because Solana's single-threaded execution within an instruction doesn't prevent reentrancy across CPIs.
- State Updates Before CPIs: Structure your Solana program's logic so that all state changes (modifications to Solana account data) are completed before any CPIs are made. This leverages Solana's account model to ensure consistency.
- Reentrancy Guard Implementation (Solana-Specific):
- Use a Solana account (or a field within an existing Solana account) to store the reentrancy guard. This leverages Solana's state management.
- At the beginning of your Solana program's entry point, check the guard. If locked, return a
ProgramError
. - Immediately set the guard to locked.
- At the end of your Solana program's entry point (even on error), reset the guard. Use a pattern that guarantees this reset, even with Solana's error handling.
- For CPI-aware guards (essential on Solana), use a counter. Increment before the CPI, decrement after. Only allow execution if the counter is zero initially. This accounts for Solana's CPI depth limits.
- Post-CPI Validation (Solana Accounts): After each CPI, re-validate the state of your program's Solana accounts. The called program might have modified them. This is critical in Solana's mutable account model.
-
Threats Mitigated:
- CPI Reentrancy (Solana-Specific): (Severity: Critical) - Prevents attackers from recursively calling your Solana program via CPIs to manipulate state, steal funds, or bypass security checks. This is unique to Solana's CPI mechanism.
- Logic Errors (Solana State): (Severity: High) - Reduces logic errors from inconsistent Solana account state due to CPIs.
- Data Corruption (Solana Accounts): (Severity: High) - Post-CPI validation prevents data corruption in Solana accounts by external programs.
-
Impact:
- CPI Reentrancy: Risk reduced from Critical to Low.
- Logic Errors: Risk reduced from High to Medium.
- Data Corruption: Risk reduced from High to Medium.
-
Currently Implemented: (Hypothetical Project)
- Partially. Reentrancy guards (boolean) in
programs/token_transfer/src/lib.rs
. CPI ordering mostly followed, but post-CPI validation is inconsistent.
- Partially. Reentrancy guards (boolean) in
-
Missing Implementation:
- CPI-aware guards (counters) missing for instructions with multiple CPIs (e.g.,
batch_transfer
). - Post-CPI validation missing in handlers interacting with custom oracles.
- Consistent guard reset pattern (like
finally
) is not used, risking human error.
- CPI-aware guards (counters) missing for instructions with multiple CPIs (e.g.,
Mitigation Strategy: Account Ownership and PDA Validation (Solana-Specific)
Description:
- Ownership Checks (Solana Account Model): At the start of each instruction handler, verify the ownership of all Solana accounts passed.
account_info.is_signer
: Check if a Solana account has signed (for signer accounts).account_info.owner == program_id
: Check if a Solana account is owned by your program.account_info.owner == expected_owner
: Check if a Solana account is owned by a specific program (e.g., the Token Program). This is crucial for interacting with other Solana programs.
- PDA Derivation (Solana-Specific):
- When using a PDA (Program Derived Address), always re-derive it within your Solana program using
Pubkey::find_program_address(&[seeds], &program_id)
. - Compare the re-derived PDA to the one provided in the instruction data. Return a
ProgramError
if they don't match. - Never trust a user-provided PDA without this verification. This is fundamental to Solana's security model.
- When using a PDA (Program Derived Address), always re-derive it within your Solana program using
- Seeds Validation (Solana PDAs): Carefully validate the seeds used for PDA derivation. Ensure they are the correct type/length and prevent predictable PDAs.
- Bump Seed Handling (Solana PDAs): Store the bump seed securely within the Solana account data. Use it consistently and protect it from modification.
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Unauthorized Account Access (Solana Accounts): (Severity: Critical) - Prevents unauthorized access to Solana accounts.
- PDA Manipulation (Solana-Specific): (Severity: Critical) - Prevents attackers from using incorrect or malicious PDAs. This is unique to Solana.
- Account Substitution (Solana Accounts): (Severity: High) - Prevents substituting one Solana account for another.
-
Impact:
- Unauthorized Access: Risk reduced from Critical to Low.
- PDA Manipulation: Risk reduced from Critical to Low.
- Account Substitution: Risk reduced from High to Low.
-
Currently Implemented: (Hypothetical Project)
- Mostly. Ownership checks and PDA validation are common.
-
Missing Implementation:
- Missing ownership checks for some configuration/metadata accounts.
- Incomplete seeds validation, potentially allowing edge-case PDA manipulation.
- Inconsistent bump seed handling.
Mitigation Strategy: Compute Unit Budgeting and Optimization (Solana-Specific)
Description:
- Profiling (Solana Compute Units): Use Solana's profiling tools to measure the compute unit consumption of your program's instructions. Identify hotspots.
- Algorithm Optimization (for Compute Units): Optimize algorithms and data structures to reduce computational complexity, specifically to minimize Solana compute unit usage.
- Loop Optimization (Solana Limits): Minimize loop iterations. Avoid nested loops. If iterating over many Solana accounts, use pagination to stay within compute unit limits.
- CPI Optimization (Solana Costs): Minimize CPI calls, as each consumes Solana compute units.
- Data Structure Size (Solana Serialization): Minimize Solana account data structure size to reduce serialization/deserialization compute unit costs.
- Conditional Logic (Solana Efficiency): Use
if
statements to avoid unnecessary computations, saving Solana compute units. - Early Exits (Solana Cost Reduction): Return early from instruction handlers if preconditions are not met, to save compute units.
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Denial of Service (DoS) (Solana Compute Units): (Severity: High) - Reduces the risk of exceeding Solana's compute unit limits. This is unique to Solana's resource model.
- Transaction Failures (Solana Limits): (Severity: Medium) - Reduces failures due to excessive compute unit consumption.
-
Impact:
- DoS: Risk reduced from High to Medium.
- Transaction Failures: Risk reduced from Medium to Low.
-
Currently Implemented: (Hypothetical Project)
- Partially. Some basic optimization.
-
Missing Implementation:
- Comprehensive profiling and optimization not done.
- Inefficient loops and data structures present.
- CPI calls not always minimized.
- No specific compute unit budget enforced.
Mitigation Strategy: Rent Exemption (Solana-Specific)
Description:
- Identify All Accounts (Solana): Identify all Solana accounts your program creates.
- Calculate Minimum Balance (Solana Rent): Use
Rent::get()?.minimum_balance(account_data_len)
to calculate the minimum balance for rent exemption.account_data_len
is the Solana account data size in bytes. This is entirely Solana-specific. - Ensure Sufficient Lamports (Solana): When creating a Solana account, fund it with at least the minimum balance for rent exemption.
- Handle Insufficient Funds (Solana): If insufficient lamports, return a
ProgramError
. - Reallocation (Solana Rent): If increasing a Solana account's size, increase lamports to maintain rent exemption. Use
reallocate
and transfer lamports.
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Account Deletion (Solana Rent): (Severity: High) - Prevents Solana accounts from being deleted due to insufficient rent. This is unique to Solana.
- Data Loss (Solana Accounts): (Severity: High) - Prevents data loss from account deletion.
- Program Failure (Solana Dependencies): (Severity: High) - Prevents failures if a relied-upon Solana account is deleted.
-
Impact:
- Account Deletion: Risk reduced from High to Low.
- Data Loss: Risk reduced from High to Low.
- Program Failure: Risk reduced from High to Low.
-
Currently Implemented: (Hypothetical Project)
- Mostly. Most account creation functions ensure rent exemption.
-
Missing Implementation:
- Some older functions don't properly handle rent exemption.
- Reallocation logic doesn't always maintain rent exemption.
Mitigation Strategy: Strict Schema Definition and Account Data Validation (Solana-Focused)
Description:
- Borsh Schema (Solana Serialization): Define clear
borsh
schemas for all Solana account data structures and instruction data. Use Rust structs and enums. Borsh is the default and recommended serialization format for Solana. - Discriminator Fields (Solana Type Safety): Include discriminator fields (enums or unique IDs) to distinguish between different Solana account types or instruction variants. This is crucial to prevent type confusion attacks within Solana's account model.
- Deserialization (Solana Borsh): Use
borsh::try_from_slice
to deserialize Solana account and instruction data. - Post-Deserialization Validation (Solana Accounts): Immediately after deserialization, validate the data within a dedicated function (e.g.,
validate(&self)
).- Check discriminator field values.
- Verify field ranges.
- Ensure field relationships are consistent.
- Check any other invariants.
- Error Handling (Solana ProgramError): If validation fails, return a specific
ProgramError
.
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Type Confusion/Deserialization Errors (Solana-Specific): (Severity: Critical) - Prevents attackers from misinterpreting data intended for one Solana account type as another. This is specific to how Solana handles account data.
- Data Corruption (Solana Accounts): (Severity: High) - Ensures Solana account data validity.
- Logic Errors (Solana State): (Severity: Medium) - Reduces logic errors from invalid Solana account data.
-
Impact:
- Type Confusion: Risk reduced from Critical to Low.
- Data Corruption: Risk reduced from High to Low.
- Logic Errors: Risk reduced from Medium to Low.
-
Currently Implemented: (Hypothetical Project)
- Partially.
Borsh
schemas are defined, and deserialization is used. Discriminators are used in some cases.
- Partially.
-
Missing Implementation:
- Comprehensive post-deserialization validation functions (
validate(&self)
) are missing for many account types. Validation is ad-hoc, leading to inconsistencies. - Discriminator fields are not consistently used.
- Some older account types use custom serialization instead of
borsh
.
- Comprehensive post-deserialization validation functions (